

sufficiently grateful, and to which the success achieved in this campaign was in no small measure due. At the end of March, then, the East African Force—apart from lines of communication troops, under Brigadier-General W. F. S. Edwards, D.S.O., as I.G.C.—was organised as follows:—

*The First Division*, under Major-General A. R. Hoskins, C.M.G., D.S.O., comprised the First East African Brigade, under Brigadier-General S. H. Sheppard, D.S.O., and the Second East African Brigade, under Brigadier-General J. A. Hannington, C.M.G., D.S.O.

*The Second Division*, under Major-General J. L. van Deventer, comprised the First South African Mounted Brigade, under Brigadier-General Manie Botha, and the Third South African Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General C. A. L. Berrange, C.M.G.

*The Third Division*, under Major-General Coen Brits, comprised the Second South African Mounted Brigade, under Brigadier-General B. Enslin, and the Second South African Infantry Brigade, under Brigadier-General P. S. Beves.

The Second South African Mounted Brigade arrived in May and was ready to take the field in the latter half of June.

Having completed the above reorganisation I disposed the infantry units as far as possible at suitable points on high and dry ground at Moschi, Himo and Mbuyuni, with only advance guards along the deadly malarial line of the Ruwu, facing the enemy forces in the Pare Mountains.

The First Mounted Brigade was pushed on to the Aruscha area, which was reported to be most suitable for horses, and at the end of March the whole brigade had arrived there.

#### *General Plan of Invasion.*

(3) The most important problem for consideration was the strategy to be followed in the coming campaign. As a result of the preceding operations we had just barely entered the enemy territory, which stretched out before us in enormous extent, with no known vital point anywhere, containing no important cities or centres, with practically no roads, the only dominant economical features of the whole being the two railway systems. Faulty strategy at the beginning, a wrong line of invasion once entered upon, might lead to months of futile marching and wasted effort. All our information credited the enemy with the two-fold intention of conducting an obstinate and prolonged campaign in the Pare and Usambara Mountains, and thereafter retiring to fight out the last phases of the campaign in the Tabora area, from which much of his supplies and most of his recruits were drawn. Careful consideration was given to the various alternative lines of invasion that presented themselves.

(4) There was, in the first place, the possibility of advancing inland from the coast along the existing railway lines, which had been adopted with such signal success in the German South-West Africa campaign. An advance from Tanga was, however, ruled out because I considered the place of no importance after the Tanga railway had been reached further north. Much, on the other hand, was to be said for an advance inland from Dar-es-Salaam, the capture of which would have great political and military importance, and would much facilitate the transport and supply arrange-

ments for the campaign into the interior. It was, however, also ruled out, partly because the prevalence of the S.E. monsoon at that period makes a landing of a large force on that coast an operation of great difficulty and even danger, partly because a prolonged campaign on the coast immediately after the rainy season would mean the disappearance of a very large percentage of my army from malaria and other tropical ailments.

(5) In the second place consideration was given to the question of an advance on Tabora by Victoria Nyanza, which we controlled, and Muanza, which would have to be wrested from the enemy. This plan had the advantage of presenting a comparatively short line of advance, and of promising to strike at the main recruiting ground of the enemy forces, as the German *askaris* would be loath to remain in the field after their homes and families had fallen into our hands. Its adoption, however, would involve the transfer to a distant theatre of a large part of our forces while the enemy army would remain concentrated and ready to strike at our railway communications with the coast. But my main objection to adopting it was the consideration that to occupy so huge a territory as German East Africa within reasonable time a simultaneous advance from different points along different routes was essential. Now in the Eastern Lake and Uganda area we already had a force of about 2,000 rifles; in addition the Belgians had a very large force in the West in the neighbourhood of Lake Kivu with which they were prepared to invade the Ruanda and Urundi districts if we could assist them with the necessary transport and supply arrangements *via* Victoria Nyanza. For the occupation of the western parts of German East Africa it was therefore only necessary to make these arrangements, and thereby to set the Belgian and British forces simultaneously in sympathetic motion in the Ruanda and Bukoba districts respectively. This was done, and with the best results, as will be described later.

(6) There remained, then, the third and last alternative of either striking at the main enemy forces in the Pare and Usambara mountains along the Tanga railway line, or of launching an attack against the interior and the Central Railway from Aruscha. A movement against the enemy concentration along the Tanga railway had, however, several grave disadvantages. It was the step desired and expected by the enemy, as the massing of almost his entire fighting force in that area showed. It would involve a prolonged and costly campaign over terrain which nature and art had prepared admirably for defensive purposes. And at the end of such a campaign the entire enemy territory would still remain unoccupied, as the operations would have been conducted lengthwise all along the border. On the other hand an advance from Aruscha into the interior, if it was not to be a mere temporary raid but a secure and permanent occupation of the country, had to be in such force that it could meet any counter-attack by the enemy, who would in such counter-attack have the advantage of his two railway systems and so be practically moving on interior lines. Such an advance in force, therefore, ran the risk of weakening our forces in front of the enemy in the Pare and Usambara mountains and of giving him an opening to attack our vulnerable communications both with the interior and the coast.