

moving over the stony ground, which indicated their position and rendered them liable to be surprised and cut off by small parties. The picquets were posted with the object merely of observing and reporting, and were not intended to hold their own in the event of a serious attack, in which case they were ordered, after giving the alarm, to fall back on their supports, the latter then retiring on the main body. To have had all picquets strong enough to offer resistance to an attack in force would have made night duty fall very heavy. The positions for the picquets were chosen chiefly with the object of watching the ravines in the vicinity of the camp. Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6 picquets were furnished by the 3rd Sikhs, Nos. 1 and 2 were ordered, in case of attack, to fall back on their support and then to rejoin the regiment. Nos. 3, 4, and 5 were also to fall back on their support, which was just outside the civil camp, and then to assist in the protection of that camp. There was a detachment of 40 rifles under a British officer posted in a breastwork about 100 yards to the north of the civil camp to protect it from that direction. No. 6 picquet was to retire on No. 7. The latter, as also No. 8, which were both on the Picquet Hill, were furnished by the 20th Bengal Infantry and had a support about 200 yards in rear of them. This support, in case of attack, was ordered to reinforce Nos. 7 and 8 picquets, which, holding positions of vital importance to the safety of the camp, were ordered to retain them at all costs and not to retire. The 1st Gurkhas furnished the picquets on the left flank, viz., 8½, 9, 10, the "Bogey," and 11. The first two were ordered to fall back on the Gurkha left support, which was to stand fast and hold its own; No. 10, the "Bogey," and No. 11 to fall back on the right support, the whole then retiring on the main body. The "Bogey" picquet was so called because it was only occasionally held, but on the night of the 2nd-3rd it was occupied. No. 12 was furnished by the 20th Bengal Infantry and had a support in rear, on which it was ordered to fall back and retire with it to camp. It may here be mentioned that when the attack actually took place, the above orders were all duly carried out except in the cases of picquets Nos. 6, 10, and 11. No. 6 did not retire as it was not considered that it was sufficiently threatened, and in the case of 10 and 11, the rush of the enemy prevented their carrying out their orders, as will be seen hereafter. To the north-east of camp and about 500 yards distant, there is a deserted Darweshkhel fort, and this on the night of the 2nd-3rd was occupied by 100 rifles of the 1st Gurkhas, with orders to remain concealed, and if an attempt on camp were made in that direction, they were to attack the enemy in rear. If the attack were made on the left of camp, they were to try and cut off any body of the enemy retreating by the Toi valley. The above brief description of our dispositions will help to explain the events that followed. It may also here be mentioned that the moon was in its first quarter and went down about ten o'clock on the evening of the 2nd.

14. The night passed quietly until 5.30 on the morning of the 3rd when the whole camp was suddenly aroused by hearing three shots followed by wild yells and the beating of drums, and at the same instant a desperate rush of some 500 determined fanatics supported by a heavy fire from the right front was made straight into the left flank and left rear of camp. So rapid was the rush that before the Gurkhas, although already accoutred, could get out of their tents, the leading men had penetrated into their camp, and some 30 of them had passed beyond into the rear of the

field hospitals, commissariat, and cavalry. The Gurkhas, though thus taken by surprise, and getting out of their tents only to find their camp in possession of the enemy, quickly formed rallying bodies and engaged in a desperate hand-to-hand conflict with the enemy, but so dark was the night that friend was undistinguishable from foe at even two or three paces distance.

15. It appears that under cover of this darkness, the enemy had approached camp from the west along the two large ravines. Emerging from these, the main body rushed past Nos. 9 and 10 picquets. In the latter, which was held by seven men, three were killed, and the others after firing three shots made their escape. It was these shots that gave the first alarm of the enemy's approach. A large body of Waziris who had continued their course down the ravine past No. 9 picquet were checked on reaching the left support of the Gurkhas and split up into two bodies, one of which joined the main attack on the left flank of the Gurkhas, and the other continuing down the ravine broke up against the rear guards, many penetrating into camp behind the field hospitals and the commissariat, where they succeeded in inflicting much damage on the unarmed followers and transport animals. Some of these men, joined by others who had penetrated down the main street, succeeded in reaching the cavalry lines and even as far as the brigade staff tents. Those in the cavalry lines set to work latching at the heel ropes of the troop horses with the apparent object of causing a stampede. A number of horses were thus set free and galloped out of camp. By some of these also it was that Lieutenant Macaulay, R.E., who was apparently making his way towards the sound of the firing, was set on and killed by swordcuts; not, however, before he had shot one man dead and another through the body with his revolver. Surgeon-Major Haig was also attacked by a swordsman when coming out of his tent, and received a cut through the upper part of the arm, completely severing the bone. In the field hospitals three of the enemy were shot dead by some of the sick, whilst two of the latter were wounded, one by a gunshot and the other by a swordcut.

16. In the meantime the Gurkhas had stopped the main rush from passing down the centre street. The reserve of the regiment under Major Robinson formed a rallying square in the centre of their camp and fought back-to-back and hand-to-hand. Here, among others, the Jemadar Adjutant of the regiment was killed, and Captain Lang and Lieutenant Angelo were wounded, the former severely, and the latter dangerously. Desperate fighting also took place in the breastwork at the north-west corner of the camp, where Lieutenant Herbert was dangerously wounded, and some nine men either killed or wounded.

17. When it became apparent that the enemy's main attack was directed against the left flank of the camp, I ordered Colonel Meiklejohn, C.M.G., Commanding the 20th Bengal Infantry, to take two companies of his regiment, which were in reserve, to reinforce the Gurkhas. This he did, clearing the way as he went with the bayonet. I also ordered a company of the 3rd Sikhs to join and assist the Gurkhas. By the time these reinforcements reached our left flank, the Gurkhas had succeeded in completely clearing their camp of the enemy who left behind them some forty bodies. After the main attack had been repulsed, two other separate but far less determined attempts were made by the enemy to get home from the same direction, but were steadily met. Orders were given for the guns to