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MONDAY, 15 MARCH, 1920.

India Office,

15th March, 1920.

The following despatch from His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India regarding the operations against Afghanistan has been received from the Government of India:—

*Army Headquarters, India,
Simla, the 1st November, 1919.*

FROM
HIS EXCELLENCY GENERAL SIR
CHARLES CARMICHAEL MONRO,
G.C.B., G.C.S.I., G.C.M.G., A.D.C.;
Commander-in-Chief in India.

TO
THE SECRETARY TO THE GOVERNMENT
OF INDIA,
ARMY DEPARTMENT.

SIR,
I have the honour to submit herewith, for the information of the Government of India, an account of the recent operations against Afghanistan.

INTRODUCTORY.

2. For the proper consideration of these operations, it is necessary to refer briefly to the conditions prevailing in India at the time hostilities broke out. As the Government of India are aware, the standard of military preparation in this country was regulated by the instructions of the War Committee of the Cabinet received through the Secretary of State for India in 1916, *viz.*, that operations on the Indian frontier were to be of a defensive nature, and that, should the offensive be forced upon us, it was to be strictly limited in scope. The Field Army maintained for this purpose, namely, four divisions, three frontier brigades and four cavalry brigades, had necessarily suffered from the demands made upon it to supply additional units and draft reinforcements for overseas theatres; and this had to a certain extent affected its efficiency; moreover, many of its best qualified officers were employed out of India, and there was considerable deficiency in medical and engineer personnel which could not be made good from home. Since the commencement of the war in 1914, India had been engaged in providing personnel, material and munitions of war to

many overseas-theatres. As a result of this drain upon her resources, stocks of electrical and railway plant and other stores, only procurable from the United Kingdom, had been reduced to the lowest ebb, and, owing to shortage of shipping, deficiencies could not be replaced. Thus the signing of the Armistice in November, 1918, found India grappling with the problem of meeting urgent demands on her greatly reduced resources, and with the machinery for carrying on her internal administration weakened by the withdrawal from all her civil departments of large numbers of officers for military duty.

3. Following on the Armistice came the demand for demobilisation. Every effort was made to release such men as were urgently required either at home or in India, and this necessitated a considerable reduction in establishments and imposed a severe strain on all branches of the service, especially in those employing skilled artisans and mechanics.

4. Such was the military situation when the outbreak of internal disturbances supervened in April, 1919. To quell these disturbances and to protect communications, it was found necessary to divert large bodies of troops from their normal peace stations, to detain others which were awaiting demobilisation or embarkation to the United Kingdom, and to recall a large number of Indian troops who had proceeded to their homes on leave. We were particularly fortunate in having at hand so valuable a reinforcement as the British troops *ex* Mesopotamia awaiting demobilisation. It was only with great reluctance that I sanctioned their retention at a time when they had every reason and right to expect their early release from military service; but my confidence in the loyalty of the British soldier was not misplaced, and I take this opportunity of expressing my appreciation of the fine military spirit he displayed in shouldering this additional burden. It was a keen and natural disappointment also to the Indian soldier to be deprived of the furlough which he had earned so well; but he, too, accepted this burden in a spirit of cheerful resignation, for which we owe him a deep debt of gratitude; his conduct throughout this period has been worthy of the highest praise.

5. Before passing on to a narrative of the operations, I propose briefly to review the work of the various administrative services and departments, for the campaign was essentially one in which administrative organisation played the leading part. At one time the strength of the force employed trans-Indus amounted to 340,000 men and 158,000 animals, and it will readily be understood that the maintenance of these numbers, with depleted means of transportation, was a problem of considerable difficulty. Fortunately, much attention had been paid in recent years to the improvement of frontier communications; new mechanical transport roads at a cost of approximately one million sterling had been constructed in the North-West Frontier Province alone during the past four years. Considerable improvements had also been effected in existing roads, the most important being those between Jamrud and Landi-Kotal, Kohat and Parachinar, Bannu and Miranshah, Dera Ismail Khan and Tank, and the Bolan road from Sibi to Quetta, on each of which a large number of girder bridges had been provided,

spanning the main waterways. With the exception of the Bolan these roads have all been subjected to heavy and continuous motor traffic throughout the operations, and have stood the test well.

