

crossed. Many fled in various directions, and the remainder took refuge in a large island, where they were subsequently attacked and destroyed. The fugitives were seized and shot. Some escaped into the Jummoo territory, and were for the most part given up to meet a similar fate.

35. It is now time to mention certain operations set on foot from the Punjab for the recovery and pacification of certain parts of the Delhi territory. When Delhi fell, emissaries from the king and the mutineers were despatched to Hurriannah, to stir up the Light Infantry Battalion quartered at Hurriannah, Hissar, Hansee, and Sirsa. These evil messengers were but too successful; the Hurriannah Light Infantry rose, and the Mahomedan population of those parts followed their example. The country, is sandy, sterile, bleak; in parts jungly. The season was inclement, and our officers had but scanty means of escaping from their awful position. Many of the Europeans at these stations were murdered; but many also, aided by some of the country people, saved their lives by flight, enduring great hardship. Thus the revolt spread to Ferozepore frontier, and to the bank of the Sutlej; there was fear that, unless we should repel the enemy from our threshold, the mischief would spread across the Sutlej and into the Ferozepore district. Therefore a force, composed chiefly of new levies, two companies of the Mooltan Police Battalion, and a troop of mounted police, were hurriedly collected and placed under General Van Cortlandt, who had belonged formerly to the Sikh army, and had served with Lieutenant-Colonel Edwardes in the second Punjab campaign, and was at that time Deputy Commissioner of Goo-gaira. With this force General Van Cortlandt started to reconquer Hurriannah. After crossing the Sutlej he received some assistance from the Maha Rajahs of Puttiala and Bikaner. After beating the rebels on several occasions, he ultimately reoccupied these districts. Indeed, it is well known how successful General Van Cortlandt was, and how by his prudence, temper, and good management, he justified the trust that had been reposed in him.

36. After the action with the Sealkote mutineers, matters remained tolerably quiet in the Punjab for a short time. The violence of the mutiny had burnt itself out. Many mutineers had been destroyed, though some escaped to Delhi. The remainder had been mostly disarmed. But soon the disarmed brigade at Lahore began to heave with a mutinous impulse. Before it could be ascertained what kind of mischief was brewing one of the regiments, the 26th Native Infantry, suddenly rose, murdered their commanding officer, Major Spencer, the serjeant-major, and two native officers, and decamped. Hearing that the men were bent on evil, Major Spencer had gone to their lines to pacify and restrain them. There he fell, a victim of generous, though misplaced, confidence in sepoys, with whom he had served, and for whom he had laboured and cared, for thirty years! The regiment then fled, but through some misapprehension, were not pursued until it was too late. They did not make for the Beas or Sutlej to go to Delhi, probably because they knew that the ferries were guarded. But they went northwards, and attempted to cross the Ravee, and so escape into the Jummoo territories. But the country people and the police got news of their flight, and collected to attack them near the river. Many were killed, and the remainder were forced to take refuge in an island. Here they were seized by Mr. F. Cooper, Deputy Commissioner of Umritsur, and put to death the following morning.

37. The other disarmed troops at Lahore, two infantry regiments and one cavalry, were then marched out of their lines, and encamped in front of the European barracks, and within range of the guns.

38. By this time, that is, the commencement of August, war and sickness had sadly thinned the ranks of our gallant soldiers before Delhi. On the one hand, while the numbers of the mutineers had been swollen by large reinforcements from Neemuch, Bareilly, Jhansee, and Mhow, on the other hand the succours despatched from the Punjab barely enabled our army to maintain its position on the ridge before Delhi. By August it became clear that assistance from below was hopeless. Therefore General Wilson wrote to the Chief Commissioner that unless he should be largely reinforced from the Punjab, he would not be able to hold his own position, much less to assault the town. It then became a serious question as to what was the proper policy to pursue. The Chief Commissioner had to consider whether the field force before Delhi should be reinforced at all hazards; or whether further assistance should be withheld, and an effort made to hold the Punjab with our remaining means. There were then in the Punjab nearly seven corps of European Infantry; five were regiments previously in the province, one, the Bombay Fusiliers, had recently arrived, and the seventh consisted of 250 men of Her Majesty's 8th, and a wing of Her Majesty's 61st. Of these three were in the Peshawur Valley, but so prostrated by sickness that they could not muster much more than 1,000 bayonets. One regiment held Lahore; one held Mooltan and Ferozepore; one furnished the detachments to hold Rawul Pindee, Umritsur, and Jullunder. There remained one corps composing the moveable column. There were from 800 to 1,000 European artillerymen. The sick and ineffective at Peshawur being deducted, there were at that juncture not more than 4,700 effective Europeans. Many of the new Punjab regiments had been organised, disciplined, and fairly drilled. Such were the available means. But with these not only was the Punjab to be held, but there were also some 18,000 Hindoostanee troops to watch and guard; and of these nearly 6,000 were armed. This large body of suspected and dangerous men was a sad incumbrance, and shackled every movement.

39. The decision of the question as to whether the army before Delhi should be reinforced or not, rested with the Chief Commissioner. After full reflection, he resolved that, come what might, our comrades before Delhi should not be abandoned. He felt that the advance on Delhi had, in the first instance, been made mainly upon his urgent solicitations. He saw that if the army before Delhi were now to fall back, it would probably be deserted by all the native troops that were with it. Such an example would probably be followed by all the Punjabee troops in the Punjab itself, and then the whole province would certainly rise. In that extremity, the only chance for the British of preserving even existence, would have been to collect the European troops into one solid mass. But even at this period (the early part of August) things had gone so far, that very possibly it would be found that the time for such concentration had gone by; and, even if it could be effected, still there was much doubt whether the combined mass of British could be strong enough to hold its own, encumbered as it would be by large numbers of women and children, and distracted by the discordant counsels which so surely follow disaster.

40. On every view of the question it seemed to