

3. From the best information I was able to obtain, it appeared the intention of the enemy was to make a combined attack on Huldwanee with a view, if successful, of endeavouring to force the hill passes; my arrangements were made to act on the defensive, and there can be no doubt, had they attempted such a move, it would have ended in their utter defeat.

4. On the afternoon of the 9th instant, reliable information having been obtained that the army under Fuzul Huq was about to effect a junction with Khali Khan's force, I considered it advisable, if possible, to crush the latter before such junction could be effected. My great fear was, that the enemy might hear of my movements, and escape the impending blow, so my preparations were conducted with the greatest secrecy. At 9 P.M. of the 9th instant, nothing in camp indicated an intended move. At that hour the tents were quietly struck, and removed to the Munde, an enclosed square, barricaded and capable of being held by the force I could spare for its protection, for some time at least, against very superior numbers.

5. At 11½ P.M. I moved from camp with the troops as per margin,* and marching all night through the forest, came on the enemy's camp, at Churpoorah, shortly after day-break, on the morning of the 10th.

I found his position a strong one, about 900 yards off the road, which was commanded by his guns. His rear and left were protected by the Paha Nuddee, which wound round his camp. The only approach to his front and right flank was over rough broken ground, intersected by Nullahs, and covered with thick jungle grass and bushes; a small village filled with infantry was on his right flank. His force, from 4 to 5,000 infantry, about 1,000 cavalry with 4 guns.

6. The surprise was complete; the only portion of my force at first visible to the enemy was an advanced guard of the Rohilcund Horse, and a party of their sowars, galloping towards us, asked if we were Fuzul Huq's army, which they expected that morning to join them. Wheeling back the cavalry, I fired a few rounds, which undeceived them, and drew on us a heavy artillery fire. Directly I ascertained their position, I drew up the guns on the road, and opened on those of the enemy, and ordered Captain Ross, commanding the 66th Goorkhas (leaving two companies to protect the artillery), and Captain Baugh, commanding the Nepal Contingent and Kumaon Levies, to advance on the enemy's right flank, supported by the Rohilcund Horse, under Captain Crossman.

During this advance, the fire on our artillery was very severe, the enemy's guns being served with the greatest rapidity and precision; their largest gun was quickly disabled, and after about forty minutes of very sharp firing, during which the cavalry and infantry were gradually nearing their right, they turned their guns on them, and plied them with grape and round shot. Our guns, thus relieved from the fire of the enemy's, were enabled to commit immense execution in their large bodies of cavalry, into which they poured shrapnel with beautiful precision and tremendous effect.

7. The advance of our line was steady and uninterrupted. The enemy's infantry and cavalry, though offering opposition from every point of advantage which the nature of the ground gave them, and though they appeared in strength and fought with resolution, could not check the 66th

and Nepal Goorkhas, who gained ground, firing with a rapidity and resolution they could not withstand.

In about an hour from their first advance, the village and right flank had been gallantly carried by the infantry, who sweeping down the front, carried the guns with a rush, cutting down every artilleryman at his gun. The resistance was very severe, and I believe that with hardly an exception, every European officer in this charge had hand to hand encounters with the enemy.

The Rohilcund Horse made a gallant charge during this advance, repulsing a very superior body of the enemy's cavalry, taking a standard, and cutting up a great number. They entered the camp with the infantry, and were most useful in cutting up stragglers.

8. As from the jungly nature of the ground it was impossible for me to witness all that was going on, I called for reports from officers commanding corps, which, with a camp order issued by me on the occasion, I have the honour to forward for his Excellency's information, and have now only the pleasant duty of reporting the complete success of our operations, and bringing to the notice of the Commander-in-Chief the gallant conduct of all engaged.

9. The enemy's standing camp and baggage fell into our hands and was burnt; the whole of his ammunition was destroyed; of his guns one was completely disabled and left on the field; the other three, with four tumbrils, we brought with us into camp. Their exact loss I am unable to state; the killed must exceed 300, and the wounded more than twice that number. The loss in their cavalry must have been very heavy from the constant fire to which they were exposed.

It would have been imprudent for me to make any delay on the ground: it was quite possible that Fuzul Huq might have heard of our move, and pushed on to make an attack on this place before I could return. Our first shot was fired at a quarter to 6 A.M.; at 8 A.M. we began to move back, and reached our camp here shortly after noon, the force under my command having marched 34 miles, and fought a severe action, in 13 hours.

10. The blow thus struck must be a severe one to the rebels in this quarter, and though Fuzul Huq keeps his force together, I am watching him closely, and will attack if a favorable opportunity offers. His present position in the heart of a dense jungle renders it unadvisable to do so at present.

11. My best thanks are due to Captain Kirby, who commanded the Artillery, and to Captain W. Maxwell, of the Artillery, who having returned to his Civil duties in the Suraie Pergunnah, served as a volunteer with the guns and rendered invaluable assistance. The services of this Officer I have already brought prominently to the notice of his Excellency, and when I state that it is by his unremitting exertions the Goorkha Artillery Company was trained, that limbers were made for the guns, and that we were able to take the field with Artillery at all, I feel that the Commander-in-Chief will fully appreciate his merits. Captain Ross, commanding 66th Goorkhas, led the Regiment with great gallantry. His coolness and judgment were conspicuous, and I would beg to recommend him to the favorable notice of his Excellency. Lieutenant and Adjutant Tytler, 66th Goorkhas, severely wounded; Lieutenant Miles, 66th Goorkhas; Lieutenant Gepp, 66th Goorkhas, mortally wounded on the field and since dead, have been brought to my notice as having prominently distinguished themselves. Captain Ross also mentions the gallant behaviour

* Two 6-pounder guns, 500 rank and file 66th Goorkhas, 150 Nepal Contingent, 60 Kumaon Levies, 200 Rohilcund Horse. Total, 710 infantry, 200 cavalry, 2 guns.