6. As regards railways, the situation was somewhat abnormal when concentration was ordered. Civil traffic had been considerably curtailed and serious damage caused at certain outlying stations during the internal disturbances in the Punjab. Nevertheless, thanks to the efforts of the North-Western and other railways, military requirements were fully met, and though the protection of Peshawar necessitated some divergence from the schedule, concentration was completed in advance of the prearranged time-table. During the month of May 637 military special trains were run over the North-Western Railway system. Early in the concentration period a number of specially fitted ambulance trains were located at convenient forward stations such as Peshawar and Rawalpindi, and special services were arranged for the conveyance of ice, fruit and vegetables in insulated railway vans, both to hospitals and the troops in the field.

7. Major-General H. F. E. Freeland, C.B., D.S.O., M.V.O., R.E., who was at this time a member of the Railway Board, earned the gratitude of the army by his zealous and unremitting efforts in developing the capacity of the railways in respect of military requirements. His wide and varied experience in dealing with military traffic problems proved of inestimable value. I had also the advantage of obtaining the valuable services of Brigadier-General C. L. Magniac, C.M.G., C.B.E., R.E., who had recently returned from France and was appointed Director of Movements.

8. The position of the Supply and Transport Services had been influenced considerably by the calls made upon them from overseas during the course of the great war. The resources of India in animal transport had been exploited to the utmost, and the reserve of animals left in the country was reduced to the lowest ebb; indeed, the supply of mules had been completely exhausted and recourse was had to ponies. These latter, though they proved themselves a fairly satisfactory substitute, were greatly inferior to the mule in general utility and endurance. The ravages of *surra*, combined with continued and heavy demands made by the operations in Persia, had seriously crippled the supply of camels; and the liability of the bullock transport to epidemic diseases limited the degree of reliability which could be placed upon it. In spite of these difficulties, the animal transport available on the outbreak of war was sufficient to equip and maintain the Field Army under the conditions referred to in paragraph 2 above.

9. The mechanical transport at my disposal was employed at the outset on convoy work through the Khaibar; but later, when reinforced by locally purchased vehicles and a number of Ford chassis received from America in March and equipped locally with van bodies, it was used to supplement the animal transport with units and field formations and for the transportation of such perishable commodities as ice, milk, fresh fruit and vegetables. The British ranks of the Heavy Mechanical Transport companies were considerably below establishment, and the proper complement of drivers could not be provided for

the vehicles available. In spite of the strain on their endurance, these men carried out their duties with a fortitude and efficiency which deserves unstinted praise, and proved themselves equal to the task of moving all the tonnage required for the maintenance of the forces in the field. It may here be mentioned that upwards of 500 tons of supplies and stores were transported daily from Peshawar and Jamrud through the Khaibar, a figure which was only reduced during the period of the Afghan threat on the Kurram, when a portion of the mechanical transport was diverted to that area from the Khaibar.

10. The reserves of supplies in position on the outbreak of war proved ample for the needs of the army. The standard laid down was sixty days' stocks, of which half had been placed in forward positions west of the Indus, and half in the base depôt at Lahore and at the ports of Bombay and Karachi. Within three days of mobilisation being ordered the reserves at the ports had been despatched, according to a pre-arranged schedule, to Lahore and the forward areas. New field service scales of rations were introduced in this campaign, and have proved highly satisfactory from a dietetic point of view; the items additional to the old scale include condensed milk, tinned or dried fruit, fresh fruit, cigarettes and sweets for British troops; and fresh meat, condensed milk, tobacco, cigarettes, sweets, and ground nuts for Indian soldiers.

11. In previous frontier campaigns units had been left to make their own arrangements for canteen supplies; but the system of relying on *bunniahs* and the peace canteen contractors of British units was unsatisfactory. The War Office were unable, however, to accede to my request that the Expeditionary Force Canteen organisation should take the matter in hand, and a general contract was therefore made with a Calcutta firm of large experience and reputation, to whom special railway and transport facilities were given. This arrangement proved satisfactory on the whole, and was certainly an improvement on the former arrangement; but I hope that in future a system may be devised which will enable us to ensure the provision on mobilisation of Field Force Canteens fully equipped with personnel and supplies.

12. In order to provide rest and refreshment for troops moving by rail and to mitigate the hardships inseparable from a journey across India during the summer months, rest camps were established at Peshawar, Nowshera, Rawalpindi, Lahore, Ambala, Quetta and Chaman, and the number of "Monro Soldiers' Canteens" (which had been established at all the principal railway stations) was increased to meet the additional demands made upon them. Tea rooms were also opened for the special use of Indian troops, not only at the chief railway stations, but also at all standing camps within the forward areas. Messes for British officers and for warrant and non-commissioned officers travelling in small parties or independently of their units, were organised and equipped at seventeen of the main halting places, in advance of railheads, on the various lines of communication.

