

previous to that date did most excellent work in Sokoto Fort. He acted as Major Burdon's Staff Officer previous to my arrival, and Major Burdon speaks of him in the highest terms.

Sergeant Maynard, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment. A most energetic and reliable non-commissioned officer, who did most excellent work on the march up, and also on the 10th instant. He was always in the right place and ready to do anything.

*Among Native Ranks.*

No. 1836, Lance-Corporal Dowdu Chicogo.  
No. 3739, Private Samari.  
No. 3548, Corporal Dania Kano.  
No. 1093, Private Jagaba.  
No. 3431, Private Ali Sorbo. All of "F" Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment.

The two former I noticed particularly in the way they stuck to their officer, Captain Gallagher, during the bayonet charge, and by their fire and bayonet fighting protected him from the enemy. The other names have been given to me by Captain Gallagher.

No. 1684, Sergeant Oyanshola.  
No. 3115, Lance-Corporal Mah Kuchi.  
No. 2091, Private Musa Argungu.  
No. 1636, Corporal Akabi, Illorin. All of "B" Company, 1st Northern Nigeria Regiment.

These names were given to me by Lieutenant Mann commanding "B" Company. It will be understood that the view inside the town being very limited, I could only see what was going on immediately around me.

I attach a list of the casualties sustained on the 10th March, and also a list of those sustained on the 14th February, on the occasion of the reverse to "C" Company, Mounted Infantry, Northern Nigeria Regiment.

I also attach reports from Major Green, D.S.O., and heartily endorse the recommendations made by that officer.

R. H. GOODWIN, Major,

Officer Commanding Troops, Sokoto.

March 15, 1906.

To Major Goodwin,  
Officer Commanding Troops, Sokoto,

Sokoto, March 12, 1906.

I beg to forward the following report on the part taken by the Mounted Infantry under my command at the action at Satiru on March 10th, 1906.

On 9th instant I received orders from you relative to the attack on Satiru to take place the following morning, and at 2 A.M., the 10th instant, the Mounted Infantry, "D" and "F" companies, with "C" and one section "G" forming a composite company, in all 229 native ranks, with nine officers, four British non-commissioned officers, one British non-commissioned officer, Royal Army Medical Corps, marched with the remainder of the column on Satiru, Lieutenant Fendall, with a section, forming the advance screen, and the remainder of the Mounted Infantry following in rear of the Infantry during the night.

At about 7 A.M. the column came in sight of the town of Satiru, and under orders from yourself the Mounted Infantry moved away to our right flank, with the object of working round the enemy should they come out of Satiru to the attack, and seeking a position from whence to

bring flanking fire to bear upon them, and also to be ready to take up the pursuit.

The ground on this flank, west of Satiru, is not very favourable for the carrying out of such an object. I had been led to suppose, from reports brought in, that high ground commanded the town on this side. The high ground which I suppose was meant in these reports was, however, discovered to be too far distant to be of any value to us, and we were, therefore, forced to come across a low-lying valley with gently rising ground, up to the town, which lay just behind this rise, and was thus invisible to anyone approaching by this line until within some 200 yards of it. While in this valley the Infantry square and the main body of the enemy were also invisible to us.

About 8 A.M. the sound of firing from the Infantry square was heard, and shortly afterwards Lieutenant Fendall and his section, having cleared the front of the Infantry, joined the rest of the Mounted Infantry.

As we continued to move across the valley a number of the enemy appeared coming over the rise to our front, and commenced coming down the hill to attack us. I accordingly formed square, and when the enemy were within about 400 yards, opened fire. Their loss was heavy, but in spite of this they continued to advance with great determination, the leaders of the line being within 100 yards of the square before their advance was stopped. Those that were left then fell back behind the rise. Having sent scouts on to the top of the ridge, I ordered an advance to the crest line, when the town came into [? view] within some 200 yards of us with a large number of the enemy in a straggling line around its edge. I immediately ordered dismounted action, and our fire drove back the enemy, who had once more advanced on us, into the town. From the position now gained a view of the Infantry square some 100 yards distant on our left flank was obtained. Being anxious to keep my men in hand for the pursuit, I did not consider myself justified in pushing on into the town, and as my position appeared likely to mask the fire of the now advancing Infantry, I retired the Mounted Infantry some 200 to 300 yards down the slope. This manoeuvre was misunderstood by the enemy who, apparently thinking they had driven us back, charged out of the town and up and over the crest line with loud shouts.

This temerity cost them dear, as halting and rapidly coming into action again, our fire caused them considerable loss as they advanced over the sky line, and once more they fell back, leaving many dead and wounded on the field.

Shortly after this, about 9 A.M., shells from the main body commenced to fall into the town, and I accordingly commenced to move round the rear (south-west) of the town, where a few scattered fugitives were to be seen going away in a southerly direction.

At 9.30 A.M. I received a message from Major Goodwin informing me that a large number of the enemy had left the town on the east side, covered from view by the ground, and ordering me to pursue.

As we were in the act of moving off to follow this party, a large number of the enemy were seen leaving the town on the west side, and running down the hill lately occupied by us, now about a mile distant. I decided to deal with this lot first, and swinging round formed line of half companies, thus bringing the whole into two lines