

camp where the enemy appeared to have the greatest strength.

21. The right or eastern flank of the camp was protected by a wing of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, under Major F. W. Collis, and two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery.

The other wing of the 21st Punjab Native Infantry, under Captain J. G. T. Carruthers, and the remaining two guns of No. 1 Mountain Battery, covered the rear of the camp, while the front and left flank were defended by the wing of the 72nd Highlanders, under Lieutenant-Colonel W. H. J. Clarke.

The whole of the troops in and around the camp were placed under command of Colonel Drew.

22. I directed Colonel Drew merely to hold his own until Colonel Gough had disposed of the enemy in his front.

23. This task Colonel Gough performed in a very admirable manner, as detailed in the annexed report. Dismounting part of his force he engaged the enemy, drove him up into the higher ranges of the hills, and kept him well in check until the infantry and guns arrived. Colonel Gough then assumed command of all the troops in that part of the field, retired his cavalry under cover of the infantry and artillery fire, and formed them up in the plain, ready to cover the withdrawal of the infantry when the time for doing so should arrive.

The squadron of the 10th Hussars under Major T. J. W. Bulkeley did good service on this occasion, and killed many of the enemy by their carbine fire.

The conduct of the 5th Punjab Cavalry under Major Williams was not less steady.

The guns of No. 2 Mountain Battery under Captain G. Swinley were extremely well served, and their fire was very effective.

The 28th Punjab Native Infantry, who were commanded by Lieutenant-Colonel J. Hudson, had my orders not to follow the enemy into the hills. The regiment executed to my satisfaction the duty of keeping him in check.

24. Having satisfied myself that we had completely repulsed the enemy on our north-west side, I returned to the camp and ordered Colonel Drew to carry the villages on our right and rear, from which the enemy had fired on the troops; and to burn them as a punishment to the inhabitants for having given shelter to our assailants.

25. During this operation the troops of the 5th Punjab Cavalry, under Major Stewart, which I brought with me from Colonel Gough's command, made a very effective charge on a number of the enemy, who were escaping from the rear of a village on which the infantry were advancing, and killed about twenty of them.

26. Before it was dark all the troops had been withdrawn to camp, and so completely had the enemy been beaten that they did not venture to following up our retiring troops, according to the usual Pathan custom. Indeed, from the first moment our men opened fire, it was evident that the enemy could not stand in front of our rifles.

27. In the evening I sent for the head-men of the Matun villages, and told them that they had brought this punishment on themselves; that it was my earnest desire to have avoided all bloodshed; and that they must now see the futility of attempting to withstand disciplined troops. However small the number might appear to them to be.

28. The punishment that these people have received has been severe, but the lesson was certainly needed, and I have every reason to expect that the results will be satisfactory.

The principal head-men of the valley have already come into camp, and others from more distant parts of the country are said to be on their way. In the meantime I am neglecting no means to assure the people that they have nothing to fear from us so long as they abstain from hostile acts. That, on the contrary, it is the desire of the British Government to treat the people of this country with forbearance and consideration, and that this force has entered Khost with the sole view of ousting the Government of the Amir of Cabul.

29. There is evidence that the combination against us was wide-spread, and that if a severe example had not been made of those who fought against us on the 7th instant, the ill feeling would have extended. It might, under those circumstances, have become impossible to leave any portion of my small column here. The aspect of affairs has now changed; the head-men of nearly all the neighbouring villages have come in, and the remainder are reported to be anxious to submit. This, of course, is all that is required, and Colonel Waterfield agrees with me in thinking that an adequate force could now be left here with safety, provided that the troops in the Kuram Valley are maintained in sufficient strength to keep open our long line of communication.

30. I purpose therefore to leave the under-mentioned troops in the Matun Fort at this place, viz. :—

Half a Mountain Battery.

Two troops Native Cavalry.

A regiment of Native Infantry.

31. Regarding the detailed arrangements which are necessary for the safety and supply of this detachment, I will do myself the honour to address you in a few days.

32. In conclusion I have to report that I have every reason to be satisfied with the steady conduct of the troops, notwithstanding that they were acting against vastly superior forces.

From the Brigadier-General H. Gough, C.B., V.C., Commanding Cavalry Brigade, Kuram Field Force, to the Assistant Quartermaster-General, Kuram Field Force—(Dated Camp Matun, Khost Valley, the 9th January, 1879).

I HAVE the honour to submit the following report in connection with the cavalry under my command, concerned in the affair in the neighbourhood of this camp on the 7th instant.

1. On the morning of the 7th instant, information having been received that the Mangals, Waziris, and other tribes on this frontier, were assembling in force towards the west or left front of our camp, with the intention of making a combined attack on our position, I received orders from the Major-General Commanding Kuram Field Force to send out a small party of cavalry to reconnoitre the ground from left, and ascertain the truth of the report.

2. I accordingly detached a troop, strength as per margin,\* under Major J. C. Stewart, 5th Punjab Cavalry, accompanied by Captain Carr, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, to proceed in the direction indicated. They soon sent in intelligence that the enemy was in strong force in the cluster of walled villages to our left front, generally known as "Matun," and that on the approach of our small body of cavalry they began to pour out in large numbers, and to open fire upon them; the latter having now reached a

\* 40 sabres.