13. The requirements of the Veterinary Service necessitated the formation of three Camel Veterinary Hospitals for 500 camels each, a Camel Convalescent Depôt and Horse Convalescent Depôt for 1,000 animals each, as well as additional Field and Mobile Veterinary Sec-

tions and Base Depôts of Veterinary Stores. The creation of these units imposed a severe tax on available sources of recruitment, and some difficulty was experienced in obtaining personnel of the right stamp. But on the whole the existing organisation stood the test well. The mortality among animals was never excessive, amounting to a weekly average of .2 per cent. in the case of horses and ponies, .04 in the case of mules, .3 in the case of bullocks and .3 in the case of camels, as compared with .2, .06, 1.6, and .1 per cent. respectively during the period May to September, 1918, in Mesopotamia. The evacuation of sick animals was on the whole well carried out, but there was a tendency to maintain too many ineffective animals with units. This fault was corrected in course of time. Considerable inefficiency was caused by the incidence of foot-and-mouth disease and rinderpest in bullocks. The organisation of the Remount Service stood the test well and calls for no comment.

14. I was fortunate in obtaining two Ordnance Mobile Workshops, complete with personnel, from Mesopotamia. These were pushed up to Peshawar to supplement the heavy workshops established in the Ordnance depôt there immediately on the outbreak of war. A number of R.A.O.C. personnel were obtained from among the troops awaiting demobilisation, and these rendered invaluable service in the Ordnance depôts in the forward areas. In other respects the existing Ordnance organisation proved sufficient for the needs of the army. An ample reserve had been provided of special stores, such as heavy tents, hand fans, mosquito nets, sun goggles, etc., which experience has shown to be necessary for the health and comfort of troops during a summer campaign.

15. As regards the Medical Service, the number of regular R.A.M.C. and I.M.S. officers available in India was short of our requirements for complete mobilisation. The source of recruitment of these categories in India is small, and it had been found impossible to make good the deficiency from home. I was fortunate, however, in obtaining the services of 107 officers and 1,280 other ranks of the R.A.M.C. who happened to be in India en route from Mesopotamia to the United Kingdom. The Field medical units of the Field Army were already partially mobilised with personnel when the outbreak of war occurred, and the equipment of other field medical units and of 21 General Hospitals was held ready for issue in medical mobilisation stores. The number of mobilised medical units employed during the campaign amounted to 29 Field Ambulances, 12 Casualty Clearing Stations, 53 Staging Sections, 15 Sanitary Sections, 8 Advanced Depôts of Medical Stores, 1½ Base Depôt Medical Stores and 16,000 beds in General Hospitals, i.e., 5,000 for British and 11,000 for Indians. The General Hospitals were established at Landi Kotal, Peshawar, Nowshera, Rawalpindi, Gharial, Kuldana, Kohat, Bannu, Dardoni (near Miranshah), Dera Ismail Khan, Tank, Manzai, and Quetta. In addition to these, convalescent camps provided accommodation in the Murree Hills for 1,200 British at Upper Topa and Lower Gharial, and for 3,000 Indians at Kohat and Rawalpindi. Medical transport included two British and eight Indian broad-gauge ambulance trains, one combined British and Indian narrow-gauge ambulance train, and over a hundred specially fitted railway ambulance coaches for use with the ordinary passenger service.

16. The two outstanding features of the campaign from the medical point of view were, firstly, an outbreak of cholera of unusual severity, and, secondly, the abnormal climatic conditions under which the troops were called upon to operate. An epidemic of cholera seldom equalled in extent and severity during the past ten years was raging among the civil population of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province during the period of the operations. It first made its appearance among the troops in the forward areas at Hangu on June 1st, and at Jamrud on June 4th, but though it spread rapidly in both the Kohat and Khaibar areas and for a time gave rise to grave anxiety, it was successfully stamped out by June 20th, an achievement for which the Medical Service deserves the greatest credit. A severe epidemic also occurred in Derajat and the Tochi Valley, and cases continued intermittently from the middle of June till the close of the operations.

17. Shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, a heat wave of remarkable severity occurred over the whole of the Punjab and North-West Frontier Province, the daily shade temperatures registered at Peshawar in May, June, and July being 5 to 7 degrees Fahrenheit above the daily average of the past twenty years. The Government of India will appreciate how great a strain was imposed on the troops when called upon to operate under these conditions in such areas as the Khaibar, the Kurram, the Derajat and Waziristan.

