

and throughout he gave me the most loyal assistance in our dealings, at times anxious, with the tribes.

I trust that Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne's request that a medal and clasp be given to all ranks serving with the expedition may meet with your Lordship's favourable consideration. Many of our Somalis served with the Italians, and show with pride the medals they received for the actions in which they were engaged. On political grounds alone the issue of a medal for the operations lately concluded would be expedient.

I would also recommend that some native title be created to reward native officers and officials who perform meritorious service in our African Protectorates, similar to the titles conferred by the Indian Government on deserving Mahomedan officials.

Bessalidar Musa Farih is a native officer eminently deserving of such a title, and I should wish to see one conferred on him, both on account of the good services he has performed for years past and the influential position he holds amongst his countrymen in Somaliland.

I have, &c.,

J. HAYES SADLER.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

London, November 10th, 1901.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to submit herewith my final Report on the recent operations conducted under my command in Somaliland.

I have, &c.,

E. J. E. SWAYNE, Lieutenant-Colonel,
Commanding Somali Levy.

Lieutenant-Colonel Swayne to Consul-General Sadler.

[Despatch relating to Field Operations.]

London, November 10, 1901.

SIR,

1. IN continuation of my despatches of June and July last, I have the honour to submit a final report on the raising of the Somali levy and the operations which resulted in the disorganization, and expulsion from the British Protectorate, of the Mullah Abdilla Hassan's armed following.

2. The raising of the levy dates back to the latter end of November, 1900, when, owing to the decision to withdraw the 2nd Battalion Central Africa Regiment, it became necessary to make some other arrangement to face the Mullah.

3. The position at this time was as follows:—

The Mullah, after his raids on the Abyssinians at Jig-Jiga, and his subsequent attacks upon our Habr Awal tribe, had moved westward to the pools of Harradiggit, situated in the Haud desert, 170 miles south of the Ishak border.

During August, September, and October our tribes, who had already suffered very severely from his raids, were kept in a state of perpetual alarm owing to the operations of bands of the Mullah's reconnoitring horsemen.

They had consequently retired to the arid coast region, where there was insufficient grazing to keep their flocks and herds alive for many days.

Formerly, although raids between the tribes were continual, a rough balance of power had existed, but the importation of arms by the Darud tribes, who supported the Mullah, absolutely altered this state of things, and placed the outlying sections of our Ishak tribes completely at the Mullah's mercy.

4. The tribes in Northern Somaliland may be classed into three main divisions: the Ishak, Darud, and Dir.

The Ishak are tribes within the Protectorate, with whom we have Treaties, to which, in 1886, "protective clauses" were added. These tribes, if we exclude a few fanatical individuals who were unsupported by their fellows, were at this time hostile to the Mullah and friendly to us.

The Darud, on the other hand, comprise the Ogaden clans south and outside of our Protectorate, and also the Dolbahanta, the bulk of whom were at this time actively supporting the Mullah, and hostile to us.

The Dir include the Esa and Gadabursi in the neighbourhood of Zeyla, remote from the scene of operations and unaffected by them.

It will be convenient, therefore, to bear in mind that, although the Administration at all times discriminated between the friendly and unfriendly sections of the Darud, and endeavoured to disabuse the people of the idea that the Darud, as a whole, were considered hostile to us, the Somali tribes generally, nevertheless, looked upon the Ishak as being on the side of Government and the Darud as being hostile.

5. Thousands of live-stock of the Ishak had been raided, and men, women, and children slaughtered. Numbers of children died from the want of milk, and the coast towns became full of destitute fugitives. The alarm spread even to Berbera and Bulhar.

6. The country is unsuitable to the employment of regular troops owing to its great distances and the scarcity of water and pasture. There is no cultivation whatever, and no food is obtainable, once the coast is left, except meat.

7. Moreover, the tribes had no confidence in the ability of regular troops to afford protection from devastating raids.

8. Regular troops had been employed in the operations against the Esa tribe in 1891. They suffered from the heat and want of water. The enemy, having greater mobility, was able to avoid the troops, and choose his opportunity for attack. At Hussein a small body of Esa rushed the camp, held by over 350 troops, and inflicted, in the dark, a considerable loss in killed and wounded.

9. It is by no means unusual for Somali horsemen whilst on a raid to cover 60 or 70 miles in a day, and even men on foot will cover over 50 miles.

10. The Mullah, being fully aware of the advantage conferred by superior mobility, disregarded our posts at Adadleh and Hargeisa, and successfully carried out his two most disastrous raids on our tribes, at a time when the 2nd Battalion King's Africa Rifles were holding posts in the interior.

11. It was therefore recognized that, in order to give adequate protection and reassure the tribes, it was necessary to have troops capable of moving as fast as the enemy.

Under these circumstances our requirements could only be met by a local levy, which could travel fast and could live entirely, if necessary, on the country. Sick men would not hamper rapid movement, as they could be sent back to their tribes on camels; moreover, an irregular levy had the advantage of being inexpensive.

12. I received orders from you on the 22nd November, 1900, to raise, as a preliminary measure, a sufficient number of men to replace the regulars.

13. In less than a week 250 men, comprising eight sections under the command of Coast Police Sepoys as Non-commissioned Officers were raised,