

(Thursday) at ten o'clock, and immediately sent the "Nyanza," condenser steamer, with tents, provisions, and one hundred men of the "Northumberland" to Ismailia, as a reinforcement to Captain Fitz Roy.

3. On Friday morning, the 18th instant, Captain Fitz Roy joined me from Ismailia, and after discussion with him I gave him the accompanying orders with reference to the occupation of that place.

4. I also arranged for the occupation of Port Said by Captain Henry Fairfax, of H.M.S. "Monarch," to whom I gave the instructions appended.

5. On Friday evening I brought in two companies of the Battalion of Marines from the "Northumberland," and placed them on board the "Monarch" and "Iris."

6. M. Victor de Lesseps, who is the working head of the Canal Company at Ismailia, came on board on the 17th instant, and entered into a long discussion, presenting a series of arguments against any possible intention on our part to disembark in the canal, and disputing the grounds of my intimation that I considered Ismailia, both town and port, to be Egyptian. He left with the conviction, I feel sure, on his part, that we, sooner or later, should use the canal for a military purpose; while I had imbibed a conviction that no remonstrance on our part would induce Count Ferdinand de Lesseps to willingly accept the position, and withdraw his opposition to our doing so.

7. I considered, therefore, that to ensure the safe passage of our troops it was absolutely necessary that the barges and dredges, &c., should be occupied along the whole line of the canal to Ismailia, and further, that it was most desirable that the Kantara Telegraph Station should be seized and our through telegraphic communication be restored, while Arabi's communication with Syria should be stopped.

8. For this duty I selected Commander H. H. Edwards, of H.M.S. "Ready," as an officer thoroughly conversant with the canal, and in whose judgment I had confidence.

9. He started at eight p.m. on Saturday evening, the 19th instant, taking the necessary telegraphists, and left the parties told off for each post as he passed up.

10. At the same time I brought in the remaining three companies of the Battalion of Marines under Lieutenant-Colonel Graham, from the "Northumberland," and towards daylight transferred them to the "Ready" and "Dee," with two launches from the "Penelope," to facilitate their landing on arrival at Ismailia.

11. The "Falcon," which had just arrived from Alexandria, was sent, an hour before sunset on the 19th, to an anchorage off the coast halfway between Port Said and Gemil, and the "Northumberland" anchored during the night off Gemil Fort; the object being to check an exodus of the Arab coal-heavers from Port Said, and to create an impression that our intention was to attack that work.

12. About four o'clock a.m. on the 20th the movement was executed simultaneously along the line with complete success, the rebels being completely taken by surprise; telegraphic communication was restored between Ismailia, Kantara, and Port Said, and the Syrian telegraph was under our control. It was found, however, that the latter had been previously disconnected.

13. On your arrival in the "Helicon," about eight a.m. on the 20th, I had intended to proceed at once to Ismailia to further reinforce Captain Fitz Roy, who was exposed to the possibility of attack

by a large force of the enemy moving down on him by rail.

14. Circumstances, however, as you are aware, necessitated my remaining at Port Said to see the 1st Division of Transports into the canal, and by their entering I was precluded from going on for some time in my flag ship. When night fell, therefore, I went up to Ismailia in a picket boat and arrived about four a.m.

15. I immediately landed and joined Captain Fitz Roy, and inspected the position he had taken up. It appeared to me to have been admirably chosen, and the works thrown up for the protection of our men by Captain Stephenson's party, with the advantage of Major Fraser's, R.E., advice, to have been thoroughly satisfactory.

16. It is known that three trains full of soldiers were moved down by the rebel General from Tel-el-Kebir with the view to attempt to retake the place, but he was deterred from making an attack probably by the shell fire on Nefiche Station, and after some time spent in observation of our position, the trains ran back in the direction from whence they came.

17. I would here draw your particular attention to the effective fire maintained by the "Orion" and "Carysfort" on a position which could only be seen from the masthead of the latter at over 4,000 yards distance; a fire by which a train standing on the rails at the station was twice struck, and the carriages and trucks secured for our own uses.

18. I enclose reports from Captains Fairfax and Fitz Roy, and Commander Edwards, of their respective shares in the operation, and desire to express my sense of the judgment, zeal, and ability shown by them in the performance of the difficult and delicate duties which devolved on them.

I have, &c.,

A. H. HOSKINS, Rear-Admiral.

To Admiral Sir F. Beauchamp Seymour, G.C.B. &c., Commander-in-Chief, Mediterranean.

P.S.—My report would not be complete without my mentioning that I employed Captain Seymour, of the "Iris," on the delicate duty of securing the Canal Company's office at Port Said, and in preventing any information being conveyed through it to their other stations or to the rebels, a duty which was performed, as have all others on which I have employed Captain Seymour, entirely to my satisfaction.

H.M.S. "Penelope,"

(MEMO.) Port Said, August 18, 1882.

SOME time before daylight on Sunday morning next, you are to land the available force under your command at Ismailia, and proceed to occupy the town, which you are to hold until you are reinforced, which will probably be at the latest within 24 hours.

It is of the greatest importance that the Telegraph Offices, both of the Canal Company and the Egyptian Government, should be seized at once, and all telegrams prevented from passing.

The waste weir to the westward of the upper lock should also be seized at once, and held if possible until the troops arrive. As this is under the fire of guns at Nefiche, entrenchments should be thrown up as soon as possible to cover the men.

You are to use your own discretion as to supporting this movement with the fire of the ships, but you will bear in mind that it is most desirable that no injury whatever should be done to the town of Ismailia or its inhabitants by any measures