18. In spite of these conditions, the incidence of sickness was not excessive. The total admissions during the period 5th May to 9th August amounted to 10,882 British and 45,774 Indians, giving a daily admission ratio per thousand of 4.98 British and 2.97 Indians. This compares not unfavourably with admission ratios in Mesopotamia which, in 1917, were 5.04 and 2.11, and, in 1918, 3.48 and 2.27 respectively.

19. In the foregoing brief review of the administrative problems presented by this campaign will, I hope, serve to illustrate some of the chief difficulties with which we had to contend. India, and especially the frontier region, is a country ill-provided with those amenities of civilisation which, in Western Europe, go so far to mitigate the discomforts of a campaign; and, coming as it did at the hottest season of the year and at a time when the army was sorely in need of rest and recreation, this campaign inevitably imposed severe hardships on the troops employed. Nevertheless, from personal inspection, I am able to assure the Government of India that everything possible was done with the means at our disposal to alleviate the discomfort of the troops, and I desire to place on record my high appreciation of the work of the administrative services and departments which contributed so largely to that end.

20. I now turn to the conduct of the operations. The distribution of the Afghan army at the end of April is believed to have been as follows:—On the northern line, including Kabul, were stationed $7\frac{1}{2}$ regiments of cavalry (2,800 sabres), 29 battalions (16,500 rifles), and 110 guns, of which about 2,000 rifles and 4 guns were located between Kunar and Asmar on the Chitral border. On the central line, including Ghazni, were 3 cavalry regiments (1,100 sabres), 17 battalions (9,150 rifles), and 60 guns; and, on the southern line, 1 cavalry

regiment (460 sabres), 10 battalions (5,250 rifles), and 24 guns. The Afghan garrisons in Herat, Farah, and Mazar-i-Sharif, and in the Maimana and Badakshan districts, are not included in the above, and amounted to about 2,700 sabres, 11,100 rifles, and 70 guns. The force at the Amir's disposal thus comprised about 7,000 sabres, 42,000 rifles, and 260 guns, but it should be noted that at least half of his guns were either immobile or obsolete.

21. But the Amir's real strength lay, not in his regular army (which, of itself, is of small account), but in the potential fighting value of the frontier tribes on either side of the border. Expert in all forms of guerilla warfare, and amounting in the aggregate to some 120,000 men, armed with modern rifles, many of which are provided from Kabul, these tribes are the outstanding factor in the Indian frontier problem, and it was on their co-operation that the Afghan plan of campaign was based. As far as can be judged, this plan contemplated operations on three fronts, viz.:—

(a) From Jalalabad on the Khaibar and Mohmand Sector;

(b) From Gardez on the Kurram and Waziristan border, utilising the Khost salient;

(c) From Kandahar on the Chaman border.

A secondary operation from Asmar on Chitral, supported by a demonstration made by the Badakshan garrison, was to be supplementary to (a) above, while, subsidiary to the action on the Kandahar front, troops were to be moved up from Girishk and Farah to threaten the Seistan border and our communications in East Persia. Each of the above fronts formed a separate command, and the general idea appears to have been to push forward in the first instance detachments of Afghan regular troops, whose function was to raise the tribes on both sides of the border with the cry of *Jehad*. Arms and ammunition were to be distributed amongst the tribesmen, and the detachments of Afghan regulars would serve as a stiffening to the tribal lashkars and as an earnest of the Amir's support. On the Khaibar sector, which was evidently looked upon as the main battle front, the intention appears to have been to hold back the bulk of the regular troops until the tribal offensive had developed. This tribal offensive was, in fact, the basis of the whole plan; and the line of action to be taken by the main Afghan army depended entirely on the extent to which the tribes consented to co-operate and on the subsequent success of their operations. It was probably realised that both as regards command and maintenance, the Afghan regular army was, of itself, incapable of undertaking sustained operations, and that their best and only chance of success lay in securing the co-operation of the tribes and in co-ordinating their efforts. The looseness of our political control over a large portion of the border territory makes it a promising field for such an enterprise. The Amir appears to have anticipated that the presence of bodies of tribesmen on the flanks and rear of our main forces would compel us to dissipate our strength and create a favourable opportunity for striking a blow with his regular troops.

