

Vieux-Condé, Maulde, Rumegies, Baisieux, Lille, Tourcoing, Comines, Houplines, Armentières, Godewaeravelde, Ghyvelde.

ART. 2. The produce mentioned in Article 1, in order to be admitted into the territory of the French Republic, even through the above-mentioned Customs-houses, must be strongly packed, but in such a manner as to permit the necessary examination to be made, and must be accompanied by a declaration made by the sender and by an attestation by the competent authority of the country of origin to the effect:—

1. That it was taken from ground (plantation or enclosure), separated from any vine stocks by a distance of at least 20 metres (*nearly 22 yards*), or by something through which the roots cannot penetrate, and which is pronounced sufficient for the purpose by the competent authority.

2. That the ground has no vine stock in it.

3. That no vines or portions of vines have been deposited on it.

4. That, if there have been in it vines which have been attacked the Phylloxera, the same have been taken up by the roots, that processes for poisoning the insect have been repeatedly carried out during a period of three years, and that such inspections have been made as show that the insect and the vine roots have been utterly destroyed.

ART. 3. Goods seized as not having complied with the above article will be at once burnt, there and then, together with the cases in which they are packed; and the persons concerned in the infringement of the regulations will be prosecuted according to law.

ART. 4. The Ministers of Agriculture and of Finance, each as regards his own department, will see to the execution of the present Decree.

Given at Paris, August 28, 1882.

JULES GRÉVY.

By the President of the Republic:—

The Minister of Agriculture,

DE MAHY.

The President of the Council, Minister for Foreign Affairs, in temporary charge of the Ministry of Finance. E. DUCLERC.

War Office, September 8, 1882.

DESPATCHES, of which the following are copies, have been received by the Secretary of State for War from the Commander-in-Chief of the Expeditionary Force in Egypt:—

SIR,

Ismailia, August 26, 1882.

I HAVE the honour to supplement my telegraphic despatch of the 24th instant with a detailed report of the events which took place on that date in the neighbourhood of Abu-Suer and of Tel-el-Mahuta, on the Sweetwater Canal, about nine miles west of Ismailia.

A gradual, but continuous, decrease of level in the canal at this place determined me to push forward my available cavalry and artillery (very little of which had landed as yet), together with the two infantry battalions, which I had advanced to Nefiche Junction on the 21st instant, with the object of seizing and occupying a position on the canal and railway, which would secure possession of that part of the water supply of the Desert lying between Ismailia and the first cultivated portion of the Delta, which I had reason to believe was the most vulnerable to damage at the hands of the enemy.

The paramount importance of this object, as affecting all my future operations, induced me to risk a Cavalry movement with horses which had been less than two days on shore, after a long sea voyage, and also neutralized the objections, which

I must otherwise have entertained, to placing the strain of a forward movement upon the recent and partially organized supply service.

Accordingly, at 4 A.M. on the 24th, I advanced with the troops, marginally noted,* whom I placed for the day under the command of Lieutenant-General Willis, C.B., Commanding 1st Division, reached Nefiche at daybreak, and following the general line of the railway, arrived at 7.30 A.M. on the north side of the canal, at a point about midway between the spot marked El-Magfar on the map and the village of Tel-el-Mahuta.

At this point, the enemy had constructed his first dam across the canal, and after some skirmishing with his scouts and light troops, in which two squadrons of Household Cavalry charged very gallantly, I took possession of it.

From this point the enemy could be observed in force about one and a half miles further on, his vedettes holding a line extending across the canal, lining the crest of a ridge which curved round to my right flank at a general distance of about 2,000 yards from my front.

The canal and railway at Tel-el-Mahuta are close together, and both are there carried through deep cuttings with mounds of sand and earth on both sides of them. These were strongly entrenched, and crowds of men could be seen at work there.

At Mahuta the enemy had constructed a very large embankment across the railway and a wide and solid dam across the canal, which afforded him easy communication from one side to the other.

From the statement of some prisoners taken by the mounted troops, as well as by the length of front covered by the enemy, it was apparent that he was in force at Mahuta, and I could see by the smoke of his locomotives, which kept constantly reaching his position throughout the forenoon, that he was being largely reinforced from Tel-el-Kebir.

I could perceive that the enemy's force, in my immediate front, was large; I estimated it at 10,000 men and 10 guns, but I have since found that it consisted of one regiment of Cavalry, nine battalions of Infantry (about 7,000 men), 12 guns, and a large but indefinite number of Bedouins. Although I had but three squadrons of Cavalry, two guns, and about 1,000 Infantry, I felt it would not be in consonance with the traditions of Her Majesty's Army that we should retire, even temporarily, before Egyptian troops, no matter what their numbers might be. I decided, therefore, upon holding my ground until evening, by which time I knew that the reinforcements, I had sent for to Nefiche and Ismailia, would reach me. I consequently took up a position, suited to the numbers at my disposal, with my left resting on the captured dam over the canal and the Cavalry and Mounted Infantry covering the right.

It was now 9 o'clock A.M. The enemy had kept gradually reinforcing his left, showing considerable skill in the method with which he swung round his left, moving along the reverse slope of his position, and showing only his light troops upon the sky-line.

The two guns of N Battery, A Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery, only reached me at 9 A.M., although the Officer in Command had made every effort to push his way as rapidly as possible through the deep sand over which our route lay. They took up a good position on a sandy hillock near the railway embankment, from which a good view of the enemy's position was to be obtained.

* Household Cavalry, Mounted Infantry, 2 guns N | A., R.H.A., York and Lancaster, Marines.