

as per margin,* was concentrated at Dera Ismail Khan on the 1st October.

Owing to political causes there was some delay in marching from that station, but on the 11th, 12th, and 13th October, the brigade moved out in three detachments, the whole force being again concentrated at Kajuri Kach on the 18th of that month, where it was joined by the members of the Delimitation Commission.

3. Previous to this reconnaissances had been carried out, under my orders, into Spin, and on my arrival at Kajuri Kach a party was sent to examine the road to Karab Kot, via Toi Khula. As a result of these reconnaissances, I decided to march from Kajuri Kach to Wano via Spin and Karab Kot.

4. On the 22nd October, accompanied by Mr. Bruce, the British Commissioner, the whole brigade, with the exception of the 20th Bengal Infantry, whom I left behind to bring up a large convoy of supplies, marched via the Karkan Kotal to the head of the Spin Tangi (12 miles), where it encamped for the night. On the 23rd the march was continued to Karab Kot (11 miles), and the brigade halted there the following day to allow of the route into Wano being reconnoitred. The best road was found to be that following the Toi Stream, and accordingly on the 24th we marched to Wano (8 miles), and encamped at the eastern end of the valley.

5. Wano is a large open plain, for the most part stony, about 13 miles long by 11 miles broad. The only running stream is the Toi which skirts the southern and south-eastern edge of the plain, and along the banks of which there is a narrow strip of cultivation surrounding the villages and forts of the Ahmadzai Darweshkhel Waziris.

6. On the 27th October, the 20th Bengal Infantry arrived in camp from Kajuri Kach, bringing supplies for the whole force up to the 20th November.

7. From the time the troops reached Wano it was apparent that individual Waziris were bent on mischief, and the camp was fired into nightly, a naick of the 1st Gurkhas being severely wounded on the 25th October. On the evening of the 28th, the Commissioner informed me that a gathering of some 800 Mahsud Waziris under the leadership of a fanatical Mulla named Pwindah, were reported to have collected at Kaniguram and were about to move into the Khaisara Valley, where they might possibly be increased to 1,000 or 2,000 men.

8. On the 30th October a strong reconnaissance, consisting of the troops as per margin† visited the Tiarza Kotal overlooking Khaisara, but no opposition was met with, except a few shots fired at the rear guard when returning to camp. The Tiarza Kotal is about 10 miles distant from here and one-and-a-half miles from the Khaisara villages, and the road was found to be practicable for laden camels. On the 1st November the report of the arrival of Mulla Pwindah at Kaniguram was confirmed, and on the 2nd news was received that he, with a following of about 1,000 men, had moved into Khaisara.

9. As soon as it was certain that a hostile

gathering had collected at Kaniguram, I assembled all Officers commanding corps and gave instructions for the necessary precautions being taken. Outlying and inlying picquets were doubled, the weak points of the camp were strengthened by breastworks, and all men were ordered to be under arms in their tents at 4 A.M.

10. On the 2nd November a reconnaissance was sent to the Inzar Kotal (a distance of some six-and-a-half miles) leading into Shakai and Khaisara. On reaching the Kotal the troops were fired on by a small party of Waziris on the slopes of Kotkun. These were driven off without any loss on our side, and the reconnaissance party returned to camp. The road to the Inzar Kotal was found to be practicable for laden mules. The first half of the route leads across the Wano plain, and the road then enters the bed of a ravine which it follows up to the Kotal, being here impracticable for cavalry.

11. On the evening of the 2nd November, the position of the camp was as shown in the accompanying sketch,* the front facing a little to the west of north. On the extreme left was the camp of the 1st Gurkhas, next came the field hospitals and commissariat, then the 1st Punjab Cavalry, 20th Bengal Infantry, Brigade Staff, No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, and No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, the extreme right being occupied by the camp of the 3rd Sikhs. The transport animals were located along the rear of corps. The civil camp was pitched separately about 100 yards to the right rear of the 3rd Sikhs. This was a source of great anxiety to me; but I consented to this arrangement on the urgent representation of the British Commissioner, who considered that it was necessary on political grounds, as allowing free access to him by *jirgas*. The country in our vicinity, as indeed all over the Wano plain, is intersected by ravines in every direction. These adjacent to the camp are shown in the accompanying sketch.† A ravine runs along the whole front and another along the rear, from which latter the drinking water is obtained. These ravines are both tributaries of the Toi which here runs from south to north, and is not more than 300 yards distant from the east end of the civil camp. Beyond the Toi rise some high hills, out of range except for arms of precision. About 400 yards in rear of the camp is a small rocky ridge with two peaks rising some 75 feet out of the plain; this is known as the "Picquet Hill."

12. It may here be mentioned that the position of the camp had been chosen chiefly on political considerations, as the British Commissioner had urged most strongly that the force should remain at the eastern end of the valley, so as to cover the main passes into the Mahsud country, namely, the Tiarza and the Inzar, already mentioned.

The political officers up to the end of October were fully persuaded that we need anticipate no strong combination among the Mahsuds to molest us, but that we should be prepared for raids or annoyance from small bands. The camp was therefore pitched somewhat more extended for sanitary reasons than it would have been in a purely military expedition.

13. The whole camp was surrounded by a chain of observation picquets, and the position of these and also of their supports on the night of the 2nd-3rd November is shown in the sketch. It had been found that patrolling at night was useless owing to the noise made by our men

* Squadron; 1st (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Punjab Cavalry, 129; No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery (6 guns), 265; No. 2 Company, Bengal Sappers and Miners, 191; 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 748; 3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, 744; 20th (The Duke of Cambridge's Own Punjab) Regiment of Bengal Infantry, 740, all ranks.

† 1st (Prince Albert Victor's Own) Punjab Cavalry, 12 sabres; No. 3 (Peshawar) Mountain Battery, 2 guns; 1st Battalion, 1st Gurkha (Rifle) Regiment, 250 rifles; 3rd Regiment of Sikh Infantry, 250 rifles.

* Not given here.

† Not given here.