

being surrounded by a native population which might at any time turn against them supplied an external pressure tending to cohesion.

Their "station" was a collection of huts and houses covering a considerable area on an admirable site near the junction of the Oloin and Toshi Rivers. Many of the houses were rectangular and built in imitation of the European fashion. The whole was surrounded by a light palisade. A sentry-post on a high platform gave a good command of view over the whole surrounding country. A tall flag-staff was erected, no doubt to imitate still further an official station.

The mutineers fought from the first, resisting the troops by every means in their power. They possessed far more ammunition than was expected. Those that were killed before they had time to fire off many cartridges had, in some cases, forty-five rounds in their waist-belts. This ammunition is said to have been procured from No. 4 (Swahili) Company in part, when that company was at Faocera, as the mutineers are said to have communicated with these men through intermediaries. The influence of Ruadebba (now a prisoner), a son of Kabarega's, procured them more, and also quantities of trade goods of all kinds, from Unyoro. Rajumba was, no doubt, instrumental in this. Part of their ammunition they took with them when they first mutinied; more was obtained from the party ambuscaded near Kisalizzi, belonging to the 27th Baluch Regiment. Finally, three boxes, captured by the Lango from Lieutenant Wake's caravan near Alagoin's, when Lieutenant Wake attacked the mutineers, passed into the possession of the latter.

The mutineers had established themselves in the country of the Chief Obokhe (now a prisoner), made friends with such of the Lango clans as surrounded them most, nearly, and in most cases, made "blood-brotherhood" with them—an engagement on the whole very faithfully kept by the Lango, but which did not always serve to protect them, as the mutineers clung to the time-honoured policy of playing off the clans against each other in turns—a policy to which the short-sighted Lango lent themselves ready victims.

When some of the Chiefs subsequently said they wished to help us but dared not, owing to this "blood-brotherhood," a sufficiently ridiculous ceremony had to be gone through to free their consciences. Dr. Bagshawe, with due formalities, injected a dose of apomorphia into the cicatrix of the incision made in the "blood-brotherhood" rites. This made the patient violently sick in about five minutes. A few nauseous draughts afterwards completed the operation, and the subject's satisfaction in the breaking of the spell.

From their headquarters the mutineers, in conjunction with their Lango allies, carried out very extensive raids, even into the Acholi district, as already reported, and causing a great deal of injury. There is also no doubt that they, with a large section of Lango, were friendly with Rajumba, and caused a lot of disloyalty to be manifested in the Chopi district of Unyoro. Very large numbers of real Lango and Lango-speaking natives live in this district, and Ruadebba, who assiduously kept alive the fiction that Kabarega would shortly return, was a strong connecting link. I believe that the stories circulated concerning the hostility of the Lango to the Wanyoro of the Chopi district to have been chiefly blinds invented by Rajumba, Mpindu, and others, and that they, with Ruadebba, of the mutineers, with their friendly Lango, meant anything but well towards the Government.

The Lango had a great reputation among the Acholi and other Nile tribes as warriors. This rested, perhaps, mainly on the fact that they had twice destroyed considerable bodies armed with rifles. Treachery was probably their most effective weapon, and it seemed from our experiences to be characteristic of the Lango. Probably, also, that wonderful native ruler, Kabarega, succeeded in using their great numerical strength by combining the clans for a common object which they appear incapable of on their own initiative or under their own Chiefs. In Emin Pasha's time they cut up a column of 200 Soudanese in the Umiro country, destroying it to a man. The Remington rifles of this ill-fated body are to be met with everywhere still.

A party of eighty was similarly cut up in Moita, nor has the successful ambuscade of a small rear guard of Indian troops in 1899 been forgotten.

About half the Lango professed to side with the expedition but could rarely be trusted, as they had so many relations and friends on the other side.

During the earlier part of the operations the hostile Lango made several attempts to ambuscade columns but always failed. Night attacks, said to be a favourite habit of the Lango, they did not indulge in. On the few occasions on which they really faced the troops, they were so roughly handled as to effectually put an end to offensive tactics on their part. Latterly they confined themselves to helping the mutineers as much as they could and saving their own cattle and other belongings.

The operations took nearly four months to complete. This slowness is in the main attributable to two causes. Firstly, the early commencement this year of a very heavy rainy season. Owing to this the grass even in May was everywhere very dense and varying in height from 6 to 9 feet. The swamps were all full, and exceedingly difficult to cross. As they occurred every few miles and the grass covered the whole surface of the country, including the ground under the trees in the forest, it is unnecessary to insist further on the advantage this state of the country gave the enemy.

The second serious drawback was the outbreak of small-pox. As the majority of individuals in the force were unprotected by vaccination or previous attacks of the disease, it was necessary to enforce very stringent rules to control the outbreak. That it was in the end quite got under is a matter for congratulation, but it much limited the radius of action of the columns and reduced the number of available troops, as, owing to the necessity for establishing a number of separate camps, the guard duty became very heavy.

One circumstance probably contributed a good deal to the decision of the mutineers to resist, and also encouraged the Lango to continue the support they gave to the former. This was, that since the capture of Mwanga and Kabarega, none of the expeditions dispatched from Lamogi or Unyoro had inconvenienced the mutineers or Lango in any way, or caused them any losses. The mutineers were, no doubt, loth to leave what must have been to them an earthly paradise, and the Lango to relinquish the help of such congenial allies in villainy. Neither could realize at first that the Government, on this occasion, meant to proceed to extremities, and both fully expected that the troops would retire after the usual pronenade.

I must draw the attention of the Commandant to the excellent behaviour of the troops. With the exception of the marksmanship, which I