

till the guns and remainder of the force came into position. Sangar No. 17 was first to be demolished, and attention then to be directed on the main sangars, 12—15, while the levies made their way high up the nullah in search of a path for a possible point to cross and turn the left of the enemy's position, and on the enemy being seen to retire, a general advance to be made.

26. Advance from Mastuj, 13th April.—I advanced from Mastuj at 7 A.M., on the 13th April, with the force as per margin* the baggage being left behind till orders were received for its advance under the escort of a portion of the garrison. There was some time lost and difficulty experienced in crossing the Yarkhun river. The advance guard coming in contact with the enemy at 10.30 A.M., advanced too much towards the centre of the plain and the attack was carried out as follows:—

27. Action of Nisa Gol, 13th April, 1895.—The advance guard "A" Company, deployed into line and advanced in extended order when within 900 yards of the position, forming its own supports and became the extreme left of the firing line. "C" Company following soon after, prolonged the line to the right, also forming its own supports. "E" and "G" Companies in reserve, in column of half-companies, forming single rank and opening out to one pace as they advanced.

Reinforcements being called for, "E" Company advanced and prolonged the line to the right. "G" Company being called up similarly, later on formed the extreme right of the firing line. The levies well on the right rather higher up the nullah.

While these movements were being executed, the battery came into action opposite No. 17 Sangar, at a range of 500 yards, with common shell, which knocked down the wall of the sangar to a height of about three feet, and fire from it was for a short time silenced. The guns then advanced against the large Sangar No. 16, which was not visible till within 150 yards and was luckily unoccupied. The defenders of No. 17 Sangar having resumed their fire, I directed the guns to fire at it again; after two common shell and two case had been fired into it at a range of 275 yards, its fire ceased and the guns were retired. The fire from this sangar was desultory for the remainder of the action; the levies now proceeded up the nullah to carry out their turning movements, and were left to their own devices in carrying them out.

The infantry having deployed, "A" and "C" Companies kept the enemy engaged directly in front along the main line of sangars, the latter company occasionally directing its fire half right against the sangars on the hills on that flank. "E" and "G" Companies' fire was almost entirely directed against the hill sangars, occasional volleys being directed on small parties of the enemy occupying hill-tops 800 or 900 yards distant.

The general average distance at which fire was opened to the front was opened and kept up at 250 to 300 yards.

The artillery moving to another position opened fire on sangars in the centre of the enemy's position at a range of 875 yards, and afterwards on Sangar No. 11 on the right centre of the enemy's position, at ranges from 1,050 to 1,200 yards.

28. Method of crossing the nullah.—After Sangar No. 17 had been somewhat silenced, Lieutenant Beynon, my Staff Officer, informed me that a goat-path had been observed on the

other side of the nullah and a practicable spot to attempt a crossing, and asked me for leave to take the Kashmir Sappers to make a practical path down into the nullah, and the company of the 4th Kashmir Infantry to cross it, when made, under cover of the fire of the deployed infantry. The scaling ladders were brought up and lowered, and after half an hour's work a track was made to the bottom of the nullah and an ascent by the goat track on the further side assured. A party of 10 Kashmir Sappers, with Lieutenant Beynon, Lieutenant Moberly, commanding the company of the 4th Kashmir Infantry, and Lieutenant Oldham, Royal Engineers, commanding the Kashmir Sappers, descended, and were being followed by the 4th Kashmir Infantry, when some guncotton lying open on the ground at the commencement of the track was ignited by a bullet striking it. A temporary retirement of the line of those near the explosive to cover some thirty yards in rear was ordered, but speedily brought to the front again when no danger of an explosion was to be apprehended. Eventually a party of about fifteen reached the other bank, and almost simultaneously with the turning movement of the levies, who had reached No. 17 Sangar and its vicinity, having run the gauntlet of a stone shoot in their course.

29. Flight of the enemy.—The appearance of these bodies on the enemy's left caused a general flight, and they streamed out of their sangars in a long line, with the guns firing at ranges from 950 to 1,425 yards and under volleys from the infantry. The ground falling away near their line of retreat did not favour our fire and protected them till almost out of range.

30. Advance of main body across nullah.—A general advance was then made across the nullah by paths "C" and "D," and as soon as a company could be mustered, it was sent in pursuit; but their flight was extremely rapid and came no longer under our fire; the enemy in the sangars on the left bank of the river disappeared into the snow, while those on the right bank who escaped our fire fled towards Drasan.

31. General details of action.—We bivouacked that night opposite Sanoghar, close to the scene of action. I attach a list of our casualties.

Confronted as they were by an enemy they could not see, I cannot speak too highly of the extreme steadiness and bravery of the troops during the course of the action, which lasted two hours, and during which they were subjected to a very heavy and trying fire from the front and left flank.

Some 40 of Umra Khan's Jandolis were reported to be in the enemy's sangars; the fire was entirely from Martini-Henry and Snider rifles, the wounds being principally from the former.

The fire discipline on our side was excellent and contributed materially in keeping down the fire from the sangars.

32. Enemy's casualties.—I estimate the number of the Chiltralis opposed to us to have been some 1,500 or more, and their casualties from native reports to have been some 60 killed and 100 wounded.

33. Wounded.—Our wounded were returned to Mastuj under the escort of the garrison (who brought out the baggage) the next morning, under the personal superintendence of Surgeon-Captain Luard, Indian Medical Service, charpoys having been obtained for them from Sanoghar.

34. Kila Drasan, 14th April.—On the 14th April I marched to Kila Drasan, with the object of seeing to what extent the enemy might be on my right flank, as Mahommed Isa had fled in that direction; the road being broken, a long detour

* 2 guns of No. 1, Kashmir Mountain Battery, 382 of the 32nd Pioneers, 40 of the Kashmir Sappers, 100 of the 4th Kashmir Infantry, 100 Levies.