

*CASUALTY RETURN of the Troops under the Command of Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan,
Commanding Left Piquet on the 26th October, 1863.*

	Killed.				Wounded.			Mules.		Remarks.	
	European Officers.	Native Officers.	Sergeants and Havildars.	Rank and File.	Native Officers.	Sergeants and Havildars.	Rank and File.	Killed.	Wounded.		
Detachment 71st Highland Light Infantry	1	...	1	4	1 Private wounded with Lieutenant-Colonel Vaughan; the other casualties on "Eagle's Nest" Piquet.	
101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers	2	On "Eagle's Nest" Piquet.	
Huzara Mountain Battery	1	...	2	...	1	With Lieut.-Colonel Vaughan.	
3rd Punjab Infantry	...	1	...	2	1	On "Eagle's Nest" Piquet.	
5th Ditto ditto	3	5	1	...	With Lieut.-Colonel Vaughan.	
6th Ditto ditto	2	9	5	2	40	...	Ditto Ditto	
20th (Ditto ditto), Native Infantry	1	1	...	8	1	...	27	On "Eagle's Nest" Piquet.	
Total	...	2	1	2	23	7	3	81	1	1	

(True Copy).
(Signed) T. WRIGHT, Major,
Assistant Adjutant-General.

(Signed) J. L. VAUGHAN, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding Left Piquet.

From Brigadier-General Sir N. Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, to the Adjutant-General, Head Quarters,—(No. 5, dated Camp, Crest of the Umbeyla Pass, the 31st October, 1863.)

HIS Excellency the Commander-in-Chief will recollect that, in my letter No. 3 of the 25th instant, I mentioned that the people of Bonair had applied to the Akhoond of Swat to aid them in resisting the advance of the force, and stated my opinion that, in the event of his doing so, the object with which the force had adopted the route of the Chumla Valley would of course be rendered very difficult of attainment. I have now to report that the Akhoond has actually joined the Bonairs and that he has brought with him upwards of 100 standards from Swat,—each standard representing, probably, from 30 to 40 footmen,—and, it is said, 120 horsemen. Besides the tribe with which he is more immediately connected, viz., the Swatees, he has summoned the people of the remote country of Bajour (on the border of the Cabul territory) the Mullazyes of Dheer, under their Chief Ghuzzun Khan; and other distant tribes whose names even are hardly known except to the officers who have served long on the frontier. There is, in fact, a general combination of almost all the tribes, from the Indus to the boundary of Cabul, against us. Old animosities are for the time in abeyance, and, under the influence of fanaticism, tribes usually hostile to each other are hastening to join the Akhoond's standard, and to fight for the sake of their common faith. The Akhoond has hitherto been opposed to the Sitana Moulvie, who represents an exceptional sect of Mahomedans; but at present the two are understood to be on friendly terms, and it is certain that the whole of the Hindoostanee Colony are either at, or on the way to, Umbeyla.

2. It is necessary that I should place the state of affairs thus distinctly before his Excellency, in order that he may understand how entirely the situation has altered since the force entered the

Umbeyla Pass, and that instead of having to deal with the Mahabun Tribes, with a view to the expulsion of the Hindoostances from that mountain, we are engaged in a contest in which not only are the Hindoostances and the Mahabun Tribes (including even some Judoons and Khodakhails) accessories, but also the Swatees, the Bajourees, and the Indus tribes north of the Burrendo, with a large sprinkling of the discontented and restless spirits from within our own border. I feel certain that his Excellency will approve of my not making an advance into the Chumla Valley with my present force, in the face of the above coalition. I could only do so by giving up the Umbeyla Pass. If the force moved into the Valley, with a view to continue its advance towards the Mahabun, and to carry out the original views of the Government, it would be exposed to the enemy's incessant attacks, both by night and day, in flank and rear, and it would be impossible, in the face of such numbers, to protect adequately a long line of laden animals to which would be daily added an ever increasing number of wounded and sick. On the other hand, if the force merely moved into the Valley with a view to take up a position in open ground, it would still lose its communication with the rear, and whenever it required fresh supplies of provisions or ammunition, or to clear the camp by sending sick and wounded to the rear, it would have to re-take the Pass, and to re-occupy, at great sacrifice of life, the very ground from which it had advanced. Further, I have felt it right not to forget, that if this force should be seriously compromised by a hazardous movement in advance, there are not, within a very great distance, the troops necessary to meet any difficulty which would be certain, under such an eventuality, immediately to arise, either within or beyond the border. In fact, my judgment tells me that, with our present numbers the only way to uphold the honour of our arms, and the interests of the Government, is to act on the defensive, in the position the force now holds, and trust to the effect of