

evacuated the south walls, and tried to escape from those to the north, they attacked them and did great execution.

Colonel Morland's column then occupied the town, which was not looted or in any way damaged. It met with but slight resistance when once within the walls.

The enemy lost about 300 killed.

Our casualties were:—Lieutenant Dyer, severely wounded; Captain Farquhar, slightly wounded; 12 rank and file wounded; three horses killed by rifle fire from walls.

The slight loss with which the capture of this formidable fortified town was effected, in spite of the resistance offered by an enemy numbering several thousands, reflects great credit on Colonel Morland and the officers and men under his command. The preservation of the town is evidence of the good discipline of the force, and of the manner in which it was kept in hand.

The vigour of the Mounted Infantry pursuit turned the defeat into a rout, and the pursuit was continued until the enemy was dispersed in all directions.

7. On my arrival at Kano on the 13th February, I found that Colonel Morland's column had been ready to move since the 9th. The enemy had, however, dispersed to their homes after the fight of the 3rd, and the only intelligence was a report that the Emir Aliyu, who had been absent at Sokoto when his capital fell, was returning with a considerable following.

Colonel Morland, therefore, in accordance with my orders, had undertaken no further movements pending my arrival. On the 13th and 15th February I received letters from Your Excellency written from Zaria on the 11th and 12th, announcing your arrival there, but detention by illness. You informed me that the situation had so changed since giving me orders as to the further conduct of the campaign beyond the occupation of Kano that you cancelled those orders, in so far as they applied to an advance against Sokoto. You desired that the responsibility for such an advance should rest, if undertaken, solely on me. You also pointed out the primary importance of making the garrison to be left at Kano impregnable, and of rendering safe the road from Zaria to Kano.

You also informed me of the unfriendliness of the town of Zaria towards us.

These were the last orders that reached me from Your Excellency up to the 17th March, *i.e.*, two days after the occupation of Sokoto.

8. Information had in the meantime reached Kano on the 14th, and the news was confirmed next morning, that a gathering of fighting men from all parts of the Kano province was taking place some 60 miles to the north-west, and the Resident, Captain Abadie, reported that all the chiefs of the district were on their way to this rendezvous and that the Emir Aliyu was near Kaura, and had sent to Sokoto for advice and aid. As I considered that the steps taken by Colonel Morland and myself for the safety of Zaria and Kano and for the safety of the road between these towns were adequate, and that it was essential to break up the gathering to the north-west, I directed Colonel Morland to advance on the 16th with this objective, and informed Your Excellency that I was accompanying his column.

9. In order to make a portion of the reserves more easily available if required, I sent orders to Colonel Festing to move one company Lagos Battalion to Zaria, one company Southern Nigeria Regiment and one 75 mm. gun to Argungu, conveying a reserve of gun and small-arm ammunition.

In view of the employment of more Europeans and the possible prolongation of operations beyond the period up to then thought probable, I also ordered the collection of one month's ration for 50 Europeans.

10. Before leaving Kano, I added the road between Zaria and Kano to the line of communications command and directed Lieutenant-Colonel Festing to send up a Field Officer to take charge of this section. In the meantime I placed the senior officer, Captain E. H. Lewis, who was commanding the Kano garrison, in command of the section, and left him instructions to be handed over to the Section Commandant on arrival. I also had full instructions sent to the Officer Commanding Zaria as to the precautions to be adopted for the safety of his post, and warned Colonel Festing, Commanding Line of Communications, that it was improbable that after leaving Kano I should be able to keep up communication with him.

11. As Colonel Morland's column advanced from Kano the enemy fell back, keeping a day or two's march ahead. Reports were received almost daily that Aliyu, Emir of Kano, was advancing from Kaura via Kammane with a large force to join the Kano gathering.

But on our arrival at Ummadau, about 100 miles north-west of Kano, on the 22nd February, it was evident that the reverse was the case, and that the Kano gathering had fallen back through a tract of bush almost devoid of water, to join their Emir, who was reported to be still a day's march or more north of Kaura.

I accordingly directed Colonel Morland to leave a portion of his Mounted Infantry to demonstrate from Ummadau up to the Kammane route, to move his main column via Duru on Kaura, and to send a party of Mounted Infantry from Duru to Kotorokoshi, from which place it was to follow the Zaria-Kano caravan route to Kaura. The whole force was to be concentrated at Kaura on the 26th.

12. As I reported from Duru on the 23rd, it was hoped by these arrangements to deter Aliyu from retracing his steps to Kano via Kammane, to meet him with the main column should he move on Kano via Duru, while should he move on Zaria or Kano via Kotorokoshi, we should at least have knowledge of his movements.

If, however, he halted at Birnin Goga, one march north of Kaura, the whole force would be concentrated at the latter place on the 26th to attack him, or to follow him should he elect to retire on Sokoto or elsewhere.

13. On the evening of the 25th the main column reached Modamawa, after an exhausting march of 27 miles without water, and was joined by Captain Porter with the Mounted Infantry from Ummadau. This officer's party had covered 60 miles in 31 hours, after several skirmishes on the Kammane road, in which he had gained intelligence from prisoners that the Emir Aliyu had fled towards Sokoto, but that the bulk of his followers were now making for Kano by the Kotorokoshi road. This news was confirmed by the townspeople of Modomawa, which place a large body of the enemy had only left that morning. It was also reported by some traders that they had heard firing near Kotorokoshi about mid-day.

I accordingly desired Colonel Morland to gain touch with and support Lieutenant Wright's party, while the main column halted at Modomawa, and he despatched Captain Porter with all available Mounted Infantry next morning and sent infantry in support later.

14. Lieutenant W. D. Wright, with Lieutenant C. L. Wells and 45 men of the Mounted Infantry,