

might be absolutely necessary to preserve the peace and to supply the drain for Hindoostan. The Chief Commissioner felt the expediency of preventing as far possible the Punjabees from seeing that the physical force in the country was on their side, or from feeling that they were the right arm of the British power. The aggregate of the Punjab forces, old and new, stands as follows in round numbers:—

Old Force (including organised Police) -	24,815
New Force -	34,000
	58,815

These troops are not, however, mostly Sikhs, nor do they belong to one or two prevailing castes or tribes, but are drawn from a variety of races (though chiefly comprised within Punjab limits), differing in religion, birthplace, habits, and dialects, as will be seen from the following abstract, which does not include the military police:—

Christians.	Sikhs.	Mahomedans.	Hillmen.	Hindoos mixed.	Hindoostanees.
16	13,344	24,027	2,203	5,336	2,430

Under the head of Mahomedans many tribes are embraced having little in common except religion. Many of these are utterly aliens to the Sikhs as to the Hindoostanees, and have proved during the second Punjab war, and on previous occasions, that they could be depended on to fight against the Sikhs.

18. After the military arrangements, one of the first precautionary measures was the strengthening of the ordinary police, and the occupying of all the ferries and principal passages of the Punjab rivers. It was felt that these great streams, which, traversing the country north and south, severed the Punjab from Hindoostan, afforded peculiar facilities for preventing ingress and egress; so a strict embargo was placed upon all suspicious travellers who could not give a proper account of themselves; and especially upon faqueers and other mendicants of a quasi religious character.

19. So difficult did it soon become for seditious characters to pass unchallenged through the country, that the public post was unavoidably resorted to by the disaffected for treasonable communications. But a strict surveillance was instituted over all postal despatches. Native letters were opened and examined by responsible British officers. In this way many important and interesting documents came to light, which, though cautiously and even enigmatically worded, yet served to indicate clearly the tendency of native opinion.

20. Another matter of urgent consequence was the protection of the large quantities of treasure in the various districts. The local officers at outlying stations were accordingly ordered to collect their treasure, and to send the bulk of it to stations where European guards could be obtained,

and on no account was any considerable sum to be retained anywhere, except at places where European troops were cantoned. Bullion was as much as possible to be kept inside fortifications, a small portion only being sent outside, so as to suffice for daily expenditure. These orders were generally executed with promptness and efficiency, and the result was satisfactory. From first to last the loss of treasure in these territories did not amount to a lakh of rupees, 10,000*l.*, and much even of this might have been saved, if the orders had in every case been strictly carried out.

21. Wherever the condition of a district might be critical, or disturbance threatened, stringent measures were adopted in the criminal department. It was felt that in such cases the punishment must be exemplarily prompt, and severe to the last degree. Authority was given that any two civil officers sitting in commission, should summarily try persons charged with offences directed against the state, or endangering the public safety, and should execute capital sentences without further references. In many localities, exposed to evil influences, the speedy justice done those offenders had a repressive and deterring effect; but the Chief Commissioner was among the foremost in urging severity upon all offenders of whatever class, while the State was menaced with dangers, and while the strongest measures were necessary to turn in our favour the balance already borne down by the weight of opposing circumstances. There was no room then for mercy; the public safety was then a paramount consideration. In these terrible days he was obliged to telegraph injunctions for the extermination of the mutineers, by the various means at our disposal, by slaying them in fight, by raising the people against them, by offering rewards for their seizure, by driving them on to destruction in the swollen rivers, in the hills and jungles. At that juncture these measures were as necessary as they were just, when the awful crimes which these mutineers had either perpetrated or meditated, and the dangers they had brought upon the empire, are considered. But at a time of success and victory, when once more we can breathe freely, when we are relieved from the pressure of imminent peril, the Chief Commissioner has deemed it his duty to advocate a merciful and considerate discrimination. We must, indeed, pursue to the last the leaders of treason, and the actual perpetrators of hideous crime. There can be no forgiveness for them on this side the grave. But having, by judicious inquiry, separated those whose guilt is secondary, whose offences, though legally punishable with death, are yet free from the blacker hues,—for these we must, in the Chief Commissioner's opinion, mitigate punishment, extend mercy, and even offer amnesty. Even if it were morally right to be inexorable towards every class of offenders, it certainly would not be practicable; even the might of British power could hardly effect this; we could not well afford to assign the number of European troops which would be requisite to conduct a guerilla warfare over a wide tract of territory and an indefinite space of time. In important classes of cases we may now proffer pardon with a good grace, without any risk of clemency being mistaken for irresolution; and thereby we may relieve our overburdened resources from a task devoid of advantage and arduous of performance. If punitive operations are too long protracted, the popular mind continues in that ferment which renders complete pacification of the distracted districts, impossible. We cannot war with large sections of the population; we must remember that they are our people; our erring