22. Our plan of campaign was to undertake the offensive towards Jalalabad with our main striking force, our object being to divide the Mohmands and Afridis (two of the most in-

fluent tribes upon our border) and to cut them off from Afghan influence and support; to strike at any Afghan concentration within reach; and to induce the withdrawal of Afghan forces from our tribal borders elsewhere, for the purpose of covering Kabul. It was proposed to maintain an active defence on other portions of our front. In the Tochi and Derajat areas we were prepared, if necessary, to evacuate temporarily those portions of the country which lay between the administrative and political borders and which were held by militia garrisons; for their retention in the face of opposition would have involved us in a series of sieges, necessitating measures for their relief and consequent dissipation of transport.

23. To carry out this plan, the army was originally organised in two forces, viz., the North-West Frontier Force, commanded by General Sir A. A. Barrett, G.C.B., K.C.S.I., K.C.V.O., A.-D.-C., and the Baluchistan Force, commanded by Lieutenant-General R. Wapshare, C.B., C.S.I., the latter including the troops allotted to the defence of the Nushki extension railway and our line of communication through East Persia to Meshed. As the operations developed, however, it was decided to effect a further decentralisation, and on May 30th the troops allotted to the Bannu and Derajat areas were separated from the North-West Frontier Force, and placed under the command of Major-General S. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O. This new command was designated the Waziristan Force. The force at Meshed under Major-General W. Malleon, C.B., C.I.E., must also be considered as part of the general organisation, for though charged with no offensive rôle in relation to the operations on the Indian frontier, the duty fell upon it of intervening, if necessary, in any attempt by the Turkistan Bolsheviks to send armed assistance into Afghanistan.

24. As constant references would be made to the Government of India and to Army Headquarters regarding the conduct and direction of the operations, and as in any case officers of sufficient status were not available to form a separate General Headquarters, it had been decided in advance that the functions of the latter were to be performed by Army Headquarters.

25. I need refer but briefly to the sequence of events which precipitated the outbreak of war. Towards the end of April, Saleh Muhammad Khan, the Afghan Commander-in-Chief, arrived at Dakka with an escort of two companies of infantry and two guns for the ostensible purpose of inspecting the Afghan frontier. On May 3rd the usual militia escort to the caravan proceeding through the Khaibar was confronted by piquets of armed Afghans on the disputed zone between Tor Kham and Landi Khana, and that night five coolies employed at the waterworks were killed by tribesmen. On May 4th large numbers of copies of a *farman*, signed by the Amir and concluding with an unmistakable exhortation to *Jihad*, were distributed in Peshawar city through the agency of the Afghan post-office there; and on the same day the Afghan postmaster arrived from Jalalabad with a motor car load of leaflets printed at Kabul, announcing that the Germans had resumed war and that India and Egypt had risen. On May 5th, the Field Army received orders for mobilisation.

26. The operations which followed fall

naturally under three heads, viz., those of the North-West Frontier Force, the Waziristan Force, and the Baluchistan Force respectively, and I propose to deal with them in three separate narratives. The chief features of the operations, viewed as a whole, can be summarised as follows. Our main effort was directed to the Khaibar front, with Dakka as the first objective. After defeating the Afghan covering troops in the vicinity of Landi Khana, our troops occupied Dakka on May 13th, i.e., within eight days of mobilization being ordered; and, following a successful action on May 17th, the Afghan main army dispersed and, for the time being, practically ceased to exist as an organised force. A pause was now necessary for the purpose of accumulating supplies preparatory to a further advance. All arrangements for the advance had been completed and the troops were ready to move when the Amir's request for negotiations rendered any further forward movement politically inexpedient. On the Waziristan front we were prepared, as explained above, to evacuate certain positions with the object of reducing detachments, avoiding embarrassing commitments, and concentrating as large a force as possible at the decisive point. The evacuation became necessary, and was carried out under arrangements concerted between General Sir A. A. Barrett and the Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province. Suitable dispositions were made to meet the situation thus created. On the Baluchistan front the only operation of importance was the attack and capture of Fort Spin Baldak. The close proximity of this fort to the Baluchistan border was a threat to our position at Chaman, and it served as a screen behind which the enemy could concentrate preparatory to an attack on Chaman itself, or against the flank of our position at Bogra. It was accordingly carried by assault on May 27th.

27. During the course of the war our troops were engaged on a front extending along the whole length of the Afghan frontier from Chitral on the north-east to Seistan on the south-west, a total distance of about 1,000 miles; indeed, the fighting front may be said to have extended still further, for our line of communication defence troops on the 300 miles of road between Robat and Rui Khaf were kept constantly on their guard against raids from across the border, and were at one time directly threatened by a small Afghan force which was detached from Herat towards the Persian frontier. Never before have simultaneous operations been undertaken on the frontier of India which have covered so wide an extent of front.

