

endeavoured to retrieve the situation, so far as possible, by personal gallantry.

On the 18th July information was received that the Nandi in the vicinity of Fort Ternan (who had hitherto declined to join in the rising and had maintained friendly relations) had broken out, and that a patrol of 27 rifles proceeding towards Kisumu had been heavily attacked on the 9th July, and had only regained the protection of the post with difficulty, sustaining a loss of nine men killed besides having two wounded.

Immediately on receipt of this information endeavours were made to intercept the down mail, which had been arranged should proceed by this route, but without success. It was subsequently (on the 6th August) ascertained that the mail escort of 19 rifles had been surprised and destroyed on the 19th July.

This party unfortunately travelled by night, and thus surrendered the advantage they had in bearing firearms.

Until the 25th August the troops were employed principally on convoy duty and on what was, in effect, a reconnaissance of the country, regarding which and the people who occupied it practically no information was available. Within the first month, however, it became evident that, excepting the doubtful attitude of a small minority in the immediate neighbourhood of Nandi Station, the whole of the Nandi were in rebellion, and that the attitude of certain sections of the Lumbwa was truculent and threatening. It was also ascertained without doubt that as soon as additional troops appeared in the country a large portion of the Nandi live stock had been driven across the Nyando River into Lumbwa or its immediate vicinity.

During this preliminary stage some damage was inflicted by the destruction of the enemy's habitations and grain supply. Although this was not, perhaps, felt at the time, there is no doubt that the Nandi subsequently experienced privations from want of shelter and food.

3. It was not until the advent of some 300 Masai and Kamasia spearmen that really effective results were obtained. After the arrival of these auxiliaries (on the 25th August) the operations assumed the nature of a series of raids of two or three days' duration, when columns consisting of about 40 rifles and 100 Masai (generally under a British officer) moved from a central camp on the lightest possible scale of baggage. It was on these occasions that the heaviest casualties were inflicted on the Nandi. These operations involved some independent fighting, mostly borne by the auxiliaries, who, from their superior mobility, were generally in advance of the troops, who thus acted as a support. In spite of their alertness by day, the Nandi were on several occasions taken completely by surprise at night, and heavy damage inflicted on them.

In this manner the Nandi country was a second time traversed, *i.e.*, from east to west, columns being sent in all directions as the main body of the force moved forward.

In the vicinity of the western extremity of the escarpment operations were undertaken against the cave strongholds of the Nandi, which they regarded as impregnable. These caves are of considerable extent, some of them being capable of holding from 200 to 300 head of cattle. Situated amongst rocks and boulders it is almost impossible without a guide to locate their entrances. Of these there are generally several, barricaded with rocks and stones, and

loopholed in such a manner that to take them with troops armed with rifles and with no protective arrangement against arrows would result in disproportionate loss of life. The caves were, however, reduced with comparatively inconsiderable casualties by employing bodies of auxiliaries, who advanced against the entrances under cover of their shields and were supported by rifles. The barricades were then pulled away and an entrance forced. After the reduction of the second cave the enemy evacuated the remainder, in some of which considerable quantities of grain were found.

The country was again worked through from west to east, almost every day having its record of losses inflicted on the enemy both in life and in captures, until Nandi Station was reached on the 24th September. It was here necessary to detach a portion of the force for escort duty and for the protection of the route *via* the Nyando Valley. For this purpose the additional troops enumerated in the margin became available.*

Acting on information which consistently pointed to the majority of the Nandi live stock (and therefore the fighting men) being in the low-lying hills between the Lumbwa Escarpment and the Nyando River, I proceeded with the remainder of the force, consisting of 145 rifles (local troops) and 300 Masai, in a southerly direction from Nandi Station, and striking the Fort Ternan-Kisumu Road on the 12th October advanced along it in the direction of Fort Ternan and encamped at Ligatet. I had on the previous day received authentic information as to the whereabouts of the most troublesome leaders of the rebellion, the two Laibons, or medicine men, Kibiles and Goitalel, and of the intention of the enemy to break back to the Nandi Escarpment as soon as the troops should arrive in the vicinity of Fort Ternan. I therefore decided to attack at once. Leaving a sufficient guard in camp I divided the remainder of the force into two columns, which left camp at 11 p.m. on the 12th October. One column, under Colour-Sergeant J. Ellison, was to proceed to the east, cross the Nyando River, and attacking the Bomas or zaribas (which were stated to be grouped in a comparatively small tract of country), to drive the enemy to the west, returning to camp, if possible, before nightfall. I may here mention that this programme was carried out in a thoroughly satisfactory manner by Colour-Sergeant Ellison, who inflicted severe loss on the enemy.

With the other column I proceeded with the intention of surprising the Boma of the Laibons, and of subsequently acting as circumstances might demand. After marching continuously until about 4 a.m. on the 13th the zariba was surrounded and taken after considerable opposition. The column then continued its advance, and after making large captures of live stock, and inflicting severe losses on the enemy, a suitable site was selected (at about 1 p.m. on the 13th) for a bivouac, as it was impossible to reach camp before nightfall. Owing to various circumstances it was found impracticable to complete more than a zariba for the captured live stock. The troops and auxiliaries were placed in the most favourable positions for protecting the captures and resisting an attack, and were warned of the extreme probability of this being made. The attack, in fact, took place at about 11 p.m., when it appears that the enemy assaulted in three bodies, one of which, breaking through the Masai spearmen, entered the cattle

* British officers, 5; local troops, 286.