

the rising ground was reached, and the long grass with which it was covered effectively screened our movements. The force was now halted, the cavalry scouts were withdrawn and replaced by infantry picquets, and the troops lay down to await the dawn.

At 5.10 a.m., in the uncertain light preceding dawn, our infantry picquets were driven in, and the indistinct forms of the advancing Dervishes became visible. The line was immediately prepared for action, and at 5.15 a.m., the guns and maxims opened fire, followed by infantry volleys. It was still too dark to accurately observe the enemy's movements, but a brisk reply to our fire gradually becoming heavier on our left front indicated that an attempt was being made to turn our left flank. A hotter fire was poured in this direction, our right was gradually thrown forward and the left flank was prolonged.

As the light improved, large bodies of shouting Dervishes were seen advancing, but our steady volleys and gun and maxim fire kept their's under, and it gradually slackened.

The whole line was now advanced down the gentle slope towards the Dervish position, and, moving forward at a more rapid pace, soon drove the retiring enemy towards their camp, which lay concealed in the midst of trees about one-and-a-half miles beyond our first position.

Cease-fire sounded at 6.25 a.m., and, as the troops advanced towards the camp, numbers of the enemy surrendered and were given the "Aman."

Thousands of women and children were found in the camp which, most fortunately, had not been reached by our fire, and numbers of fugitives who had passed through it now returned and threw down their arms.

The cavalry and camel corps continued the pursuit for some miles, and it was soon evident that the entire force had surrendered. Occasional shots were exchanged with some of the "Jehadhiah" of the Emir Khatim Musa, but on his surrender all gradually came in and gave themselves up.

Immediately in front of the line of advance of the 9th Sudanese, and only a few hundred yards from our original position on the rising ground, a large number of the enemy were seen lying dead, huddled together in a comparatively small space; on examination, these proved to be the bodies of the Khalifa Abdulla et Taishi, the Khalifa Ali Wad Helu, Ahmed-el-Fedil, the Khalifa's two brothers, Sennousi Ahmed and Hamed Mohammed, the Mahdi's son, Es-Sadek, and a number of other well-known leaders.

At a short distance behind them lay their dead horses, and, from the few men still alive—amongst whom was the Emir Yunis Edekein—we learnt that the Khalifa, having failed in his attempt to reach the rising ground where we had forestalled him, had then endeavoured to make a turning movement, which had been crushed by our fire. Seeing his followers retiring, he made an ineffectual attempt to rally them, but recognising that the day was lost, he had called on his Emirs to dismount from their horses, and seating himself on his "furwa" or sheepskin—as is the custom of Arab chiefs, who disdain surrender—he had placed Khalifa Ali Wad Helu on his right and Ahmed Fedil on his left, whilst the remaining Emirs seated themselves round him, with their body-guard in line some 20 paces to their front, and in this position they had unflinchingly met their death. They were given a fitting burial, under our supervision, by the surviving members of their own tribesmen.

The Khalifa's death was the signal for wholesale surrender, and by the afternoon we had collected upwards of 3,000 men and 6,000 women and children, besides quantities of rifles, swords, spears, cattle, etc.

Amongst the prisoners are 29 important Emirs, a few of whom are wounded, and in this latter category is included the Sheik Ed Din, the Khalifa's eldest son and intended successor.

Our casualties in this action amounted to three killed and 23 wounded, making a total of four killed and two officers and 27 men wounded in the two actions.

The total Dervish losses during the two days' fighting are estimated at 1,000 men killed and wounded, and 9,400 prisoners, including women and children.

I would refer briefly to the excellent behaviour and gallantry of all troops who took part in these operations.

The importance of striking rapidly at Fedil's force; and following up the blow on the Khalifa's main body, necessitated long night marches with little rest during the day, and demanded all the powers of endurance on the part of every member of the force. From 4 p.m. on the 21st, to 7 a.m. on the 24th, a period of 63 hours, the troops had covered a distance of 57 miles and fought two successful actions.

No commanding officer could have received more loyal or genuine support than I have from every officer and man of the force it has been my good fortune to command; and, in submitting for your favourable consideration the names of those officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services have been most prominently brought to my notice, I would add my warm endorsement to the recommendations that have been made.

In conclusion, I have to submit, for your favourable consideration, the names of the following officers and non-commissioned officers:—

To Brevet Colonel Lewis, commanding the Infantry Brigade, my most cordial thanks are due. The previous good services of this gallant officer are well known. On him devolved the arduous duty of rapidly concentrating the flying column at Fachi Shoya, prior to my arrival. Throughout the recent operations he has given fresh proof of his capacity for command, and to his energy and great practical knowledge of the handling of troops I attribute, in a large measure, the success which has been achieved. Colonel Lewis has brought to my notice the good services performed by his Brigade Major, Captain Doughty (Royal Welsh Fusiliers), and by Captain Smyth, V.C. (2nd Dragoon Guards) his Intelligence Officer and aide-de-camp.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Hickman (Worcester Regiment) acted as my Chief Staff Officer throughout the operations. On him devolved all the details of organisation of the force, and his capacity as a Staff Officer of exceptional ability was never more apparent. His energy, foresight, and tact, mark him out as a most valuable officer.

Brevet Lieutenant-Colonel Mahon (8th Hussars) acted as Assistant Adjutant-General, and was also in charge of the Intelligence Department. I cannot speak in sufficiently strong terms of the excellence of the services performed by this officer. I invariably placed him in general command of all the mounted troops; his personal disregard for danger, intrepid scouting, and careful handling of men, all fit him for high command; his bold and successful seizure of the position in front of Fedil's camp, and his conduct of the fight before I came up, show him