

one native officer, five other native ranks and two followers; ninety-eight horses and transport animals were also killed or wounded.

11. Meanwhile, on my arrival at Nawagai on the 14th September, I found the Khan disposed to be friendly, and to do all in his power to provide such supplies as we required. The Hadda Mullah was reported to be in the Bedmanai Pass with a small gathering, which was said to be increasing in numbers; but the tribes inhabiting the Mittai and neighbouring valleys seemed somewhat half-hearted about opposing us. The tribes south of the Rambat Pass also sent to disclaim hostile intentions; but, notwithstanding this, some of their men joined in the night attack of the 14th-15th on Brigadier-General Jeffreys' camp.

12. Early in the morning of the 15th I received a brief report by heliograph of the attack on Brigadier-General Jeffreys' camp the night before, and at once sent him orders to concentrate his force and proceed to the punishment of the tribes concerned. Later in the day I received a fuller report of what had happened, together with information from Brigadier-General Jeffreys that he had received my orders and was concentrating his brigade at Inayat Kili in the Mamund Valley, with a view to carrying them out. He had ascertained that the attack on his camp had been made by a small gathering of Mamunds, who had been reinforced by some of Umra Khan's followers from Zagai, a village in the Mamund Valley, and by a few men from the neighbouring tribes.

13. Naturally the night attack of the 14th-15th, with the consequent turning aside into the Mamund Valley of Brigadier-General Jeffreys' brigade, made a considerable change in the aspect of affairs in South Bajaur and the Mohmand country; and the strategical situation which had now developed itself was interesting. I found myself at Nawagai with a brigade of all arms* in a strongly entrenched position, faced by the Hadda Mullah's gathering in the Bedmanai Pass,—a not very difficult defile some six or eight miles in length, the mouth of which is about seven miles south-west in a straight line from the site of my camp,—itself about one mile south of Nawagai village. The intervening ground is a plain of which the western half is cut up by ravines, while the rest is favourable for cavalry. East of and behind me lay the road to the camp of the 2nd Brigade at Inayat Kili running for about six miles through a network of deep ravines, and then for the remaining six or seven over a plain. I was not strong enough to attack the Mullah's gathering in their position with a sufficient amount of odds in my favour, while I did not think it advisable to rejoin Brigadier-General Jeffreys,—first, because he was strong† enough already for immediate requirements; secondly, because it would have been most unwise to have retired through the ravines above mentioned in face of the Mullah's gathering; thirdly, because I expected that one of Major-General Elles' brigades would join me in the Nawagai Valley on the 17th or the 18th at latest, and, finally, because my support was necessary to keep the Khan of Nawagai with us,—as, if I had deserted him, he would have been compelled by the Mullah's men to throw in his lot with them, which would have been a serious matter on account of his influence in Bajaur. Accordingly, I deter-

mined to stay where I was until Major-General Elles' advance should make it possible to dispose effectually of the Mullah's gathering, and to clear out the Bedmanai Pass and the Mittai and neighbouring valleys with completeness.

14. At about 6.30 on the morning of the 16th September, Brigadier-General Jeffreys moved out from his camp at Inayat Kili, with the greater portion of his force in three columns, to deal with the villages of the Mamunds.

15. The right column under Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian, 38th Dogras, consisting of six companies and a detachment of sappers, was directed along the eastern side of the Mamund Valley on the villages of Shinkot, Chingai 1st, Damadolah and Badam Kili; the central column under Colonel Goldney, 35th Sikhs, consisting of six companies, four guns, one squadron and a detachment of sappers, was directed against the villages of Munar, Hazarnao and Badalai; while the left column under Major Campbell of the Guides, was composed of five companies and a detachment of sappers, and was directed along the right bank of the Watelai ravine parallel to the centre column.

16. The right column, under Lieutenant-Colonel Vivian, having advanced by the route ordered as far as Damadolah, found that place too strong and too strongly held to be reasonably attempted without artillery, and returned thence to camp, arriving at 4 P.M. with two men slightly wounded.

17. The centre column, under Colonel Goldney, 35th Sikhs, advanced some six miles up the valley without seeing anything of the enemy, who were first reported at Badam Kili, to which place a detachment under Lieutenant-Colonel A. E. Ommanney was sent to dislodge them. The remainder of the column pushed on, and at about 10.30 A.M. two companies of the 35th Sikhs which led the advance, occupied a knoll near Shahi Tangi, upwards of nine miles from camp. In this movement, however, the two companies advanced too far from their supports, and as the enemy promptly attacked them in force, they were compelled to retire about a mile, with the loss of one British officer and one sepoy killed and sixteen non-commissioned officers and sepoy wounded. Soon afterwards the Buffs, under Lieutenant-Colonel Ommanney, coming up, the knoll was again occupied without much opposition, being the furthest point reached by the column.

18. During this advance the guns came into action—first on the spur north of Badalai, and afterwards on that north of Chingai 2nd. They were covered in the first position by two companies of the 35th Sikhs, posted to their right; and on their moving towards the second position, one-and-a-half of these companies, under Captain W. I. Ryder, were ordered to cover the movement by climbing to the top of the high ridge to their right, and then advancing along it towards the north. Owing to subsequent orders not reaching him, Captain Ryder went further than was intended.

19. In the earlier part of the day the left column had remained far behind, being fully occupied for some considerable time in dealing with the numerous villages met with along the road shortly after leaving camp. Towards 9 A.M. it was called up by Brigadier-General Jeffreys, as the enemy began to appear in force on his left near Agrah, and it joined the centre column about noon.

20. At about 2.30 P.M., as soon as the fortified villages of Chingai 2nd and Shahi Tangi had been dismantled, Brigadier-General Jeffreys ordered the troops to return to camp. Captain Ryder was

* 3 Battalions, 1 Mountain Battery, 3 Squadrons, 1 Company of Sappers.

† 4 Battalions, 1 Mounted Battery, 1 Squadron, 1 Company of Sappers.