

very high standard of efficiency, and is a performance of which the Northern Nigeria Regiment may justly be proud. There were, in addition, some 70 armed constabulary in charge of the fort: their arms were not sufficiently reliable to admit of any portion taking part in the action. The enemy fought with great bravery, repeatedly charging the square, and the village was taken at the point of the bayonet. The Mounted Infantry pursued the fugitives, as did also the native horsemen, who had accounts to settle with them for the numbers of people they had killed, and the villages they had destroyed.

9. I would bring to your Lordship's notice, and to that of the Secretary of State for War and the Army Council, the admirable service done by Major R. H. Goodwin, Royal Artillery, not only in his skilful handling of his troops in the field, which is apparent from the enclosed despatches, but also in the dispositions made prior to the advance of the reliefs. I formed a very high opinion of this officer, and I predict for him a distinguished career. He brings to my notice the names of two officers, Captains Gallagher and Fendall, and two British non-commissioned officers, Sergeants Slack and Maynard; the proportion (4 out of 30) is not large, and I would strongly recommend them for recognition, and, in especial, Captain Gallagher, who has, on repeated occasions, shown exceptional ability in handling troops, and distinguished personal gallantry. He has been frequently mentioned in despatches, and I believe that his influence with his men is unusual, and they will follow him anywhere. I endorse the recommendations among the native ranks which appear in the despatches, and in especial I desire to commend the conduct of Privates Moma Wurrikin and Moma Zaria, whom I referred to in paragraph 3. The action of Private Moma Wurrikin appears to me worthy of the highest reward. Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler adds the names of two more officers, and of one non-commissioned officer for your consideration, especially that of Captain Macdonell. I trust also that your Lordship may see fit to express, through the High Commissioner of Southern Nigeria, to Major McLeod and the officers and 150 rank and file of the Lagos contingent your appreciation of the strenuous efforts made by them to reach Northern Nigeria with the least possible delay. They started, I believe, within 24 hours of the receipt of the news, and reached Zungeru on or about March 5th, too late, of course, to take part in the operations, but, had the matter taken a more protracted and less fortunate course, their services would have been of great value to us. Their discipline and conduct was exemplary, and I heard no single word of complaint during their stay in Northern Nigeria. I would also remind your Lordship of the really phenomenal marches made by the troops under Lieutenant-Colonel Hasler's command, on receipt of the news and orders of recall, from Munshiland.

Captain Cock, with a column of 280 troops and 300 carriers, marched overland some 312 miles in 12½ days, over bad roads and through a part of the country affording insufficient supplies. Lieutenant-Colonel Dobell, coming by river to Katcha, with a half company, marched the last 83 miles in 48 hours.

10. The difficulty and anxiety at the time was very greatly increased by news from Eastern Bauchi that certain fanatical preachers were inciting the people to exterminate "unbelievers," and by the attitude of the Emir of Hadeija—or

rather of a war-faction among his chiefs and satellites. The former matter was dealt with in a prompt and effective way by the Hon. O. Howard, Resident of Bauchi, but I judged it unwise to postpone any longer a settlement of the matters at issue with Hadeija. It was, I think, largely due to the boastful and independent attitude of this town that the propaganda to which I have alluded had arisen. Even after the arrest of the preachers in Bauchi, it appeared doubtful whether the band of fanatical leaders, who were said to have assembled in German territory with the view of preaching a Jihad at Bima, in Bauchi, had finally dispersed. For three years I had endeavoured to conciliate Hadeija, and this action was, as usual, interpreted as a sign of fear. Our reverse at Satiru compelled me to reassert the prestige of the Government (on which our rule depends), and I judged that the fall of Hadeija would put a final end to the Bima excitement. Nor could I longer afford to leave this threat on the flank of Kano, necessitating the presence of 250 troops, whom I could not detach for service elsewhere, however great the emergency. Moreover, of late it had been reported that schemes for "rushing" the fort at night had been discussed in Hadeija. In addition to this a soldier had been murdered, it was said deliberately and in cold blood, by the Emir's orders, but this had not been proved, and investigation or reparation was, in the circumstances and tension, impossible without recourse to arms. I, therefore, instructed the Resident to inform the Emir that this state of things had now lasted long enough, and to call upon him to surrender the principal agitators of the war faction whose names were well known (giving him 24 hours to consider his reply); these I intended to remove to another province. Meanwhile I told the Resident to inform the Emir, whom I believed to be not ill-disposed, that if he was anxious but unable to comply with my ultimatum, he might run away to Katagum till the trouble was over, after which I would reinstate him.

11. The Commandant, Colonel Lowry Cole, had meantime returned to Nigeria, the troops had returned from Munshiland, and by April 16th the forces engaged at Sokoto had also returned. On that date a force marched out of Kano. When joined by the garrison of Hadeija it amounted to 24 officers, 10 British non-commissioned officers and 687 rank and file, with two guns, and was accompanied by Captain Phillips, D.S.O., Resident, and Captain Rice, Assistant Resident. They found on their way that all preparations for fighting had been made at Hadeija. My message was sent to the Emir, who struck the messenger (the greatest insult a Fulani could offer), and contemptuously invited Colonel Cole to come and arrest the persons for himself. A main gate in the almost impregnable walls (which rival or surpass those of Kano) was immediately seized. It was not defended, and Colonel Cole formed up inside the town in the open space which intervened between the outer and an old ruined inner wall. Acting with striking self-constraint, and knowing my desire to avoid bloodshed, he sent a messenger three times to "warn the people that if they laid down their arms and came out they had nothing to fear," and he was about to send a fourth embassy with an officer, though the mounted men were apparently ready for action, when he was charged by a body of mounted spearmen. The majority were swept away by the fire of the troops, but re-formed, and charged again with the same result. Again Colonel Cole hoped to