

Pass, whence the united force would make the best of their way to the Sasobai Pass, endeavouring to reach it as soon after daybreak on the morning of the 20th as possible.

11. At 5 p.m. on the 19th, the troops of my Division assembled a short distance below Ali Musjid, and taking the road by the Chura Kandao, the column marched on during the night. The night was dark, no moon till 3 a.m., and the mountain road only a pathway. At 4 a.m. the head of the column had not reached further than within half a mile of Chura.

12. Captain Tucker then reported that he had been misinformed as to the distance to Chura, and that as Bazar was still at least eight miles further, and the road to it lay through the bed of the Chura stream, which had to be forded about knee deep by the infantry constantly, there was no longer any hope of surprising the enemy at daybreak.

13. As the troops from Jumrud had already been under arms since 9 a.m. the previous day, and no advantage was to be gained by advancing any further till daylight broke, I halted there till then, and let the men get something to eat.

14. The column then moved on, passing the village of Chura, inhabited by friendly Malikdin Khels, up the bed of the river.

After passing Chura I crowned the heights on both sides of the river with flanking parties of the Goorkhas, and I sent on Lieutenant-Colonel Heathcote, with a troop of the 13th Bengal Lancers, to reconnoitre. That officer reported no signs of an enemy, so the column moved on without opposition, except a few long shots fired from the surrounding hills, and reached Wallai, the first village of Bazar, at 12.30 p.m., which was found to be deserted.

15. My first object now was to open communication with Brigadier-General Tytler, and I accordingly despatched a note to him, and was gratified before the evening to receive an answer from him, saying that, though the road he had taken had proved very difficult, he had reached the Sasobai Pass, and would effect a junction with me next day.

We then bivouacked for the night at Wallai, the usual picquets having been thrown out.

16. Captain Tucker informed me that he had offered certain terms to the Bazar people, and that he had named 9 o'clock next morning as the time at which they were to be complied with, and that, in the event of their not being complied with, he wished the troops to march at that hour and destroy the towers and villages.

17. I therefore directed the troops to parade at 9 a.m., when Captain Tucker informed me that his terms had not been complied with.

Exactly at that hour Brigadier-General Tytler, C.B., V.C., reported himself, and his opportune appearance at that hour excited in no small degree the admiration of the friendly chiefs.

I arranged with him to undertake the destruction of all towers in the village of Nekai, and any others near his position, while my force moved on the principal village of China.

18. Shortly after 9 a.m., after leaving a sufficient guard in camp, my force therefore marched for the village of China, I having sent the troop of the 13th Bengal Lancers under Major W. H. Macnaghten on a short time before by a different route to the far (west) end of the Bazar Valley, where there was a village called Halwai, with orders to cut off any one who might be driven out of China, and to destroy Halwai if possible.

This troop performed the duty entrusted to it

with great efficiency, took possession of the village of Halwai, and destroyed it.

19. On arriving at China it was found to be deserted. I therefore detached the 2nd Goorkhas, under Lieutenant-Colonel D. Macintyre, V.C., to the south of the valley, and a detachment of the Mhairwarra Battalion under Captain O'M. Creagh to the east of China.

20. In this manner every village in the valley of any importance was visited, and their towers destroyed. In all, including that of Wallai, not less than ten towers were destroyed.

This accomplished, the troops returned to Wallai, and bivouacked there again.

The enemy had everywhere escaped with all his cattle and movable property, a matter not altogether to be regretted, as the destruction of the towers and the capture of a large quantity of grain sufficiently punished them, as well as adequately marked their inability to cope with our power.

21. On the 22nd my force returned to Ali Musjid, and that of Brigadier-General Tytler to Dakka. I have not yet heard whether any opposition was offered to this officer's force, but the only resistance attempted on the road followed by my column was by a small party of Zakka Khels, who fired some shots into the column and rearguard, dangerously wounding a Goorkha, since dead, and causing our only casualty.

22. In carrying out the chastisement of the Zakka Khels, described in the foregoing, I have of course acted in strict conformity with the views of the political authorities, from whom I received every assistance, and therefore having described briefly the events so far as they came within my province, I leave it to the political officer to report to his own department the political reasons which called for the services of the troops under my command, and the political effect our visit to Bazar may be likely to cause.

23. The spirit of officers and men throughout was excellent, and I wish to favourably mention the name of Brigadier-General J. Doran, C.B., second in command, and to record the valuable assistance I received from Colonel C. M. Macgregor, C.S.I., C.I.E., of the Quartermaster-General's Department, on special service, who was with me during the expedition.

24. Annexed is as good a plan of the country alluded to in this letter as I have been able to obtain.

25. Since writing the above I have received a report from Brigadier-General J. A. Tyler, C.B., V.C., commanding the 2nd Brigade, 1st Division, Peshawar Valley Field Force.

26. Brigadier-General Tytler, in this report, No. 31, dated the 26th December, 1878, states that in compliance with orders, he marched from Dakka on the 19th instant, with a force, as per margin \* with two days' rations, for the purpose of co-operating with the force from my division in the Bazar district against the Zakka Khels. The two mountain guns and the detachment of the 27th Native Infantry had only arrived from Dundi Kotal early on the morning of the 19th, and to give the men and animals necessary rest

\* Strength of Column.—Staff, 5 British officers; No. 11-9th Royal Artillery, 1 British officers, 50 non-commissioned officers and men, 2 guns; total, 51. 1st Battalion 17th Foot, 10 British officers, 300 non-commissioned officers and men; total, 310. Sappers and Miners, 1 British officer, 41 non-commissioned officers and men; total, 42. 27th Native Infantry, 3 British officers, 263 non-commissioned officers and men; total, 266. 45th Sikhs, 2 British officers, 114 non-commissioned officers and men; total, 116. Total, 17 British officers, 768 non-commissioned officers and men, 2 guns; total, 785.