

recognizing in the event the hand of a Higher Power.

27. It will now be proper to make further reference to the moveable column already mentioned. That column had been greatly reduced in force by the recall of one of its European regiments to strengthen Peshawur, and by the onward advance of the guides, the 4th Sikhs and the Kumaon Battalion to join the army before Delhi. Brigadier General Chamberlain had moved with the column to Wuzcerabad, on the left bank of the Chenab. Here it was arranged that the column should be augmented by troops from Sealkote, namely, Her Majesty's 52nd, the European artillery, the 35th Native Infantry, and half the 9th Light Cavalry at Sealkote; there were thus left the 46th Native Infantry, and the remaining wing of the 9th Light Cavalry. It was necessary to take the European force from Sealkote to join the column. The native troops at Sealkote had behaved well since the commencement of the crisis. The brigadier commanding, and the officers, expressed entire confidence in the men, but still it was not thought safe to leave the whole brigade at the station alone without Europeans. When, therefore, the European force was unavoidably withdrawn, a large portion of the native troops accompanied them, so that only a comparatively small number were left at the station. It had more than once been contemplated to disarm every sepoy regiment in the Punjab. But the Chief Commissioner found that this could not in all cases be successfully carried out. He indeed knew, but too well, that every one of these corps was rotten to the core. Many of them, still, however, preserved the appearance of fidelity, and avoided the least overt manifestation that might justify extreme measures. There was a hope that if Delhi were to fall speedily, a reaction of loyalty among these regiments would set in. But the chief difficulty was this, that in many places the disarming could not be carried through in such force as to prevent the men from escaping by flight; and it was of great consequence that the numbers of the Delhi mutineers should not be swelled by the accession of such fugitives. Under these circumstances, it was arranged that the moveable column should range about within a certain circle, ready to sweep down upon any station on the first alarm. But notwithstanding this precaution, the Chief Commissioner kept the policy of disarming constantly in view; and it will now be seen that necessity soon arose for carrying out that policy in other cases besides those already recounted.

28. Early in July, the 14th Native Infantry, at Jhelum, showed symptoms of uneasiness. Whereupon the detachment of Punjabee Military Police at that station was strengthened, some mounted levies were sent there to overawe the sepoys, and two companies of the 14th Native Infantry itself were ordered on special duty to Rawul Pindee, so as to separate and weaken the regiment. Matters growing worse, it became necessary to act at once, though action was difficult. There were no Europeans whatever at Jhelum. The only available European troops were 500 infantry, and six guns with European artillerymen at Rawul Pindee, 75 miles off. But at that station there was the 58th Native Infantry and two companies of the 14th. Jhelum, however, was an important place, situated on right bank of the river of that name, and commanding the grand trunk road between Lahore and Peshawur. A successful disturbance there would have cut the Punjab into two halves. The Chief Commissioner, therefore, resolved with the scanty European force at Rawul Pindee to disarm the sepoys

both at that station and Jhelum. About half the Rawul Pindee force, that is, 280 Europeans of all arms, were sent to Jhelum to disarm the main body of the 14th Native Infantry. The sepoys, however, resisted desperately, and were with great difficulty overpowered. After a regular fight during the day, they fled in the night; four hundred of them were killed in the fight and pursuit, or seized and executed. About 200 escaped into the neighbouring Jummo territory, but were subsequently given up by the Maha Rajah Golab Singh. These men, however, having received from the officer of the Maha Rajah a promise that their lives should be spared, that promise was kept by the British officer, and they were transported beyond the seas. At Rawul Pindee, the 58th Native Infantry and the remainder of the 14th quietly surrendered their arms, excepting a few men who endeavoured to escape and were intercepted.

29. Immediately upon hearing of the outbreak at Jullundur, the Chief Commissioner deemed it absolutely necessary to disarm the two Native Infantry regiments at Mooltan, one of which (the 69th) had, in particular, evinced a bad spirit. There were at that time some sixty European artillerymen in the Fort. There was no European infantry; but a regiment had been ordered thither by the Supreme Government, which was coming up the Indus by detachments. The first of these detachments was expected to arrive in about ten days: Time, however, in respect to disarming these two Native Infantry corps was of the last importance; if they should hear of the Jullunder mutiny, they might rise. If we were to lose Mooltan, all the Southern Punjab would be lost with it; and the only line of communication then open, namely, that to Bombay, would be closed. Besides the sixty gunners, there were the 1st Irregular Cavalry, all Hindoostanees; the 1st Punjab Cavalry, partly Punjabees, and partly Hindoostanees; the 2nd Punjab Infantry, nearly all Hindoostanees; a few men of the Local Police Battalion, and a Hindoostanee troop of Horse Artillery, with six guns. These troops aggregated about 1,200 available men; from their composition they could hardly be implicitly relied upon, and it was doubtful whether the 1st Irregular Cavalry would prove staunch. The Chief Commissioner, however, decided that, even with these doubtful means, an attempt must be made to disarm the Native Infantry corps before the news of the Jullunder outbreak should reach Mooltan. The Chief Commissioner accordingly telegraphed his suggestions to that effect to General Gowan, at Lahore, and begged that the task might be entrusted to Major Crawford Chamberlain, commanding the 1st Irregulars. The General was good enough to comply with this request, and invested Major Chamberlain with the command of all the irregular troops at Mooltan for this purpose. The disarming was effected in a masterly manner, and the conduct of the Irregulars was quite satisfactory. Too much credit cannot well be given to Major Chamberlain for his coolness, resolution, and good management on this trying occasion. So delicate was the task, that the Chief Commissioner believes that if it had devolved on the officer commanding at Mooltan, or upon any officer at the station other than Major Chamberlain, there would have been a failure. As the result of failure would have been calamitous, so the result of success was most favourable; indeed the disarming at Mooltan was a turning point in the Punjab crisis, second only in importance to the disarmings at Lahore and Peshawur. Shortly afterwards, on the 17th June, the first detachment of the Bombay European Fusiliers arrived