28. There are other important points of difference between this and previous campaigns on the Indian frontier. In the first and second Afghan wars and in the Tirah campaign the initiative lay with the Government of India. India was enjoying internal tranquility, and the Government was able to mature its plans and move in its own time during the cool season of the year. On the present occasion Afghanistan was the aggressor; certain districts of internal India were still under martial law; the time chosen was the hottest season of the year, and the invasion contemplated a rising in Peshawar. In 1878 and 1897 eight weeks elapsed between the issue of orders to concentrate and the advance of our forces up the Khaibar and into Tirah respectively. In

1919 two weeks only elapsed between the receipt of information of the impending Afghan attack and the dispersal of the main Afghan army on the Jalalabad plain, and within four weeks Amir Amanullah had sued for an armistice. The promptitude of this advance through the Khaibar and the consequent menace to Jalalabad prevented an Afghan-tribal combination against us, and saved India the long and costly war which would have resulted from the loss of the Khaibar.

29. Two other features of the campaign may be mentioned as exercising an appreciable influence on the course of the operations. The first is the failure of the system of tribal militias. With certain notable exceptions (which are referred to in their place) the outbreak of war was followed almost immediately by wholesale desertions from militia units, necessitating the complete disbandment of one and the reduction of others to a small fraction of their proper establishment. The defection of these units at a time when the Field Army was concentrating in rear of them constituted a grave danger, and this danger is one which, in my opinion, we cannot afford to accept in the future.

The other feature to which I refer is the great disadvantage from which the troops suffered as the result of the political situation. From the granting of the armistice at the beginning of June to the signing of peace on August 8th the Amir failed to exercise complete control over his own tribesmen and the agents whom he had deputed to raise the tribes within the British border. Consequently throughout this period the whole length of the frontier was threatened and constant raiding occurred.

30. The formations at my disposal at the outbreak of war (excluding units allotted to area defence) comprised two divisions and two cavalry brigades on the Khaibar line, one brigade in the Kohat-Kurram area, two brigades in Waziristan, and one division and one cavalry brigade on the Baluchistan front, with one division, one cavalry brigade and two mixed brigades in central reserve. During the course of the operations seven additional brigades and one cavalry brigade were formed, increasing the total force employed at the signing of peace to the equivalent of about seven divisions and four cavalry brigades, with one cavalry and five infantry brigades in reserve.

OPERATIONS OF THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER FORCE.

31. News of the proclamation of *Jehad* by the Amir of Afghanistan, together with the move of Afghan troops towards the Khaibar and Kurram, reached Peshawar on the 3rd May. I immediately ordered General Sir A. A. Barrett, who was at that time on inspection duty in Delhi, to proceed at once to Peshawar to control the military measures necessary in the North-West Frontier Province. He was directed to assume command of the North-West Frontier Force, the troops at his disposal comprising the 1st and 10th Cavalry Brigades, the 1st and 2nd Divisions, the Internal Security Troops of the Peshawar area, and the Kohat, Bannu and Derajat Brigades, together with Corps Troops and Frontier Militia. In view of the paramount importance of safeguarding the Peshawar district, which was already threatened by Afghan forces and

which is surrounded by powerful independent tribes, General Sir A. A. Barrett directed the 2nd Division into the Peshawar area in support of the 1st Division.

32. Prior to his arrival in Peshawar the situation on the Khaibar line had developed rapidly. On the morning of the 4th May Afghan troops, supported by large bodies of tribesmen, were reported to have taken possession of the Bagh and Tangi springs, near Landi Khana, and to be on the Spinatsuka and Tor Sappar ridges to the north of Landi Kotal. On the following day a small column, which had been ordered to hold itself in readiness at Peshawar, was despatched by the General Officer Commanding, 1st Division, in motor lorries to Landi Kotal to support the Khaibar Rifles. It was essential that the Afghans should be driven from the springs as quickly as possible, as on one of them depended the principal water supply of Landi Kotal, and until the springs were in our possession no large force could be concentrated at that place. Troops were therefore pushed up the Khaibar as rapidly as possible, and on the 8th the 1st Infantry Brigade, with one battalion of the 2nd Infantry Brigade and 14 field and mountain guns, under the command of Brigadier-General G. D. Crocker, were concentrated at Landi Kotal, other troops of the 1st Division moving up the Khaibar in support. Troops of the 2nd Division were meanwhile arriving continuously in the Peshawar area.

