with the Chins. They expected us to make a quick advance, do some damage, and retire. The steady persistent advance, together with the pains that were taken to get into touch with them, and to explain our objects and intentions, paralysed their spirits and efforts for resistance; and thus tribe after tribe submitted and yielded to our terms.

16. The same difficulty that met the Burma Column, also greatly delayed General Tregear. He was unable to get the section of the mule road into Haka until the 13th April. The completion of the mule road through from Burma to Bengal was the crowning success of the season's work. The junction of the two columns, however, occurred too late to allow of our undertaking any operations in concert, and General Tregear returned to the west on the 16th of April.

17. The Chins first met with were the Yokwas of the Baungshé tribe.

18. From the outset, I resolved to try a lenient policy with the Southern Chins, who, before these operations, had not come into contact with us.

19. After one poor attempt by the Yokwas at opposition to our advance on the 28th of December, near Taungtek, when they acknowledged to having had 500 men and 300 guns against us, and to having sustained a great defeat, they gave up all hope of keeping us out of their hills.

20. On the 8th of January, two Yokwa Chins came into camp, and from this date onwards we were never again out of touch with the tribes. The objects of our coming, and our terms and conditions, were carefully explained to these two men, and they were dismissed to repeat them to their chiefs.

21. Much delay and difficulty was experienced in dealing with the Chins on account of the numbers of chiefs with each tribe. There is no central controlling authority. Each chief has a following, and all are bitterly jealous one of the other. Negotiations, therefore, had to be carried on with extreme patience.

22. In my opinion the course we pursued in abstaining from harsh measures, such as burning of villages, has advanced the settlement of the Chin Hill tracts to a point that we could not have reached by any other means in one season's work.

23. Having dealt with the Yokwas, as soon as the mule path was sufficiently forward, the column moved on Haka, arriving there on the 13th of February. The same procedure as observed with the Yokwas obtained the full submission of the important Haka community; and the surrender of these two clans was virtually equivalent to the submission of the whole Baungshé tribe.

24. Whilst waiting for the mule path to reach Haka, reconnaissances were made to the west to explore the country, obtain the submission of the Tlan-Tlangs, get touch with the Chittagong Column, and assist them in their advance eastward. These objects were most satisfactorily obtained. On the 26th of February, the advance parties of the Burma and Chittagong Columns met at Tao village, 52 miles west of Haka.

25. Meanwhile preparations were being pushed forward for a combined march on the Tashon Ywama. It was a matter of the first importance to ensure the success of the movement against, and the submission of, this the by far the most populous and influential of the Chin tribes.

26. At this time, the end of February, sickness amongst the troops and carrier coolies had so weakened the strength of the Southern Column, that a very small force only, one quite inadequate in case of serious resistance, could be taken

into the Tashon country from the south. To minimise this risk, it was necessary to arrange for the simultaneous arrival of the two small columns from Fort White and Haka at the Tashon Ywama. A successful and rapidly executed reconnaissance from Haka to within eight miles of the Ywama, on the 26th February and four following days, enable this movement to be planned.

27. The Fort White Column under Colonel Skene, 350 strong, started on the 8th of March; and the Southern Column, consisting of two mountain guns and 290 rifles, which I commanded, left Haka on the 9th of March.

28. On the 11th March, the two columns arrived from the north and south within one hour of each other on opposite banks of the Manipur or Nankathe River,—without having been opposed.

29. Elaborate preparations for the defence of their capital had been made by the Tashons. Innumerable stockades, breastworks, and obstructions, extending over some nine miles of country, but chiefly intended against an enemy advancing from the north, had been freshly erected at every commanding point. Large numbers of armed men watched both columns as they advanced, but there was no collision. It is difficult to estimate their numbers, but on the south of the Manipur River, near the Ywama, there were not less than 5,000 men, of whom two-thirds were armed with guns, and the rest with spears.

30. The Southern Column, notwithstanding the emphatic protests of three of the chiefs who had come out to meet it, continued its advance to within 1,000 yards of the Ywama, and there encamped. An assembly was called, and the chiefs were asked if they would agree to our terms. To our great surprise, after permitting the columns to approach their capital unopposed, they firmly declined to acknowledge the supremacy of the Government by paying any tribute; and without absolutely refusing, thought it very unlikely that they would be able to pay any portion of the fine of Rs. 10,000, imposed on them by the Chief Commissioner of Burma.

The situation thus became as strained as it well could be. Having warned the chiefs to think well over the consequences that their persistent refusal of submission would entail, I dismissed them.

31. The next two days were spent in prolonged negotiations, which severely taxed our patience, but with the happy result in the end of the attainment of all our desires.

The tribute due for 1889 was paid, as well as the fine, the latter reduced at their earnest solicitation to Rs. 5,000.

32. A small reconnoitring party having been sent down to Sihaung, both columns withdrew from Tashon territory without mishap.

from Tashon territory without mishap. 33. The following would appear to have influenced the chiefs of the war and stronger party to submission:

In the first place, they were impressed with our mobility and power of concentration. Then they were greatly upset with the information that we should have no alternative but to put garrisons in their country until they gave in. The people also living along our lines of advance, to save their valuable villages, used their utmost persuasion with the chiefs to urge them to agree to our terms, which we had taken care to have well circulated to them in advance.

34. The chiefs confessed that to within a few days of our arrival they had intended to oppose us; that their pride and position as head of all