

the belt of ravines, and the left front of Calpee, on the table land, immediately outside the belt.

The remainder of the 1st Brigade, facing the continuation of the belt of ravines, which took a sweep outward, and the 2nd Brigade and Hyderabad Field Force, facing the table land, or plain, stretching from Golowlee across the road from Calpee to Julalpoor, were thrown back en potence. This ground was adapted to the movements of artillery and cavalry.

My whole front was well guarded by strong out-posts, with advanced sentries in the ravines and pickets.

On the morning of the 22nd, I made the following disposition of my troops to resist the expected attack.

The pickets on the right front of Her Majesty's 86th regiment and 3rd Europeans were reinforced by the remainder of the 86th in skirmishing order; their right resting on the Jumna. In support were three guns of No 4 Light Field Battery, one troop Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons, a troop of the 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry, and four companies of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, the whole under the command of Brigadier Stuart.

The pickets of the right centre were supported by the other half of No. 4 Light Field Battery, the remainder of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, with the 21st Company Royal Engineers, the whole under Lieutenant-Colonel Robertson.

My left centre, facing the plain and the village of Tehree, was guarded by No. 1 Bombay Troop Horse Artillery, supported by two troops Her Majesty's 14th Light Dragoons.

The siege guns, two 18-pounders, one 24-pounder and two 8-inch howitzers, each of their flanks guarded by detachments of the 3rd Europeans, formed the centre, supported by the wing of Her Majesty's 71st, one squadron of the 14th, a troop of the 3rd Light Cavalry and Captain Field's Royal Artillery, 9-pounders.

The left was formed by the Camel Corps and No. 18 Light Field Battery, supported by a detachment of the Sikh Corps, the Hyderabad Field Force covering my extreme left.

Two companies Her Majesty's 88th, whose strength, although they had only been two or three days in my camp, was already much weakened by sun casualties, and four companies of the 25th Bombay Native Infantry, were left in the camp for its protection.

Shortly after 8 o'clock A.M., on the 22nd of May, the enemy, who continued their tactics of forcing my troops to fight in the heat of the day, were reported, by continued messages from my videttes and out-posts, to be advancing in great force from Calpee, and its environs, towards the belt of ravines on my right, and along the Julalpoor and Calpee road, against my left.

Their left manœuvred so skilfully that they got, under cover of broken ground, into the ravines, without being perceived on the right; and Brigadier Stuart reported to me, as I was posting the siege guns, that my right was no longer threatened.

The enemy's right, consisting of 1,300 or 1,400 cavalry, supported by several battalions of infantry, and horse artillery 9-pounders, continuing their advance along the Julalpoor road, brought their left shoulders up, when opposite the village of Tehree, in front of my centre, from whence they reinforced strongly their pickets in the ravines opposite my right centre, and deploying their guns and cavalry to the right, menaced to out-flank and turn my right. I still felt the conviction that the enemy's real object of attack was my right; and that this ostentatious display of force against my left, and the perfect stillness in the deep ravines

on my right, were ruses to mislead me and induce me to weaken my right, by sending reinforcements from it to my left, when they would have attacked with all their energy my right, endeavoured to take the mortar battery and the camp, their right falling at the same time on my left, and cutting me off in combination with their left, from the Jumna.

Whilst, therefore, I protected my left against a feint, which might become a serious attack, I did not take a man away from my right, and endeavored to catch the enemy in their own trap. I reinforced the pickets, on the left, in the first instance, with a squadron of the 14th Light Dragoons under Lieutenant-Colonel Gall, and the 3rd Hyderabad Cavalry under Captain Abbott, and afterwards directed these troops to retire slowly before the enemy, obliquely across my front, in order to conceal my heavy guns, and draw the rebel cavalry into their fire. Captain Abbott was directed, after having completed this movement, to place his regiment perpendicularly to my front, in order to be able to charge, with all his horse, the right flank of the advancing cavalry. The manœuvre succeeded partially; the rebel horse were enticed into the fire of the siege guns, which caused confusion and numerous casualties amongst them, killing, amongst others, the commanding officer of the 5th Bengal Irregulars. But the mutinous cavalry adhered to their system of never allowing the British cavalry to close with them, and kept carefully out of the way of the Hyderabad Horse.

To discover the enemy, who, I felt assured, were concealed in the ravines in front of my right, I had ordered a company of the 3rd Europeans to be pushed some hundred yards forward, in front of my outposts, into this network of ambushes. The 3rd Europeans, after advancing some distance, found the rebel host crouched in their lair, and started them from it. In an instant, a serious and general engagement began along the whole line from the Jumna to the village of Tehree; the belt of ravines in front of my position, becoming enveloped in smoke and fire, the sepoys rose out of their hiding places in thick chains of skirmishers, advancing and firing heavily, followed by large supports and columns *en masse* at a distance. All my guns opened on the advance of the rebels; and the supports closed up to their threatened fronts.

I was watching the determined attack on the centre of my position, from the left of the village of Tehree, and at the same time their movements towards my right and left, when I heard a slackening of our fire on the right. I instantly sent an enquiry to Brigadier Stuart, whether he would wish to be reinforced by half of the camel corps; he replied that he should be very glad to have them; directly afterwards, Brigadier Stuart's fire became fainter and fainter, and that of the enemy heavier. I understood that my right, the key of my whole position, was in danger, and instantly proceeded myself to its assistance with the whole of the camel corps at their best pace. On the way, I met an orderly coming to me at full speed, from Brigadier Stuart, asking for further reinforcements. I knew that they were required, for the enemy's fire now came from within our position. The camel corps, under Major Ross, having reached the foot of the rising ground, on which were the mortar battery and the three 9 pounders, and dismounted, went up the rise in line at the double, in perfect order.

The situation of Brigadier Stuart's position was very critical. Volleys of musketry, which killed or wounded every horse of my Staff but one, were coming over the crest of the rising ground from the sepoy troops, who had debouched, and were