33. On the morning of the 9th, General Crocker, reinforced by another battalion of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, attacked the enemy and secured the Tangi springs and water works; but he encountered stubborn opposition, and the force at his disposal was insufficient to drive the Afghans from their strong position, in difficult mountainous country, covering the Bagh springs. Next day the remainder of the 2nd Infantry Brigade, together with a mountain battery and a machine-gun company, reinforced the troops at Landi Kotal, where Major-General C. A. Fowler, C.B., D.S.O., commanding the 1st Division, had assumed command.

34. On the 11th May the headquarters and one and a half battalions of the 3rd Infantry Brigade reached Landi Kotal, and an entirely successful attack was made on the Afghans on the Khargali heights dominating the Bagh springs. Infantry, guns, machine guns, and aeroplanes worked in close co-operation, and the enemy, who again resisted stubbornly, fled in disorder, leaving behind him six guns, which fell into our hands. Our casualties were happily slight. The Royal Air Force not only co-operated in the action, but also systematically bombed Dakka, where the Afghan transport had been collected. The material and moral effect of this bombing was very great. Major-General Fowler brings to notice the excellent work of the 2nd Battalion, North Staffordshire Regiment, the 1st Gurkha Rifles, and No. 8 Mountain Battery, R.G.A., on this occasion. On the following day a reconnaissance disclosed the Afghans still holding Spinatsuka and a hill near Tor Sappar, but these localities were found evacuated on May 13th.

35. On May 10th I authorised General Sir A. A. Barrett to advance to the vicinity of Dakka in order the more effectively to deter the tribes from hostilities by threatening their rear and preventing their maintenance

from Kabul with arms and ammunition. On the 13th May a cavalry force, consisting of the 1st Cavalry Brigade and one regiment of the 10th Cavalry Brigade, which had been concentrated in readiness at Jamrud, advanced through the Khaibar and occupied Dakka without opposition. This force was followed next day by the headquarters and two battalions of the 1st Infantry Brigade, and on the 16th by the remaining two battalions of the 1st Infantry Brigade, a mountain battery and a company of sappers and miners. A reconnaissance on the morning of this date from Dakka towards Hazarnao disclosed the Afghans in large numbers, and our troops were closely followed up during their withdrawal to camp. Fighting took place at close quarters, the British squadrons executing several charges before the enemy was successfully beaten off. The enemy now established himself on the hills above Robat Fort to the west of the camp, but was unable to advance into the plain. On the following morning Brigadier-General Crocker attacked with the 1st Infantry Brigade, supported by aeroplanes and the fire of horse artillery, mountain, and machine guns. As in the previous actions, the enemy held stoutly to his position along the crest of precipitous hills. During the action two battalions of the 3rd Infantry Brigade, with field and mountain howitzers, arrived from Landi Kotal, under the command of Major-General A. Skeen, C.M.G., and finally forced the enemy to retreat with heavy loss. The manner in which the attack was carried out reflects great credit on the commander and troops employed, and the results of the action were far-reaching; for the enemy retreated in great disorder, losing large numbers by desertion, and it was long before he was able to reorganise his units. The value of high explosive shell, and particularly of the 3.7 inch mountain howitzer, in dislodging an enemy from an inaccessible position in mountainous country, was well demonstrated in this action; indeed, these weapons have been of the greatest service throughout the operations.

36. While these operations had been taking place the state of unrest prevailing in the Peshawar area had given cause for much concern. On the 8th May Peshawar city was quickly and successfully surrounded by a cordon of troops, and several leaders of the anti-British party, including the Afghan Postmaster, were arrested. It was found necessary to institute martial law and to keep a large body of infantry permanently on duty in the city. Raiding into the Peshawar cantonment and in the district was at this time very prevalent, and communications up the Khaibar, particularly in the neighbourhood of Ali Masjid, were subjected to constant sniping and attacks by tribesmen. The Khaibar Rifles, in whose hands the guarding of the road through the Pass had at first been left, became unreliable, and after frequent desertions had occurred they were replaced by regular troops, the corps being disbanded. Additional posts were also established in the lower Khaibar, and this, and other measures taken by Major-General Sir C. M. Dobell, K.C.B., C.M.G., D.S.O., Commanding the 2nd Division, quickly resulted in the security of the communications. On the 15th and 16th

May the 6th Infantry Brigade carried out operations near Ali Masjid to secure the heights south of the Khaibar stream and inflicted heavy casualties on the enemy. By the 19th May the 2nd Division was holding the line from Landi Kotal to Peshawar, with the 1st Division, less two field batteries, concentrated at Dakka and Landi Khana, two of the three Infantry Brigades being at the former place, where the force was temporarily under the command of Major-General Skeen. On May 12th I placed the 16th Division from the Central Reserve at General Sir A. A. Barrett's disposal, and on the 14th I directed him to make preparations for a forward move of four marches from Dakka.

