

commenced to evacuate their main and original position on the immediate right of the Khurd Kabul or Sang-i-Nawishta Pass.

While these operations were progressing, the advance on my right was being conducted in a most satisfactory manner. As previously stated, the enemy had taken up such an advanced position as to prevent the troops getting in the early part of the day within artillery range of the enemy's main position a strong opposition being offered in their immediate front by a force of infantry and artillery, represented by three banners and four Armstrong field guns.

The fire of the half battery of G-3 R. A., under the command of Major Sidney Parry, made the most excellent practice, and greatly aided the troops in their advance, and on the left outflanking movement developing itself, two companies of the 92nd Highlanders, under the command of Captain Cotton, were directed to take the hills on the extreme right, which they carried in a very dashing manner, in the face of an obstinate resistance, and it was here that the 92nd experienced all the casualties which were incurred, with the exception of two which were wounded in Captain Oxley's advance. By this movement the Kotal, from behind which a heavy artillery and infantry fire had been brought to bear during the day, was taken in flank and carried shortly after 4 o'clock; and in connection with this operation Major White brings forward the name of a native officer Jemadar Beer Sing, of the 23rd Pioneers, as being most forward in the capture of the guns; I would therefore wish to recommend him for the order of merit.

After having occupied with the 23rd Pioneers, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Currie, the crest of the rocky precipitous heights which turned the enemy's main position, and the whole of the troops were completed with ammunition from the reserve, the advance was sounded shortly after 4 o'clock p.m., and, with the exception of a few shots fired, no further resistance was offered by the enemy until we reached a point in rear of their main position, where we found our cavalry, with a few infantry, under the command of Major Hay, 92nd Highlanders (who with great readiness had pushed through the Pass in their support), checked and unable to advance owing to the rear guard of the enemy having taken up a position on the east side of the river, with a view of covering the retreat on that flank; the country, moreover, was not adapted for the action of cavalry.

I immediately brought the mountain guns into action on their position from the heights above, and at the same time directed the 23rd Pioneers and the 5th Punjab Infantry to descend into the valley at the double, and to engage the remains of the enemy's force. The artillery fire proved most effective, and, together with the the infantry advance, compelled the small remaining portion of the enemy to make a hurried retreat.

It was now getting dark, so no further advance was made, and I rested contented with holding the ground in advance by picquets and bivouacking on to the enemy's position of the morning, with my headquarters in the rear on the north side of the Pass, on the road leading into the city of Kabul, while picquets were posted on the south side of the pass, commanding the inlet thereto. While the advance was being made along the heights, which formed the second part of the operations of that day, a company of the 92nd Highlanders was directed by Major White to ascend the heights on the left of the pass, and in their hands fell without opposition twelve moun-

tain guns in addition to the four Armstrong guns taken in advance of the pass. I cannot conclude this report without expressing, for the information of the Major-General Commanding, my high appreciation of the gallant behaviour of the troops, both British and native, on this occasion. They were kept well in hand by their regimental commanders, and the fire discipline was all that could be desired.

I feel convinced that the manner in which the troops advanced clearly showed the enemy, as also the natives who accompanied the Assistant Commissioner, Hyat Khan, and who were attached to me during the day's operation, how unable they are to stand against the rapid and effective fire of our breechloaders. Such was the opinion voluntarily expressed by those natives who accompanied me.

I would wish to bring to special notice the names of Lieutenant-Colonel Clarke, 72nd Highlanders (and whose horse was shot under him in the early part of the day).

Major White, 92nd Highlanders.

Lieutenant-Colonel Currie, commanding 23rd Pioneers.

Major FitzHugh, commanding 5th Goorkhas.

Major Sidney Parry, commanding G-3rd R.A.

and—

Captain Swinley, commanding No. 2 Mountain

Battery.

Captain Hall, commanding detachment 5th Punjab Infantry, and—

Major Hammond, 5th Punjab Cavalry, who was in command of the cavalry; and—

Mohamed Hyat Khan Bahadur, C. S. I., who was attached to me as Political Officer during the day's operations.

Resaldar Bahawaldeen Khan, 11th Bengal Lancers, who was also attached to my staff, afforded me every assistance. His horse was shot under him during the action.

And the several officers of my staff, viz. :—

Captain Farwell, Brigade Major.

Lieutenant Spratt, Royal Engineers, and Lieutenant M. Smith, 3rd Sikhs, who were attached to me as D.A.Q.M.G.

And my two orderly officers—

Captain Pole Carew, Coldstream Guards, and Lieutenant Kane, 72nd Highlanders,

All of whom afforded me every assistance during the day's operations.

It is difficult to estimate the strength of the enemy actually engaged, as so large a number consisted of men from the neighbouring villages, and the city of Kabul itself. From information, however, derived from local native sources, it would appear that thirteen regular regiments were engaged, and that the number altogether opposed to us was over 1,300. They were commanded by Sirdar Nek Mohamed Khan, son of the late Ameer Dost Mohamed Khan, and he was supported by General Mohamed Kurreem Khan (Gilzai).

General Ghulam Hyder Khan (Chuckri),

General Mohamed Afzul Khan (Reaka), and

Sirdar Mohamed Zaman Khan (Governor of Khost).

Their loss in killed is estimated at about 300, in addition to a large number of wounded.

All their guns (with a large amount of ammunition) were taken, twenty in number, one being an 8-inch brass howitzer presented to them by the British Government, and a great proportion of the small arms and ammunition used against us was also presented to them by our Government.

The force under my command was composed of 1,090 British and 1,513 Native troops.