former withdrew by order, but the latter was maintained with great spirit by the Chasseurs Britanniques. Seeing a fair opportunity of striking a blow upon the enemy, I requested Lieutenant-General Sir Edward Paget to move with the 1st and 5th divisions upon the enemy's right flank, which movement having been well executed, drove them back upon Monasterio, and our posts were replaced in Quintana Palla.

On the morning of the 21st, I received a letter from Sir Rowland Hill, of the 17th, in which he acquainted me of the enemy's intention to move towards the Tagus, which was already fordable by individuals in many places, and was likely to become so by an army.

The castle of Chinchilla had surrendered on the

9th instant.

The enemy's force in Valencia was supposed to

amount to not less than seventy thousand men, a very large proportion of which, it was expected, would be disposable for service out of that kingdom. I had desired Lieutenant-General Sir Rowland Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage; and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated, in consequence of the movements which he should find himself

under the necessity of making; I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 20th, and moved the whole army back towards the Douro.

I felt severely the sacrifice I was thereby obliged to make. Your Lordship is aware that I was never very sanguine in my expectations of success in the siege of Burgos, notwithstanding that I considered success was attainable, even with the means in my power, within a reasonably limited period. If the attack made on the first line on the 22d or the 29th had succeeded, I believe we should have taken the place, notwithstanding the ability with which the Governor conducted the defence, and the gallantry with which it was executed by the garrison. Our means were limited; but it appeared to me, that if we should succeed, the advantage to the cause would be great, and the final success of the campaign would have been certain.

I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops during the siege of Burgos, particularly with the brigade of Guards.

During the latter part of the siege the weather was very unfavourable, and the troops suffered much from the rain. The officers at the head of the artillery and engineer departments—Lieutenant-Colonel Robe, and Lieutenant-Colonel Burgoyne, and Lieutenant-Colonel Dickson, who commands the reserve artillery, rendered me every assistance: and the failure of success is not to be attributed to them. By their activity we carried off every thing in the course of one night, excepting the three eighteen-pounders destroyed by the enemy's fire, and the eight pieces of cannon which we had taken from the enemy on the night of the 19th ultimo in the storm of the hornwork. Having sent our cattle to meet the equipment expected from Santander, we had not the means of moving the latter.

The enemy was not aware of our movement, and did not follow us till late on the 22d, when ten thousand men encamped on this side of Burgos.

The British army encamped at Celada del Camino and Hornillos, with the light cavalry at Estepan and Baniel. We continued our march on the following day, the right of the army to Torquemada, the left to Cordevilla, at which places we crossed the Pisuerga.

The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear guard consisted of two light battalions of the King's German Legion, under Colonel Halkett, and of Major-General Anson's brigade of cavalry: and Major-General Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Pozo to give them support. The whole under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzon; and the party of Guerillas, heretofore commanded by the late Martinez, on the hills on the left of our rear guard.

Major General Anson's brigade charged twice with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy was detained above three hours by the troops under Lieutenant General Sir S. Cotton in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that

village.

The rear guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the Guerillas on the left having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear guard of Major General Anson's brigade, and four or five squadron's of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss, and Lieutenant Colonel Pelly, of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse shot, was taken prisoner.

The delay occasioned by this misfortune enabled the enemy to bring up a very superior body of cavalry, which was charged by Maj. Gen. Bock's and Major-Gen. Anson's brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but unsuccessfully, and our rear-guard was hardly pressed. The enemy made their charges on the two light battalions of the King's German Legion, formed in squares, but were always repulsed with considerable loss by the steadiness of these two battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently appland their conduct and that of Colonel Halkett who commanded them.

The exertions and conduct of Lieutenant General Sir S. Cotton, and of the officers and staff attached to him throughout this day, were highly meritorious, and although the charge made by the cavalry was not successful, I had the satisfaction of observing great steadiness in their movements. Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under Major Downman and Captain Ramsay, distinguished themselves.

The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Duenas and its left at Villa Muriel, and the 1st battalion 1st Guards joined us from Coruña.

battalion 1st Guards joined us from Coruña.

I halted here on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa Muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the fifth division of infantry, under the command of Major General Oswald, in the absence of Lieutenant General Leith on account of

indisposition.

I had directed the third battalion of the Royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place, but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point, that Lieut. Colonel Campbell thought it necessary to retire upon Villa Muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed M. General Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right of the fifth division. The bridge of Villa Muriel was destroyed; but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a considerable body of infantry and cavalry. I made M. General Pringle and M. General Barnes attack