

battalion, and our other casualties were—killed, Second Lieutenant W. C. Browne-Clayton, 1st Battalion, Royal West Kent Regiment, three British and seven native soldiers; wounded, six British officers, twenty-one British and twenty-two native soldiers,—total 61 casualties. The enemy suffered severely in this action, and did not display their usual enterprise in following our infantry to the level ground, on their withdrawal and return to camp.

46. The next operation of interest was on the 3rd October, when Brigadier-General Jeffreys, whose force had now been increased by half a battalion and four mountain guns, seized and destroyed the village of Badalai without opposition. During his return to camp, however, the enemy showed in great force at the upper end of the valley, and advanced among the ravines to within 1,000 to 1,200 yards of the troops covering his withdrawal. They were kept in check without any difficulty, but as they had many Martini-Henry rifles, and expended a great quantity of ammunition, they caused a loss on our side of two killed and sixteen wounded, in spite of the long ranges at which they fired.

47. On the 4th October, the arrival of four guns of the 10th Field Battery, under Major Anderson, Royal Artillery, and of the 2nd Battalion, Highland Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel R. D. B. Rutherford, brought the force at my disposal at Inayat Kili up to the strength detailed in paragraph 43. Major H. A. Deane C.S.I., the Political Agent of Dir, Swat and Chitral, arrived the same day, and as he recommended a cessation of hostilities for a few days to enable the Khan of Nawagai, and his brothers, the Khans of Khar and Jhar, to recommence negotiations with the tribes, who were reported to be again anxious to make terms, I discontinued operations with the exception of the daily foraging.

48. Ultimately the Mamund jirga came in and made submission on the 11th October, and on the following day the force marched to Jhar, advancing on the 13th to a position about three miles up the Salarzai Valley. Here the force halted until the 19th October while negotiations were carried on by the political officers with the Salarzai tribe, who were required to surrender some rifles and other firearms as a punishment for joining in the attack on Chakadara Fort in July and August last. These negotiations having been successfully concluded, the force moved back to Jhar on the 20th October, where the Shamozai section of the Utman Khels, who had also taken part in the attack on Chakadara Fort, were in like manner called upon to surrender arms; and after they had done so the force started on the 22nd for the Swat Valley, where they were all assembled on the 27th October.

49. It will have been observed, of course, that there was much more difficulty in dealing with the Mamunds than was experienced with the Swatis, the Masazai Mohmands, or with the Mamunds' neighbours, the Salarzai and Shamozai.

50. Much of this difficulty was due to the fact that our invasion of the Mamund Valley was not preceded by a decisive action like that at the Malakand on the 2nd August, at Landakai on the 17th August, at Nawagai on the night of the 20th September, or, as in the case of the Salarzai and Shamozai, by such an object-lesson as our operations against the Mamunds themselves.

51. Besides this, however, the special physical features of the Mamund Valley gave the tribe great advantages, which they utilized with considerable tactical skill. It will be seen from the

accompanying map that the valley consists of a broad and gently sloping plateau, cut up by ravines, especially towards the top, and with hills rising somewhat suddenly on all sides. This plateau is well cultivated for rain crops, but is practically waterless at this season; the only good water above a point near Inayat Kili being in the ravines on the sides of the hills, where many of the most important villages are consequently situated, those on the level depending for their water supply on tanks, or, in one or two cases, on doubtful wells. Thus, as soon as the lower villages had been dealt with, which was done without opposition, it was necessary for our troops to attack those on the sides of the hills, on ground very difficult for assailants and extremely favourable for defenders.

52. The tribesmen were further much assisted by the circumstances that a great part of their best lands lie in Afghanistan, on the north-western side of the high range of mountains whose crest forms the Afghan frontier in that direction. Thus, much of their property was beyond our reach, while they had a secure refuge to which they could send their moveables from our side of the frontier, and betake themselves if pressed. They showed commendable skill and patience in adhering to the only tactics which could give them any measure of success, always retiring* before our troops so long as they advanced, and then following them up in skirmishing order as far as the open ground on their withdrawal to their camp, which had to remain low down the valley on account of the difficulty about water higher up. The more credit is due to the Mamunds for holding out so well, as they suffered† severely in every encounter with us, besides undergoing much loss of property and destruction of their defences, whose speedy reconstruction, though costly and difficult for them, is necessary to their existence.

53. Both in the Nawagai and Mamund Valleys a considerable number of Martini-Henry and other rifles were used against us with apparently unlimited supplies of ammunition.

54. The conduct and discipline of the troops in the operations under reference was in the highest degree satisfactory. The operations, which extended over seven weeks, were carried on without tents and on a very low scale of baggage, while the rations, though abundant and excellent in all respects, were necessarily open to the objection of sameness. Notwithstanding these inconveniences, the troops remained uniformly cheerful, especially when active hostilities were going on.

55. I have already alluded to the steadiness and gallant bearing of the infantry in the several engagements that took place during the operations under reference, and I would now wish to invite attention to the invaluable nature of the services rendered by the cavalry. At Nawagai three squadrons of the 11th Bengal Lancers, under Major S. B. Beatson, swept the country everywhere that cavalry could go, carrying out reconnaissances, protecting signalling parties, and watching every movement of the enemy. In the Mamund Valley a squadron of the same regiment, under Captain E. H. Cole, took part in every engagement that occurred while they were there, establishing such a reputation that the enemy even when in greatly superior numbers never dared to face them in the open. Afterwards,

* There was an exception at Agrah and Gat on the 30th September.

† It is now known that 220 of the tribes were killed, besides about 150 of their friends who came to help them.