

Lowe exercised a wise discretion in rallying his men.

Lieutenant-Colonel Buller, meanwhile, had posted the mounted infantry so as to fire into the flank of the retiring enemy, and the remainder of his mounted men, making for the country beyond, killed some 450 in the pursuit. Our 9-pounder guns were shortly afterwards moved from the rear and front faces of the square, and made excellent practice on the enemy retreating over the hills to the east on our left rear, and between Ulundi and the River Umvelosi.

As soon as our wounded had been attended to, and were fit to be moved, the force advanced to the banks of the stream near Ulundi, while the mounted men and cavalry swept the country beyond.

Ulundi was fired at 11.40 A.M., and the kraals of Qikazi and Umpambongwena shortly afterwards.

At 2 P.M. the force commenced to return to its camp on the right bank of the Umvelosi, which it reached about 3.30 P.M. by sunset. Every military kraal undestroyed up to this time in the valley of the Umvelosi was in flames. Not a sign of the vast army that had attacked us in the morning was to be seen in any direction.

By the statements of the prisoners attached (marked D), it would appear that nearly the whole available Zulu army was under Ketchwayo's command this day. By Mr. Fiji's statement, it would appear he considered it to be 20,000, by others it is put down at 25,000, or even more, and was larger than that assembled at Kambula; it must have been formed on a circumference of some 10 miles, vide map attached (marked E).

It appears that Ketchwayo himself arranged the disposition of the forces, and that they considered they would have no difficulty in defeating British troops if they advanced in the open, away from their wagons.

I feel I have a right in saying that the results of the battle of Ulundi, gained by the steadiness of the infantry, the good practice of the artillery, and the dash of the cavalry and mounted troops will be sufficient to dispel this idea from the minds of the Zulu nation, and of every other tribe in South Africa for ever.

It is difficult to compute accurately the loss of the Zulus on this occasion, as the extent of ground over which the attack was made, and the pursuit carried on, was so great, but judging by the reports of those engaged it cannot be placed at a less number than 1,500 killed.

The loss of the Zulus killed in action since the commencement of hostilities in January, have been placed at not less than 10,000 men, and I am inclined to believe this estimate is not too great. I regret to state that in addition to the casualties (vide Enclosure I) in killed and wounded, the Honourable W. Drummond (in charge of my Intelligence Department) is reported missing; it appears he was last seen riding alone near Ulundi, at a time when a considerable number of Zulus were still hovering about.

On the 3rd July Major Upcher, commanding the forts here, reported that Lieutenant Scott-Douglas, of the 2nd Battalion 21st Regiment, in charge of the signalling stations, had not returned here. I enclose a copy of his report (marked F).

I fear it must be considered certain that Mr. Drummond, Lieutenant Scott-Douglas, and the Corporal 17th Lancers, have fallen into the hands of the enemy.

I hope to enclose the name of the Corporal before the post closes (vide Enclosure H).

In order that my account of the battle of Ulundi may reach you with as little delay as possible,

I have taken upon myself to disregard the instructions I have received, and am sending this despatch direct, furnishing a copy to Sir Garnet Wolseley, who is with General Crealock's Division. I trust that this action will meet with your approval.

I avail myself of this opportunity to bring to your notice the names of the following officers who have specially assisted me during the recent operations in Zululand:—

Major-General E. Newdigate, C.B.
Brigadier-General E. Wood, V.C., C.B.
Colonel Drury-Lowe, 17th Lancers.
Lieutenant-Colonel Redvers Buller, C.B., 60th Rifles.

Lieutenant-Colonel Crealock, 95th Regiment, Military Secretary.

Captain W. C. Molyneux, 22nd Regiment, Senior A.D.C.

Captain E. Buller, Rifle Brigade, Commandant at Headquarters.

Lieutenant A. Milne, R.N., A.D.C.

Dr. Scott, Medical Officer in charge at Headquarters.

Colonel Bellairs, C.B., D.A.G.

Major Grenfell, 60th Rifles, D.A.A.G.

Lieutenant-Colonel East, D.Q.M.G.

Lieutenant-Colonel Harrison, R.E., A.Q.M.G.

Deputy Commissary-General Morris.

I have requested Major-General Newdigate and Brigadier-General Wood to furnish me with the names of any officers whom they themselves are anxious to bring to my notice, but it is probable that this list will not be in time to accompany my Despatch.

I feel bound to express my obligations to my Interpreter, Mr. H. W. Longeast, who has, since my first taking the field last January, always been at my side, and who, by his intimate knowledge of the Zulu character and of their country, has proved of the greatest value to me, and during the late operations afforded great assistance as a guide to the leading column.

I have, &c.,

CHELMSFORD, L.G.

A.

Message from Lord Chelmsford to Ketchwayo.

June 30, 1879.

Lord Chelmsford sends the following to Ketchwayo:—

1. If the Induna "Mundula" brings with him (1,000) one thousand rifles taken at Sandhswana, I will not insist on 1,000 men coming to lay them down if the Zulus are afraid to come. He must bring the two cannon and the remainder of the cattle; I will then be willing to negotiate.

2. As he has caused me to advance by the great delay he has made, I must now go as far as the Umvelosi River to enable my men to drink. I will consent, pending negotiations, to halt on the further (Ulundi) bank of the river, and will not burn any kraals until the 3rd July, provided no opposition is made to my advance to the position on the Umvelosi, by which day, the 3rd July, by noon, the conditions must be complied with.

3. If my force is fired upon, I shall consider negotiations are at an end, and to avoid any chance of this, it is best that "Mundula" should come to my camp to-morrow at daybreak or to-night, and that the Zulu troops should withdraw from the river and its neighbourhood to Ulundi.

4. I cannot stop the General with the Coast army until all conditions are complied with; when they are so, I will send, as speedily as possible, a message to him.