

success at Kano adds but one more to the list of his achievements in West Africa. General Kemball himself joined the force in the field after all initial arrangements had been made, and Kano, the objective of the operations, had been occupied, from which point he carried the campaign to a successful conclusion. There is no need for me to bear witness to General Kemball's ability as a Commander. I have had opportunities of doing so in strong terms on former occasions, when he was Acting Commandant in this Protectorate. The complete success of the operations allows a generous measure of credit to be accorded to every one concerned, both before and subsequent to the capture of Kano. Lieutenant-Colonel Festing, C.M.G., D.S.O., organized the preliminaries of the campaign prior to the arrival of Colonel Morland, to which its later success is largely due, and I heartily endorse the special mention made of him. I endorse also the commendation of the officers and British non-commissioned officers, whose names have been submitted by General Kemball and Colonel Morland; among whom the latter desires to include the name of Captain Skeffington-Smyth, and to mention the names of Quartermasters Lees and Carnell. I desire myself to specially commend Captain Abadie, to whom the success of the arrangements for the supply of the column were largely due, and on whose information, as Intelligence Officer, its movements were largely based. He accompanied me on special service later from Kano to Sokoto and back via Katsena, mapping the whole route, and his services were invaluable to me on this march, which was not devoid of some risk and difficulty. Among the individual officers to whom, in a special degree, the success of the operations was due, his name must be included.

6. In forwarding this able and clear report, the Regulations prescribe that I shall express my own opinion upon the operations as a whole. The report, however, speaks for itself. I have only to add to it an expression of the great pleasure which it gives me to record my keen appreciation of the accurate diagnosis of the situation made by the Political Officers; the foresight and thoroughness with which the necessary supplies (which proved amply adequate without excess) were collected at a minimum of cost, in spite of great transport difficulties; the ability of the leadership, and the forbearance and disciplinary control shown in victory; and the eagerness, loyalty, and gallantry of all ranks.

I have, &c.,

F. D. LUGARD.

Sir,

Zungeru, April 9, 1903.

I have the honour to submit a report summarising the operations of the Kano Expeditionary Force, of which I assumed command on my arrival at Zungeru on the 26th January, after reporting myself to Your Excellency for orders. The military instructions regarding the occupation of Kano, Katsena, and Sokoto, already given by you to Colonel T. L. N. Morland, D.S.O., Commanding Northern Nigeria Regiment, were transferred to me; Your Excellency at the same time directing that all political matters should be left in Colonel Morland's hands, as he was an officer of the Northern Nigeria Administration.

2. Colonel Morland had left Zungeru for Zaria on the 15th January, in command of a strong column of Northern Nigeria troops, and on the 21st January orders had been despatched to him to advance at once on Kano,

On my arrival at Zungeru, where the telegraph line ended, it seemed to me necessary that I should proceed to the front without delay, for in no other manner could I have any say as to the conduct of further military operations; with your concurrence I therefore sent orders to Colonel Morland to confine himself to the effective occupation of Kano and to await my arrival there.

3. Before leaving Zungeru on the 29th January, I issued orders, after consulting Your Excellency, on the following points:—

(a) The organization of the line of communications to Zaria, under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel A. Festing, C.M.G., D.S.O., Northern Nigeria Regiment.

(b) The movement of the Lagos contingent of 300 men and 300 carriers to Zungeru, for employment there, and on the line of communications.

(c) The way in which the reserve troops should be employed, if required nearer to the front. I also obtained your sanction to the collection at Lokoja of 300 carriers from the Benue, so as to mobilize the Southern Nigeria contingent, as the ordinary sources of carrier supply in the Niger Valley were completely exhausted.

4. On my way through Zaria I made such arrangements as still seemed necessary for the security of that garrison, in case of attack, and sent orders (of which I informed Your Excellency) to Lieutenant-Colonel Festing not to withdraw from Zaria the troops for the Bautche garrison until those troops had been replaced at Zaria by the Lagos contingent.

5. In the meantime Colonel Morland had advanced from Zaria on the 29th January. On the 1st February he encountered opposition at the walled town of Bebedji, but blew in the gate with shell fire, entered the town, and dispersed the enemy, with only two casualties on our side, viz., Lieutenant Wright and one soldier of the Mounted Infantry wounded.

6. On the night of the 2nd the column camped at the Shallawa River, six miles from Kano, and the next morning Colonel Morland advanced at 6 A.M. on Kano, with the force detailed in margin,* leaving his carriers in a zariba, guarded by two officers and 75 men.

Colonel Morland brought two guns into action at about 1,000 yards from the walls of the town, and extended two companies at about 600 yards from and facing the main gate, which he proposed to attack.

The guns had no effect on the walls, owing to their great thickness (40 feet at base and four feet at loopholes), and the gate itself was hidden from view by bushes.

Colonel Morland therefore decided to attack another gate, about half-a-mile to the west. He left 1½ companies to hold its defenders to the main gate and moved three companies and the guns to a point opposite to the new point of attack.

The Mounted Infantry were kept out to guard the flanks, and a portion of them were dismounted, in order to assist in keeping down the fire of the enemy from the walls.

The guns soon breached the gate, and the storming party, led by Lieutenants Dyer and Gascoyne and Sergeant Lefanu, effected an entrance and drove the enemy from the walls. The Mounted Infantry meanwhile had galloped round both sides of the town, and as the enemy

* 24 Officers, 2 Medical Officers, 12 European Non-Commissioned Officers, 71 Artillery, 550 Infantry, 161 Mounted Infantry, 4—75 mm. Guns, 4 Maxims.