

INDIA BOARD, April 20, 1858.

The following Papers have been received at the East India House :—

No. 1.

The Adjutant-General of the Army to the Secretary to Government, Secret Department, Bombay.

No. 2133.

SIR, Bombay, March 9, 1858,

IN continuation of previous correspondence, I have the honour, by direction of the Commander-in-Chief, to transmit, for submission to the Right Honourable the Governor in Council, the enclosed despatch, dated the 7th ultimo, from Major-General Sir H. Rose, K.C.B., commanding the Central India Field Force, detailing the operations of the force under his command before Rathghur.

2. In submitting the despatch the Commander-in-Chief desires me to request you will bring to the favourable notice of the Right Honourable the Governor in Council the names of the under-mentioned officers and soldiers, who are specially noted by Sir Hugh Rose for their conduct on the occasion in question :—

Brigadier Stuart, Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons.

Lieutenant-Colonel Turnbull, Artillery.

Major Boileau, Madras Engineers.

Captain Forbes, 3d Regiment Light Cavalry.

Captain Lightfoot, Artillery.

Captain Hare and Lieutenant Westmacott, Hyderabad Contingent.

Lieutenant Moore, 3d Regiment Light Cavalry.

Lieutenant and Quartermaster Thompson, Artillery, Hyderabad Contingent.

Private Davies, 3d European Regiment.

I have, &c.,

EDWARD GREEN, Colonel,
Adjutant-General.

No. 2.

Major-General Sir Hugh Rose, K.C.B., commanding Central India Field Force, to the Adjutant-General of the Army.

Head-Quarters, Bombay,

SIR, Camp, Saugor, February 7, 1858.

MY report of the 31st ultimo will have informed you, for the information of his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, that the rebels had determined to defend the Fort of Rathghur, in order to prevent my force from relieving Saugor, and putting down rebellion in the Saugor and Bundelcund districts.

As I approached Rathghur, I received information of the assemblage of rebels at Oodepore, in Scindia's country, and in my front; in order to insure the safety of the siege train, which was a day's march in the rear, and not to lose time, I brought it up by a night march to my force, and adopted precautions against surprise.

In going through a pass over a range of hills, five miles from Rathghur, the officer commanding the leading flankers, embarrassed by the thick jungle, took by mistake the right instead of the left

road, as ordered, and crossing, in consequence, the river Beena by the upper, the wrong ford, got into a skirmish with the rebels posted in the suburbs of Rathghur. I had just arrived with the advance guard at the encamping ground; to extricate the flankers from a position so unfavourable to cavalry, I advanced and covered, with infantry, guns, and supports, their return to their proper position. In rectifying this mistake I had gained a good deal of ground to the right front, and a company of the 24th Native Infantry had taken, with spirit, one or two houses and gardens. On reconnoitring, I found that they were the commencement of the suburbs, and that to keep all this would compromise my right, and plan of attacking the fort from the left flank; I therefore ordered the troops back to their camp.

The next day I made, with Major Boileau, commanding engineer, and a small party of the 3d Europeans and 3d Light Cavalry, under Captain Forbes, a complete reconnaissance of eighteen miles of the whole country round the rock of Rathghur.

I ascertained that the rock, one and a half miles in length, covered and surrounded with thick jungle, slopes from the west, where it is precipitous, to the east, where it is accessible. The north front of the fort was the only one which was habited; the other fronts were merely fortifications. The river Beena was under the west face.

The reconnaissance confirmed in all essentials the information on which I had formed my plan of attack; I carried it out, by investing the same evening the rock of Rathghur, as clearly as the great extent, hills, thick jungle, and a difficult river would allow me; but it was impossible, unless with a very much larger force than my own, to invest completely such ground, because a great part of it is dense jungle, which, hiding all view of the enemy's motions, enable him by a feint to concentrate the videttes and pickets on one point and then pass through the vacuum.

Sir Robert Hamilton had had the goodness to place at my disposal 600 or 700 troops of all arms of the Regiment of Bhopal, and I had requested their commander to invest the south-west of the fort, as being nearest to their country, and to take the village of Paltun, which they did with alacrity after firing a few shots.

The next day, as soon as the officers commanding the Artillery and Engineers had reported that they were ready for the siege, I attacked the fort from the left, at the south-west end of the rock, under cover of feint from the right, against the town, from which all possible advantage was to be derived.

Both succeeded.

Leaving a troop of the 3d Light Cavalry at the foot of the slope to cover our rear, accompanied by Captain Forbes, commanding the 3d Light Cavalry, who is always as zealous as he is useful, I mounted, with the troops in the margin,* under the com-

* Lieutenant-Colonel Liddell commanding 3d Bombay European Regiment; detachment of siege train, under Lieutenant Mallock; two 18-pounders, 16 men Bombay Artillery; two 5½-inch mortars, ten men Bombay Artillery; 90 Madras Sappers and Miners, two 6-pounder guns, Artillery Hyderabad Contingent, one troop, 3d Light Cavalry, under Captain Forbes.