

back to his main line of defence at Nurunyu, opposite to which our troops entrenched.

Active reconnaissance was carried out on the 19th in preparation for attack, but in view of reliable information that the enemy had received considerable reinforcements from the north, I did not consider it advisable to press the Lindi offensive further at the time, and decided to confine action in that area to active patrolling and to organisation and preparation until the Kilwa force should be ready to move.

17. The attempt at the end of July to drive Naumann south on to the Central Railway had not been successful. In the early days of August he succeeded in evading our troops on the Kondoa-Dodoma line by night marches through thick bush, and broke out with his main force eastwards towards Luita. As this movement brought him beyond the reach of the Belgian troops, these were withdrawn, and the pursuit taken up by a column under Colonel Dyke, consisting of the 1st Battalion, Cape Corps and King's African Rifles Mounted Infantry, gradually reinforced by the 10th South African Horse, as that regiment completed its mobilisation. One Nigerian battalion was also temporarily attached to this column.

Reports first indicated that he was making for Handeni, and I formed a small mobile column of King's African Rifles at Korogwe to meet this move. On the 13th information was received that Naumann was moving south from Luita towards the railway, and our troops moved to intercept him. Finding himself headed off, he moved east towards the Nguru Hills, closely pursued by our troops, which now included part of the 10th South African Horse. Naumann had now divided into three parties, and reports became in consequence very conflicting; but by the 21st it was evident that his main force was moving north again, via the Masai Steppe, while one party still remained west of the Nguru Hills, in the vicinity of Kakera. This latter party was at once closed on by our troops, and surrendered on 2nd September, nine whites and about 100 Askaris, with many porters, being made prisoners. Naumann with his main body crossed the Masai Steppe, and on the 29th one of his raiding parties held up a train near Kahe, while his third party, keeping more to the west, headed for Engaruka and Massogoloda.

At day or two later reports were received that Naumann had given up his move north and was doubling back south across the Masai Steppe. During the previous few weeks minor captures from his force had been frequent, and it was evident that it was being gradually destroyed and that the end could not be far off. He reached Kischungo on the 8th September, and thence made south towards the Nguru Hills, with our troops closing in from all sides. The 1st Battalion Cape Corps, under Lieutenant-Colonel Morris, which had done much hard marching during the pursuit, closed in from north, north-west and west, while another portion of the battalion, which had been previously detached, closed in from the east and south-east. Both these detachments were accompanied by troops of the King's African Rifles Mounted Infantry, which had closed close to the enemy throughout. The column of King's African Rifles based on Korogwe closed in from the north-east, while the 10th South African Horse advanced from the south-west and south. On the 15th Nau-

mann reached Geiro, but found his way blocked by the cavalry. He then turned north again with the 10th South African Horse in close pursuit, and was finally brought to bay on the Luita Hill, a very strong natural position. The 10th South African Horse occupied all surrounding water-holes, and kept Naumann's force in play until the arrival of the infantry. Naumann was then closely invested, and surrendered on 1st October, together with fourteen other German whites, 165 Askaris and many porters.

The remaining party of Naumann's force had meanwhile continued to move west to Lake Eyassi, where it halted. This party was of small strength, and on October 2nd surrendered to a detachment of King's African Rifles sent from Aruscha. Three whites and fifty-three Askaris were made prisoners.

Thus ended a remarkable raid. The force which carried it out was composed of first-class Askaris, well led. It started under Wintgens from Gumbiro, sixty miles north-west of Songea, in the beginning of February. New Langenburg and Bismarcksburg were threatened in turn; the force then turned northwards and passed through Itunda, leaving the German Commander in our hands there, sick. Naumann succeeded, and crossed the Central Railway east of Tabora on 27th May, marching north. Repused at Mkalama, and prevented from breaking westwards, Naumann went north again, heavily engaged the Belgians at Ikoma, after which he moved westwards towards the Magadi Lake, then south to Kondoa Irangi, near which place he narrowly escaped capture. After threatening Handeni, he was next heard of near Moshi. Finding our troops ready for him there, he doubled back on his tracks, re-crossed the Kondoa Irangi-Handeni road and was finally brought to bay.

Such a raid could perhaps only have been carried out in a country like German East Africa, where the bush is often so thick that two considerable forces may pass within a mile, unaware of each other's presence; and where a ruthless leader of a small force can nearly always live on the country.

18. By the middle of September the situation was ripe for the main advance. The Kilwa force had been strengthened by the bulk of the Nigerian Brigade, the 25th Indian Cavalry, and two Indian Battalions, the 55th Rifles and 127th Baluchis. The Lindi force had also been increased, and was organised in two main columns, Nos. 3 and 4. Sufficient motor transport was by this time available for the whole force.

My plan was to make a combined movement southwards from the Kilwa area, and south-westwards from Lindi, engaging the enemy wherever met with.

I hoped thus to be able to deal with the enemy main force, whatever course it might take. If it went westwards towards the Liwale Mahenge area, the Kilwa force could be diverted in that direction, while the Lindi force occupied Massassi and cut off retreat to the south. If it stood to fight against the Kilwa force, the Lindi force would come in against its flank and rear. If it were divided against the Kilwa or Lindi forces, or opposed mainly to the latter, then the Kilwa force was strong enough to press back anything that might oppose it, and attack the flank or rear of the portion opposing the Lindi troops.