

it would be absolutely impossible for our troops to cross the pass for some time.

His Excellency considers the arrangements made, the perseverance and skill displayed by the officers, and the excellent behaviour of the troops, worthy of the highest praise, and while commending all, wishes to record the important part taken by Captain H. B. Borradaile, 32nd Pioneers, and his detachment, who were the first over the pass.

The detailed report of the arrangements made by this officer will be found in enclosure D.

6. The Gilgit force first encountered the enemy in a strong position at Chakalwat (Derband) on the 9th April, when Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly with 280 men and two guns defeated a gathering estimated at 400 to 500 strong, reaching Mastuj the same day, and raising the siege of that place, which had been invested for eighteen days.

7. A second engagement occurred on the 13th April, at Nisa Gol, where Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's force, then 622 men and two guns, again defeated 1,500 of the enemy under Mahomed Isa in a very strong position.

8. Sir George White considers that the tactical dispositions of Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly were most creditable to that officer, and that but for the ability he displayed the loss in attacking such strong positions held by men armed with Martini and Snider rifles would have been much greater among the troops and levies engaged. His Excellency would also express his appreciation of the manner in which the two guns were handled, and the excellent fire discipline of the men of the 32nd Pioneers.

9. No further opposition was met with, the enemy retiring as Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's force advanced; but considerable physical difficulties had still to be overcome.

On the 17th April the bridge over the river having been broken, the troops had to ford it breast high at the imminent risk of being carried off their feet. Successfully surmounting these and other difficulties, the force reached Chitral on the 20th April, 1895, twenty-nine days after leaving Gilgit.

During this period, Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and his small force were completely cut adrift from their base; were liable to attack at almost any moment, and had to contend with formidable natural obstacles, and great difficulties in respect to transport and supplies.

His Excellency therefore finds it a pleasing duty to publicly place on record his appreciation of the skill and ability displayed by Colonel Kelly in the conduct of this long and arduous advance to the relief of Chitral; of the services of the officers who so ably seconded him, and of the exertions and endurance of the troops, all of which combined to crown the undertaking with success.

10. The Commander-in-Chief cordially endorses the commendations bestowed by Colonel Kelly on the following officers:—Lieutenant S. M. Edwardes, 2nd Bombay Infantry, Lieutenant J. S. Fowler, Royal Engineers, both of whom so gallantly defended the position at Reshan before they fell into the hands of the enemy by treachery; Lieutenant H. J. Jones, 14th Sikhs; Lieutenant F. J. Moberly, D.S.O., 37th Dogras, whose defence of Mastuj during its investment was conducted with great credit.

His Excellency also notices with satisfaction the excellent services rendered by the Kashmir troops with Lieutenant Moberly and the levies, viz., those under Raja Akhbar Khan of Cher Kila, the Hunzas under Wazir Humayan, the Nagar under Wazir Taifu, the Sai under Wazir

Shah Mirza, and the Punyal levies under Raja Jawahal Shah.

No. 1-C, dated Chitral, the 6th May, 1895, from Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly, 32nd Pioneers, Commanding the Gilgit Force, to the Adjutant-General in India.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India, the following report of the operations of the Gilgit Force in the relief of Chitral, from the 23rd March to the 23rd April, 1895.

2. About the 9th February I received orders from the Resident in Kashmir to hold half the 32nd Pioneers in readiness to move to Gilgit, but not to do so till I received his or Surgeon-Major Robertson's orders. I therefore selected 400 men to carry 20 lb. kits and to move with the 100 mules forming the regimental transport in the Indus Valley.

3. Indus Valley, Gilgit, 14th to 22nd March.—On the night of the 14th March I was directed by the Assistant British Agent, Gilgit, to move my men up to Gilgit, which I accordingly did from Buner and Jullipur, arriving there on the 20th and 22nd.

4. Disposition of troops remaining in Gilgit.—In accordance with your telegram No. 592-F-C, I assumed command of the Gilgit Force and marched out with 200 Pioneers, and directed the other half to escort next day the two guns of No. 1 Kashmir Mountain Battery, which I had suggested should be brought in from Nomal to Gilgit, and also called up 200 more Pioneers from Buner to Gilgit, and directed the remainder of the 32nd Pioneers to discontinue work on the road and proceed to Chilas Fort, releasing 150 Kashmir troops to strengthen the posts along the Indus Valley in strength at Bunji and Ramghat Bridge.

5. Gupis-Ghizr, 23rd to 31st March, 1895.—The two detachments arrived at Gupis on the 26th and 27th March, where the mule transport was changed to coolie and local pony carriage, to enable the Government transport to work in the conveyance of stores between Gilgit and Gupis. An opportunity was taken here to further reduce the stores required to be carried, by dropping our Pioneer equipment, &c. The march was resumed again on the 27th and 28th March, and Ghizr was reached by the two columns on the 30th and 31st March, respectively, snow lying on the ground to the depth of a foot.

6. Supplies.—The unfortunate absence of Captain Bretherton, Deputy-Assistant Commissary-General in Mastuj, was a source of some anxiety as to the supplies available for the column, as I wished to be independent of the stocks that might be available in the places we were attempting to relieve. At Gupis we could not ascertain what supplies had been sent forward, and the balances there were insufficient to take more than was necessary for the road, although they were near the base at Gilgit for replenishing their stock. At Ghizr I found there was sufficient for 1,000 men for 11½ days, and probably supplies in Mastuj for the garrison there for 16 days. I was able after passing Laspur to somewhat supplement our resources locally.

7. Transport.—The collection of transport at Ghizr was a matter of some difficulty, and on the 1st April, before marching, it was found that many of the Yassin coolies had absconded, which meant that a further reduction would have to be made in the supplies to be carried. An attempt was made to bring them back, but only a few returned, and I eventually found that I had only