

in favour of the Poles. In every considerable State where there exists a national representation,—in England, in France, in Austria, in Prussia, in Italy, in Spain, in Portugal, in Sweden, in Denmark,—that sympathy has been manifested. Wherever there is a National Administration, the Administration has shared, though with prudence and reserve in expression, the feelings of the legislature and the nation.

Russia ought to take into account these sympathies, and profit by the lesson which they teach.

3. Prince Gortchakoff lays much stress on the fact, which cannot be denied, that “the insurgents demand neither an amnesty, nor an autonomy, nor a representation more or less complete.”

But it would be a mistake to suppose that in cases of this kind there are only two parties, viz., the Government occupied in suppressing the insurrection, and the leaders of the insurgents busy in fomenting and extending it. Besides these parties there is always in such cases a large floating mass who would be quite contented to see persons and property secure under a just and beneficent Administration. The confidence of this great mass has not been obtained, and their continued inaction can hardly be depended upon.

Her Majesty's Government must again represent the extreme urgency of attempting at once the work of conciliation which is so necessary for the general interest.

In profiting by the loyal and disinterested assistance which is offered her by Austria, France, and Great Britain, the Court of Russia secures to herself the most powerful means towards making ideas of moderation prevail in Poland, and thus laying the foundations of permanent peace.

4. In referring to the Treaty of Vienna, Prince Gortchakoff says that “we should not be far from the truth if we affirmed that the 1st Article of the Treaty of Vienna was prepared by and directly emanated from His Majesty the Emperor Alexander I.”

Her Majesty's Government readily admit the probability of this supposition. In 1815, Great Britain, Austria, France, and Prussia would have preferred to the arrangement finally made, a restoration of the ancient Kingdom of Poland as it existed prior to the first partition of 1772, or even the establishment of a new independent Kingdom of Poland, with the same limits as the present kingdom.

The great army which the Emperor Alexander then had in Poland, the important services which Russia had rendered to the Alliance, and, above all, a fear of the renewal of war in Europe, combined to make Great Britain, Austria, and Prussia, accept the arrangement proposed by the Emperor Alexander, although it was, in their eyes, of the three arrangements in contemplation, the one least likely to produce permanent peace and security in Europe.

But the more Her Majesty's Government see in the decision adopted the prevailing influence of Russia, the more they are impressed with the conviction that the Emperor of Russia ought to be, of all Sovereigns, the most desirous to observe the conditions of that arrangement.

It would not be open to Russia to enjoy all the benefits of a large addition to her dominions, and to repudiate the terms of the instrument upon which her tenure depends.

In stating these terms Prince Gortchakoff says that the only stipulation which can have made it appear doubtful that the Emperor of Russia possessed the Kingdom of Poland by the same title as that by which he holds his other possessions, the only one which could make his rights dependent

upon any condition whatever, is contained in two passages, which he proceeds to quote.

But there is another passage which he does not quote. It is found in the beginning of the 1st Article, and says :—

“The Duchy of Warsaw, with the exception of the provinces and districts which are otherwise disposed of by the following Articles, is united to the Russian Empire, to which it shall be irrevocably attached by its Constitution, and be possessed by His Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, his heirs and successors in perpetuity.”

Were not a national representation intended by this Article it would have been sufficient to say, “to which it shall be irrevocably attached,” without any mention of a Constitution.

It is, therefore, evident that the Constitution is the link by which Poland was connected with Russia. It is important to know what this Constitution was which united Poland and Russia. It was not prescribed by the Treaty; it was not promulgated by the European Powers; its construction was left entirely to the Emperor Alexander: but nevertheless, when once promulgated, it must be taken to be the Constitution meant by the framers of the Treaty of Vienna.

It was for this reason that Her Majesty's Government proposed as the second of the six points laid before the Government of Russia, “national representation with powers similar to those which are fixed by the Charter of the 14th November, 1815.”

5. Passing to the specific propositions of Her Majesty's Government, Prince Gortchakoff says in regard to the six points, that the greater part of the measures which were pointed out by the three Powers “have already been either decreed or prepared on the initiative of our august Master.”

Towards the end of the despatch an allusion is made to “the measures which His Majesty adheres to, both in the germs already laid down, and in the development of them which he has allowed to be foreseen.”

This passage, though far from being a definite assurance either of a national representation with efficacious means of control, or of a national administration, gives some hope that the Emperor Alexander will ultimately listen to the inspirations of his own benevolent disposition and to the counsels of Europe.

The proposal of a suspension of hostilities is rejected “in justice to the Emperor's faithful army, to the peaceable majority of Poles, and to Russia, on whom these agitations impose painful sacrifices.”

The proposal of a Conference of the Powers who signed the Treaty of Vienna is rejected, and with it the prospect of an immediate and friendly concert.

In the place of this fair and equitable proposal, the Russian Cabinet suggests that the three Powers who proposed the separate Treaties between Austria and Russia, and Prussia and Russia, previously to the General Treaty of Vienna, should meet together, and that France and Great Britain should be afterwards informed of the result of their deliberations.

There are two reasons, either of which would be sufficient to condemn this suggestion :—

1. The Treaties in question, taken apart from the provisions inserted in the General Treaty of Vienna, have reference only to material objects,—the use of the banks of rivers, the regulations for towing paths, the free passage of merchandize from one province to another, and such other matters of convenience and of commerce. No