

cuted in a most orderly manner, but with great dash, our Infantry being well supported by the Artillery, whilst the Maxims advanced with the line. In a short while the enemy were broken and fled in disorder, leaving our troops in undisputed possession of the field.

A careful estimate of the Fur casualties, which was made subsequently, gave the total losses at over 1,000; 231 dead and 96 seriously wounded were counted within 500 yards of our position immediately after the battle. From parade states discovered at El Fasher it appeared that the enemy's force on this occasion consisted of 3,600 riflemen, besides a number of spearmen and auxiliaries.

Colonel Kelly pays a warm tribute to the admirable manner in which the various units engaged on this occasion were handled by their commanders, and to the steadiness and discipline of the troops, who throughout were most skilfully supported by the guns. To these factors he ascribes the credit for this signal victory won over a numerically very superior force, in what was distinctly a "soldiers' " battle.

Our casualties were:—

*Officers.*

Captain H. C. Maydon, 12th Lancers, Mounted Infantry, severely wounded.

El Mulazim Awal (Lieutenant) Mohammed Effendi Yusri, Artillery, slightly wounded.

El Mulazim Tani (2nd Lieutenant) Ahmed Effendi Mohammed Zahran, 14th Sudanese, slightly wounded.

*Rank and File.*

Killed	...	...	...	...	2
Died of wounds	...	...	...	...	3
Wounded	...	...	...	...	18

The force resumed the march to El Fasher at 4.0 p.m. the same evening, and went into bivouac, which was strongly entrenched for the night, a few miles outside the capital. Here, at 3.0 a.m. next morning (23rd May), they were attacked by what, in the light of our star shell and magnesium flares, appeared to be a force of about 500 horsemen and 300 infantry. This attack was driven off with the loss to the force of one artilleryman wounded. At 6.0 a.m., when the troops were about to advance, some hundreds of the enemy to our left flank were dispersed by artillery and maxim fire and bombed by aeroplane. At 10.0 am. Colonel Kelly, with the mounted troops, entered El Fasher, which was found to be almost deserted except by women.

Sultan Ali Dinar, on receipt of the news of the crushing defeat at Beringia, made a final effort to rally the remainder of his army to the attack in the early morning of the 23rd, and subsequently fled with some 2,000 men, who were bombed as they emerged from the south end of the town by Lieutenant J. C. Slessor, Royal Flying Corps, in the course of a gallant and successful flight. The Sultan is now in the neighbourhood of Jebel Marra with a greatly reduced following, and is unlikely for the moment to give further trouble.

The booty taken at El Fasher included four guns, 55,000 rounds S.A.A., and the whole of the local plant for the manufacture of gunpowder, and upwards of 4,000 rifles were captured or handed in within a few weeks of our occupation of the town.

On the 9th June I was able to report that the greater portion of the local population had already returned, and that amongst the numerous individuals who had surrendered since the battle were included nearly all the Sultan's lieutenants and Darfur notables who were not previously accounted for.

I am well aware that these operations are insignificant in importance as compared with the tremendous conflicts now being waged in Europe and Asia; but I have described them at some length inasmuch as they constitute, in themselves, a military feat of some distinction.

It will be realised that a most careful and comprehensive organisation was required to convey some 3,000 men, with stores, guns, aeroplanes and other bulky equipment of a modern expeditionary force, from the base at Khartoum (500 miles by rail from the nearest seaport) to rail-head 428 miles distant, and thence across a desolate tract of roadless country, almost barren of food supplies and served by half a dozen local water centres, for nearly 400 miles, and there to occupy a stronghold defended by a numerically superior and fanatical enemy, armed with modern rifles and of no mean fighting spirit. That this was accomplished without a hitch or set-back of any kind is due to the excellence of the preliminary staff arrangements, to the fine qualities of leadership possessed by Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly and his subordinate commanders, and to the splendid fighting spirit and endurance shown by all ranks of the expeditionary force under the very arduous conditions inseparable from a campaign during the summer months in the Sudan.

Lieutenant-Colonel Kelly's sound judgment and correct appreciation of the military situation have been frequently shown in his admirable conduct of the expedition. He pays a tribute, which I gladly endorse, to the loyal and unfailing support he has received from the commanding and subordinate officers of the units of his force. In particular he acknowledges the great assistance afforded to him at all times by Major C. W. Spinks, Royal Artillery, Commanding the Artillery, by Major C. H. Little, his Chief Staff Officer (who also was responsible for much of the early preparation for the expedition), and by Major H. J. Huddleston, O.C. Camel Corps, and Major W. H. M. Cowan, Cameron Highlanders, Commanding Arab Battalion, and Major E. A. T. Bayly, Royal Welsh Fusiliers, Commanding 13th Battalion, Sudanese Infantry. Of the work of (temporary) Captain H. A. MacMichael, the Political and Intelligence Officer, Colonel Kelly speaks in the highest terms. It is satisfactory to know that Captain MacMichael's remarkable knowledge of Darfur and its natives, and his capacity for incessant work, will be fully utilised in connection with the future administration of the 150,000 square miles of new territory which this successful expedition has regained to the Sudan.

I have included the remainder of Colonel Kelly's mentions of individual officers and men who have performed specially meritorious services in the list submitted at the end of my despatch.

I desire also to bring to notice the valuable contribution to the success of these operations which has been rendered by certain corps and units whose work could not conveniently be described in the foregoing summary.