

right bank of the river, the other allies along the left bank. It was then settled in direct communication with General Chaffee, United States Army, and General Yamaguchi, Japanese Army, that, as regards the left attack, *i.e.*, that on the right bank of the river, the movement should be of a turning nature along the embankment marked A.....B in the attached sketch, the Japanese leading, followed in succession by the British and Americans. The turning movement to commence at 2 A.M. on the 5th.

4. In pursuance of the above agreement, the British troops marginally noted* moved from Tien-tsin to Hsi-ku on the afternoon of the 4th and bivouacked in the area marked C. Annexure A (Field Force Order No. 140) shows the arrangements for the march. The British were followed by the Americans and Japanese, who bivouacked at the points marked D and E.

5. As arranged, in the early hours of the 5th instant, the turning movement commenced. At daybreak the column came under a heavy fire from the right front and the action began with a vigorous forward movement of the Japanese against the entrenchments, supported on the right by the British. The brunt of the action fell on the Japanese, who attacked and stormed line after line in the most gallant manner. Our troops, in consequence of their position, scarcely fired a shot, and I readily accord to the Japanese the whole credit of the victory. Their loss was, I understand, about 300 killed and wounded, while ours was only 25 (*vide* Annexure B). The Chinese rout was complete, and before noon they had entirely disappeared, having fled to the left bank of the river. The other allied forces were scarcely engaged at all and practically had no loss.

6. After the victory at Pei-tsang we pushed on for a mile or two along the right bank, but, being stopped by inundations, were compelled to return to Pei-tsang, and cross over to the right (*sic*) bank, where we bivouacked for the night, covered by a strong outpost, two or three miles in advance.

7. On the 6th instant the whole of the allied forces marched on Yang-tsun by the right bank, with the exception of about 6,000 Japanese, who continued to advance by the left bank. Owing to the direction taken by the several columns the British troops were leading along the direct road when we came in sight of Yang-tsun, the Americans being on our right flank. The enemy's main position was apparently along the railway embankment, with one flank resting on a village close to the Pei-ho railway bridge. It was at once arranged to attack this position with one Russian battalion on the left, the British troops in the centre, and the Americans on the right, while the 1st Bengal Lancers covered the extreme right flank. I thereupon directed the 1st Sikh Infantry to extend for attack, supported by the Royal Welsh Fusiliers, and the 24th Punjab Infantry, the advance to be covered by the fire of No. 12 Battery Royal Field Artillery. The remainder of our troops were too far in rear to be utilized at the moment. The advance to attack was made in beautiful order over about 5,000 yards of level plain, covered with high crops.

* Naval Brigade, 4 guns; Royal Marine Light Infantry, 300; 12th Battery Royal Field Artillery, 6 guns; Hong Kong Artillery, 2 guns, 4 Maxims; Detachment Royal Engineers, —; 1st Bengal Lancers, 400; Royal Welsh Fusiliers, 300; 7th Bengal Infantry, 500; 24th Punjab Infantry, 300; 1st Sikh Infantry, 500; Hong Kong Regiment, 100; Chinese Regiment, 100.

At about half this distance the troops came under a hot shell and musketry fire, nevertheless, owing to the open order in which we worked, the British loss was comparatively small. The further advance was a rapid one, and the embankment was carried by a rush of the 1st Sikh Infantry and 24th Punjab Infantry. The Welsh Fusiliers, owing to the conformation of the ground, were rather wedged out of the assaulting line. This practically ended the fight, as the Chinese fled precipitately in all directions. The enemy's guns were in a retired position and thus escaped capture. Our loss on this occasion was as shown in Annexure C.

8. On the 7th instant the allies halted to bring up supplies, and on the 8th the movement was continued. On the 9th, at Ho-hsi-wu, a squadron of the 1st Bengal Lancers caught up some retreating Tartar cavalry, inflicting on them heavy loss, and on the 12th Tung-chao was occupied without opposition. At a conference held on that day it was decided to send forward strong reconnoitring forces on the 13th, to concentrate on a line about five miles from Peking on the 14th, and to attack on the 15th. The positions of the several forces were assigned, the British taking the extreme left. On the 14th, however, owing to the premature advance of a battalion of one of the allied forces, the intended concentration was abandoned, and the troops all hurried forward to assault the city of Peking.

9. I have above endeavoured to give a connected account of the military operations preceding the attack on Peking, and I will now try to briefly relate what occurred on the 14th, so far as Her Majesty's troops are concerned. Our forces on the night of the 13th were concentrated on the river south-east of Tung-chao, about 15 miles from Peking, with two guns, the 1st Bengal Lancers and the 7th Bengal Infantry about nine miles in advance as an observation force. At 2.30 A.M. on the 14th, hearing heavy firing in the direction of Peking, I caused the rouse to be sounded and marched without delay towards the supposed scene of action. About 7 A.M. I reached the point held by my advanced force, and at once pushed on with the troops there available, directing the main body to follow after an hour's rest. About noon I got into touch with the Americans, who were on the south bank of the canal, and as they and the French were preparing to assault the Tung Tien Gate, I decided to push straight on and assault the south-east gate of the Chinese city, Sha-chia-men. Here I met with no opposition, and about 1 P.M. the British troops passed through the city wall. I then ordered the 1st Bengal Lancers and the 24th Punjab Infantry to march straight to the Temple of Heaven Park, which I wished to secure as a camping ground, and also as a protection to my left and rear, while with the rest of my available troops I pushed on through streets and alleys towards the water gate of the Tartar City, a point which I had learnt from a cypher message from Sir C. Macdonald would probably be the most vulnerable. Our troops were much exhausted by the long march and intense heat, and were much scattered in groups, but they struggled gamely on without attempting to reply to the desultory and ineffective fire of the enemy. At a few minutes before 3 P.M., I, with a few officers of my staff and about 70 men of the 1st Sikhs and 7th Bengal Infantry, reached a point opposite the water gate. The British flag was still flying on that portion of the Tartar wall which we knew the Legations had occupied, but an ominous silence made us fear that the worst had occurred, and that the flag was only a ruse to lure us on;