



# Edinburgh Gazette.

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FROM TUESDAY, MAY 12. to FRIDAY, MAY 15. 1807.

DOWNING STREET, May 9, 1807.

A dispatch, of which the inclosed is a copy, has been received this day at the office of Lord Castlereagh, from Major-General Fraser, dated Alexandria, 25th March 1807, addressed to the Right Honourable William Windham.

SIR, *Alexandria, March 25, 1807.*

It is with much satisfaction I have the honour to inform you, that in the afternoon of the 20th current, the town and fortress of Alexandria, with two Turkish frigates and a corvette, surrendered to his Majesty's arms by capitulation; and they were taken possession of on the memorable morning of the 21st, by the troops under my command. You are already apprized of my having been detached on this service, with a body of troops from Messina, by his Excellency General Fox, under convoy of his Majesty's ships Tigre and Apollo; and the Wizard sloop was sent forward by Captain Hallowell, to get intelligence from Major Misset, whom I had been, by my instructions, directed to consult as to the best plan of operations for effecting the purposes of the expedition. I have now to acquaint you, that in the night of the 7th instant, (the day after we sailed), the Apollo frigate, with nineteen transports, out of thirty-three which conveyed the troops, parted company, and that the other fourteen, with the Tigre, came to anchor to the westward of Alexandria on the 16th. On our getting near the land we saw the Wizard, and Captain Palmer immediately brought me the intelligence he had received from Major Misset, together with a letter from him, stating that he had not come off himself, thinking his presence in Alexandria absolutely necessary to counteract the intrigues of the French Consul, who was endeavouring to prevail upon the Governor to admit a body of Albanians from Rosetta, to assist in the defence of the place. He earnestly recommended me to land the troops

immediately, as the inhabitants were well affected toward us, and that he had sanguine hopes we should be able to get possession of it without firing a shot.

Before I determined; however, upon this measure, I deemed it prudent to acquaint Major Misset with the very diminished state of my force; and I therefore sent my Aid-de-Camp, Captain A'Court of the 31st regiment, with a flag of truce to him, with a detailed account of it; and, at the same time, a manifesto to the Governor and inhabitants, (a copy of which I inclose), which had not the desired effect, but, on the contrary, was treated by the Governor with contempt. The Major, however, in reply, urged my immediate landing, still repeating that we should not meet with any resistance, and that my doing so would be the only means of preventing the garrison being reinforced by the Albanians, who had actually been sent for, and might be expected in the course of twenty-four hours. These considerations led me to follow his advice; and accordingly I landed that evening (the 17th) as many troops as our small number of boats could convey, a few miles to the eastward of Marabout, without opposition, though I could only take up a position for the night, as, before the next landing could be effected, such a surf had arisen on the beach, as totally to prevent the second division from approaching the shore. The next morning; however, with infinite difficulty and risk, they were landed; but finding my situation now, from the increased height of the surf, and appearance of the weather, to be very precarious, both with respect to getting stores or provisions on shore, or having any communications with the transports, I determined, at all hazards, to force my way to the western side, where I could receive supplies from Aboukir Bay; at the same time, resolv-

ing to attempt (in passing) to get into the town, even with the small force I had, and push my way, if possible, into the forts that commanded it; a matter I had reason to believe, from Major Misset and others, would not be very difficult to accomplish.

I therefore moved forward about eight o'clock in the evening of the 18th, and in our way forced a pallisaded intrenchment with a deep ditch in front of it, (that had been thrown up by the Turks, as a defence against the Mamelukes and Arabs on the western side), stretching from Fort des Bains to Lake Mariotis, strengthened by three batteries, mounting eight guns, exclusive of Fort des Bains on its right flank, mounting thirteen guns.

This we effected with very little loss; though under a heavy fire of cannon and musketry, and proceeded within a few yards of Pompey's Gate, where we found the garrison prepared to receive us, the gate barricadoed, and the walls lined with troops and armed inhabitants. This, added to the smallness of my force, (not exceeding 1000 men of all descriptions), led me to think the risk too great, and I determined to proceed to the westward, as I had originally intended, where I arrived on the morning of the 19th, and took up my position on the ground the British troops occupied in the action of the 21st, immediately sending detachments to take possession of Aboukir Castle, and the cut between the lakes Maadie and Mariotis, by which communication the reinforcement of Albanians was expected in Alexandria: in both these attempts we succeeded.

The next day, the 20th, I sent in (by a friendly Arab that had stolen out of town and joined us) a manifesto addressed to the inhabitants, warning them of the danger of implicating friends and foes, in the event of taking the place by assault, and urging them to force

Price Sixpence.

