

(7) In spite of these difficulties powerful arguments weighed with me in finally deciding in favour of an advance into the interior. I was informed that the violence of the coming rainy season would be mostly confined to the Kilimanjaro-Aruscha area; that further West and South the rainy season was milder and would not markedly interfere with military operations; and therefore an advance into the interior would prevent our operations being brought to a complete standstill during the rainy months of April and May. In addition to this the enemy had made the mistake of retiring South along the Tanga railway with practically his entire fighting force, and the door to the interior stood wide open and unguarded. Even the six companies which had operated between Kilimanjaro and Meru mountains against General Stewart's advance from Longido, and were expected by me to fall back on Aruscha and obstruct our advance in that direction, joined the enemy's main force at Kahe. A small detachment at Aruscha fell back before the advance of our mounted scouts, and when the mounted brigade arrived at Aruscha at the end of March there was for the moment nothing to prevent an immediate movement into the heart of the enemy country. I decided to push the whole of the 2nd Division into the interior under van Deventer, and for the present to keep the other two divisions with me in rain quarters facing the enemy concentration South of the Ruwa. In this way it would be possible to occupy a valuable portion of the enemy country within the next two months; and if, as I expected, this move would and must have the effect of compelling the enemy to withdraw large forces from the Pares and Usambaras to stem the tide of invasion into the interior I could, if necessary, strengthen van Deventer still further and yet have sufficient troops left to make a comparatively easy conquest of these mountains against the enemy's weakened defence. These anticipations were fully realised, as will be seen from the sequel.

*Van Deventer's March to Kondoa Irangi.*

(8) By April 1st the Headquarters of the 2nd Division, together with the 1st South African Mounted Brigade and two batteries of artillery had reached Aruscha, while two battalions of the 3rd South African Infantry Brigade were on the way.

On the same day General van Deventer reported that his scouts had engaged the enemy six miles north of Lolkissale, an isolated rocky hill in the Masai Steppe some 35 miles southwest of Aruscha. Further reports showed that this force consisted of a detachment of the enemy which had taken up a position covering the water springs on the hill, and that no other water was to be found in the vicinity. I therefore issued instructions that the movement southward should be initiated by the occupation of Lolkissale.

This operation was carried out with great skill by the 1st Mounted Brigade. On the morning of the 3rd April three regiments of South African Horse moved out from Aruscha, and during the night of 3rd/4th April surrounded Lolkissale. The enemy held the mountain with considerable determination, and fighting continued all day on the 4th and 5th, but at daybreak on the 6th the whole force, consisting of the 28th Field Company and Kaempfe's Detachment numbering 17 whites and 404

*askaris* with porters and two machine guns, surrendered. Our horses had been without water since noon of the 3rd. A large quantity of stores, ammunition, pack animals, etc., fell into our hands, while from information obtained from prisoners and captured documents it was ascertained that the enemy contemplated reinforcing Ufiome and Kondoa Irangi, and that the garrisons at these places had received instructions to hold out as long as possible. As it was evident that the bulk of these reinforcements must be sent from the troops on the Usambara Railway, and that several weeks must elapse before they could arrive, I decided to press forward the movement southwards of the 2nd Division as rapidly as possible, and ordered General van Deventer to send his mounted troops to occupy Ufiome, Umbulu and Kondoa Irangi before the enemy could reinforce them. The remainder of the 2nd Division to follow in support of the mounted troops.

(9) The 1st Mounted Brigade continued its advance to Ufiome on the 7th, encountering the enemy's patrols at various points of the route and dispersing them with loss in killed and prisoners. On the 10th the enemy were located holding a kopje in the vicinity of Ufiome, and on the 11th the Brigade advanced from the Tarangire River. This movement resulted in the occupation of Ufiome on the 13th, the garrison of about 20 whites and 200 *askaris* retiring into the mountains, leaving 30 prisoners, some wounded and a large quantity of supplies in our hands. The enemy was pursued for 20 miles south to Kiese and Ssalanga, retiring in disorder.

(10) As the horses of the 1st Mounted Brigade were greatly exhausted by the continuous marching and fighting a halt was made at Ssalanga until the 17th. The 4th South African Horse had in the meantime been sent by me to join the 2nd Division, and on its arrival was directed on Ubugwe with instructions to clear Umbulu of the enemy.

The 10th South African Infantry and 28th Mountain Battery were also detailed by General van Deventer to follow in support of the 4th South African Horse. Umbulu was finally occupied on 11th May, about one company of the enemy being driven out with loss.

The advance southward continued on the 17th, and contact was made with the enemy four miles north of Kondoa Irangi on the same day. Fighting continued till noon of the 19th, when our troops occupied Kondoa Irangi with no casualties, having inflicted a loss on the enemy of 20 killed, and 4 whites and 30 *askaris* captured. The enemy succeeded in destroying the wireless station and a portion of his supplies, but left behind about 80 rifles with much ammunition, and 800 head of cattle.

(11) General van Deventer reported after this action that his horses were so exhausted that he would not be able to move until remounts arrived. He had lost hundreds of animals from horse sickness during his advance of some 200 miles from Moschi in the last four weeks, and his troops were worn out with ceaseless marching and fighting. I therefore decided that the 2nd Division should concentrate at Kondoa Irangi with detachments at Ufiome and Umbulu, and send patrols towards the Central Railway, Ssingida, Mkalama and Handeni. During the remainder of the month and the first few days of May this concentration was gradually effected. The expedition, conducted