

time, and of the discouragement which repeated unsuccessful attacks are likely to produce upon the enemy, to weaken their numbers, and to break up their combination.

3. The first result of the combination between the Akhoond and the Moulvie was an attack upon the right piquets of the camp, early yesterday morning, by the Hindoostanees, and an almost simultaneous attack upon the front of camp by the Swatees. The front attack was repulsed under my personal superintendence, without difficulty, by the good practice of the Artillery under Captain Tulloh, and the fire of Her Majesty's 71st Highland Light Infantry, and the 101st Royal Bengal Fusiliers, which lined the breastworks, under Colonel Hope, C.B., and Lieutenant-Colonel Salusbury respectively. Some of the enemy behaved with considerable boldness, and afforded an opportunity for the 5th Goorkha Regiment to make a spirited charge. They left 40 dead bodies on the ground, which have been recognised as men from Swat and Ranezye, and must have lost heavily in addition, though according to custom they carried off as many of their dead as they could. The attack by the Hindoostanees on the right was directed against the extreme right piquet, known as the "Crag" piquet. A little before daylight this piquet was attacked in force by the enemy, and its garrison driven in. It was, however, brilliantly re-taken by Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, as soon as the day broke, at a loss to the enemy of nearly 60 killed. For the particulars of this most successful affair I beg to refer his Excellency to the enclosed reports from Major C. P. Keyes, Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, and Lieutenant-Colonel A. T. Wilde, C.B., who commands the Right Defences. I feel sure that I only anticipate his Excellency's judgment in stating that I consider the re-capture of the "Crag" by Major Keyes a most brilliant exploit. The decision and determination Major Keyes displayed stamp him as possessing some of the highest qualifications of an officer, and I recommend him strongly to his Excellency's favour.

4. Major Keyes in his report brings to notice the distinguished conduct of Lieutenant Pitcher, Adjutant 1st Punjab Infantry, and of Lieutenant Fosbery, of the late 4th European Regiment, and recommends them for the Victoria Cross. I place his recommendation, in which I entirely concur, in the hands of his Excellency, and would further submit that Major Keyes himself well deserves the same distinction.

5. Major Brownlow, commanding the 20th Punjab Native Infantry, became, on the arrival of the Regiment at the ground, the senior Officer, but immediately adopted Major Keyes' suggestion that he should advance by a ridge which runs to the right of the Crag and threaten the enemy's rear. There is no doubt that this movement most materially aided the success of Major Keyes' attack in front, though it deprived Major Brownlow of the opportunity of sharing in the actual conflict at the Crag.

6. With reference to the list of Native Officers and men who distinguished themselves, given in Major Keyes' report, I have the honour to state that a Standing Committee has been formed in camp to investigate all such claims, and that its proceedings shall be forwarded as soon as practicable.

7. I enclose a Casualty Roll.

8. I think I have only to add to this report that the 14th Native Infantry joined the force on the 27th, and the 4th Goorkha Regiment, and half No. 3 Punjab Light Field Battery, on the 29th instant.

9. A copy of this report has been forwarded to

Colonel Norman, C.B., for the information of the Government.

*From Lieutenant-Colonel A. Wilde, C.B., Commanding Right Flank Piquets, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Eusufzye Field Force,—(Dated Umbeyla Pass, the 31st October, 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain, K.C.B., the enclosed reports of the successful defeats of the enemy, on the 25th and 30th of October, when they attacked the advance piquets of the Right Defence.

2. Major C. P. Keyes, Commandant of the 1st Punjab Infantry, commanded in person on both occasions, and from my knowledge of the ground and scene of their operations, and from enquiries made on the spot as soon as I could reach these piquets, I can confidently assert that his conduct and management of the troops as they successively reached him in support, mainly contributed to the signal defeat of the enemy.

3. The attack upon the "Crag" piquet, occupied as it was by the enemy in force, was, by the concurrent testimony of all the officers and men who witnessed it, a most daring and brilliant feat of arms, and to Major Keyes is due the credit of not only having planned it, but in person he led on his men to the assault with a perseverance and intrepidity never surpassed.

4. Major Keyes was gallantly supported by Lieutenant Fosbery, of the late 4th European Regiment, and his Adjutant, Lieutenant H. Pitcher, and I trust that the Brigadier-General will deem the conduct of Major Keyes and his officers deserving of a recommendation to his Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, for the reward of gallantry so highly prized by an officer serving in Her Majesty's Forces.

Major C. P. Keyes and Lieutenant Pitcher were both wounded in the assault on the piquet.

*From Major C. P. Keyes Commanding 1st Punjab Infantry, Punjab Irregular Force, to the Assistant Adjutant-General, Eusufzye Field Force,—(Dated Camp, Umbeyla Pass, the 31st October, 1863.)*

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of Brigadier-General Sir Neville Chamberlain, K.C.B., Commanding Eusufzye Field Force, the particulars of an attack made by the enemy, on the morning of the 30th October, 1863, upon the advance piquets of the Right Defence, the whole of which were held by the 1st Punjab Infantry and a Company of the Guide Corps under my command.

2. Above the main piquets is a high rock, which I will, for reference, call "The Crag." The ascent to this is most precipitous, the path leading to its top narrow and difficult, and where the summit is reached there is but little level ground to stand upon: it was, however, necessary to occupy it, as it commanded the lower piquets, and I placed a small party of 12 men in it, as much as it could conveniently hold. About half an hour before daylight on the morning of the 30th instant, heavy firing commenced on the "Crag," and it soon appeared that the piquet was hard pressed by the enemy. I immediately detached all the men I could spare from the lower piquets in support, and accompanied by Lieutenant H. W. Pitcher, the Adjutant of the 1st Punjab Infantry, I advanced myself with about 20 picked men to their assistance, but before I could reach the top of the "Crag" my small party there had been overpowered and driven off the "rocks," though they still were holding the ground lower down the hill.