

These troops had been delayed in their march, owing to the extreme difficulties of the ground they traversed.

I communicated that evening to the Major-General Commanding, by special messenger, my exact position and intention as regards future action, and stated at the same time how desirable it would be if a force were sent to cut the enemy off the Kohistan road, our cavalry being, as I saw that afternoon, in possession of the road on the north and west leading to Bamian, Ghuzni, and Hazarat Jat. About two hours afterwards I received from the Major-General Commanding information that three regiments from Ghuzni were expected to have arrived that day to join the enemy in this position, and that the Major-General had therefore determined on reinforcing me considerably by daybreak. In reply to the communication sent by me to the Major-General, as stated above, I subsequently received a letter to the effect that he had deemed it advisable to reinforce me, as the enemy might during the night be considerably reinforced, but would also send some Cavalry and two R. H. A. guns under Brigadier-General Gough to prevent the enemy escaping by the Kohistan road.

In deferring the attack on the enemy's position until the following morning I felt it was only a choice between two evils, as I had at the time great misgivings as to the enemy remaining in their position until the following morning, but under the circumstances I had no alternative; I therefore placed picquets along my front and rear, and on the road leading to the enemy's position, and bivouacked on the spot, from which I determined at daybreak to deliver my attack. At 1:30 o'clock A.M., I directed a strong patrol, consisting of 100 men of the 23rd Pioneers under Captain Paterson, and 50 men of the 92nd Highlanders under Captain Oxley, and accompanied by Lieutenant Smith, who was attached to me as Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General, to move in the direction of the enemy's encampment, they came into contact with some few of the enemy, whom they killed, and from prisoners there taken it was ascertained that the main portion of the enemy had dispersed to their homes, and that about 800, under the command of General Mahomed Jan Khan Wardug, who had commanded on that occasion, had gone in a westerly direction, but which of the three roads they wanted to strike, viz., the Bamian, Ghuzni, or Hazarat Jat, they were unable to state; this information reached me at about 4:30 o'clock (an hour before daylight), and the first action taken by me, which was carried out forthwith, was to send a mounted native with the information to Brigadier-General Massy, who with the Cavalry force was, as mentioned before, in possession of those roads, and at the same time informed him that I would support him with infantry. About an hour subsequent to this reinforcements reached me under the command of Brigadier-General Macpherson, who, in accordance with instructions received from the Major-General Commanding, who had just arrived on the ground, proceeded with the troops under his command to advance in support of the cavalry.

The enemy's camp fell into our hands, including all their tents and camp equipage, and, in addition to this, some elephants, camels, mules, and ponies; also all their guns, which were in position, twelve in number, and the whole of the drums belonging to the three regiments.

After having made the necessary arrangements with regard to the occupation of the Sher Darwaz heights, I proceeded with the remaining troops under my command to the Head-quarter Camp, which commands the city on the south side.

The strength of the enemy opposed to me in this operation I estimated at about 1,500 regulars, and about the same number of villagers and city people; they were commanded by General Mahomed Jan Khan Wardug, assisted by General Ameer Faker Khan and Shaguzi Shah Sawan Khan.

Our troops were so disposed that, although a hot artillery fire was occasionally opened on our position, the casualties were nil. The two mountain battery guns, which were well commanded by Lieutenant Smith, silenced temporarily a certain portion of the enemy's artillery, while the infantry brought to bear on the tower at the foot of the position on the north side of the river prevented the enemy's gunners serving the two guns there placed. The gatling gun, as was the case on the 6th instant, got repeatedly jammed when in action, and its effect I may say was nil.

The signalling arrangements under the direct superintendence of Captain Stratton, 22nd Regiment, were of great service to me during the day's operations.

The amount of ammunition expended by the troops was as follows:—

2 guns mountain battery	81 rounds.
1 Gatling gun	.. the contents of one drum and a half.
72nd Highlanders	.. 672 rounds.
92nd "	.. 2,558 "
23rd Pioneers	.. 15 "

I beg to enclose a sketch of the ground executed by Lieutenant Smith, Deputy Assistant Quartermaster-General.

I have, &c.

T. D. BAKER, Brigadier-General.

#### E.

From Brigadier-General W. G. Dunham Massy, Commanding Cavalry Brigade, to Colonel Macgregor, C.B., C.S.I., C.I.E., Chief of the Staff, Kabul Field Force.

SIR, *Camp Kabul, October 11, 1879.*

I HAVE the honour to report, for the information of the Major-General Commanding, that at 9:30 A.M. on the 8th instant I received orders to turn out the Cavalry Brigade, as soon as possible, and proceed towards Deh-i-Mozund village, where a force of the enemy was reported to be encamped.

2. The troops available for this purpose consisted of one squadron 9th Lancers, two squadrons 5th Punjab Cavalry, three squadrons 12th Bengal Cavalry, and two squadrons 14th Bengal Lancers, making a total of 720 of all ranks.

3. We started at 11 A.M., and owing to the shortness of the notice, no rations and but little grain could be taken.

4. We proceeded in a northerly direction over the Siah Sung range of hills, and then to the west close under the walls of the fortified cantonment of Sherpore, which we reconnoitred and found it had been recently evacuated, and in it we discovered seventy-six guns and three howitzers of the following calibres:—4 eighteen-pounders, smooth-bore, iron; 18 field pieces, Armstrong pattern; 4 twelve-pounders, brass; 46 mountain guns, brass; 4 mountain guns, steel; 2 eight-inch howitzers, brass; 1 eight-inch howitzer, iron.

5. From this point we could see that the hill in continuation of the Bala Hissar range was crowded with the enemy, who occupied a very strong position, with guns, perfectly unassailable by cavalry, and commanding the direct road running viâ Bolund Killa over the Kotal to Deh-i-Mozund, and thus necessitating our making a considerable detour viâ the villages of Burakee,