37. In the north successful operations had been carried out by the Chitral garrison in conjunction with the Chitral Scouts and His Highness the Mehtar's Bodyguard. On the 12th May the Afghans occupied Arnawai, in the Chitral Valley, and advanced rapidly up the river. On the 14th the Chitral Scouts drove back the enemy's advanced parties near Kauti. On the 20th Lieutenant-Colonel F. C. S. Samborne-Palmer, Commanding at Chitral, moved down the Chitral River with a small mobile column, and on the 23rd the column and scouts attacked and drove the enemy from Arnawai, destroying the force opposed to them and capturing four guns. The 11th Rajputs particularly distinguished themselves in this action. The mobile column returned to Drosch on 5th June. During the remainder of this month successful raids into Afghan territory were made by the Chitralis, resulting in the capture of a large quantity of live stock.

38. For some days prior to the 20th May reports had been received of the presence of Afghan troops on the Mohmand-Afghan border, and on the evening of that day they were reported to have reached Ghalanai in Mohmand country to the west of Shabkadr. A brigade of the 16th Division, with some of the divisional troops of the 2nd Division, under the command of Brigadier-General W. M. Southey, C.M.G., was despatched from Peshawar to Shabkadr and Michni for the defence of that portion of the frontier. The Afghans did not advance, nor did the Mohmand gathering assume large proportions; and after being bombed on two days by aeroplanes the enemy withdrew.

39. The 31st Squadron, Royal Air Force, under the direction of Lieutenant-Colonel F. F. Minchin, D.S.O., M.C., Commanding the 52nd Wing, carried out concentrated bombing raids on Jalalabad on the 17th, 20th and 24th May with marked effect; large portions of the military quarter of the town were burnt out, including the Afghan headquarters, and on one occasion a parade of 2,000 Afghan troops was bombed with good results. In the panic which followed these raids the neighbouring tribesmen entered the town and secured large quantities of loot in the shape of arms, ammunition and treasure. On the 24th, Captain Halley, R.A.F., in a Handley-Page machine, performed a notable feat by bombing Kabul; and there is little doubt that this raid was an important factor in producing a desire for peace at the headquarters of the Afghan Government.

40. Meanwhile, preparations for an advance from Dakka were nearing completion, but

unofficial overtures begun on May 15th, for a cessation of hostilities, culminated on May 31st in a formal request from the Amir for the conclusion of an armistice. The Government of India were desirous of avoiding any action which might serve to prejudice the negotiations, and I therefore issued orders that, though preparations for an advance on Jalalabad were to continue without interruption, no further advance was to be made without previous reference to me. The period of inaction which followed was one of great hardship to the troops, for the success of their efforts had led them to expect an early termination of the war, and they were looking forward eagerly to their long-delayed leave or demobilisation. The situation was met, however, in that spirit of willing self-sacrifice which we have learnt to expect from the British and Indian Armies, and I desire to express here my appreciation of the high sense of duty they displayed during this period.

41. Turning now to the operations of the force in the Kohat-Kurram area (which, as explained above, formed part of General Sir A. A. Barrett's command), the situation had remained quiet during the first fortnight of May; there had been no unusual raiding from tribal territory and no information was received of any Afghan concentration in Khost. On May 5th, Major-General A. H. Eustace, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding the Kohat area, ordered a column of all arms to proceed from Thal to Parachinar in support of the Kurram Militia. On the 14th, information was received that two Afghan battalions had arrived at Peiwar Kotal, and that there were three battalions with guns at Ali Khel. A detachment of the Kurram Militia, with two guns, was accordingly moved to Peiwar, and four additional battalions and a mountain battery to Kohat. As units became available at Kohat, they were moved up to Thal and Parachinar, and on the 26th the force at the latter place consisted of two battalions, one squadron, and four mountain guns. Having regard to the requirements of the Khaibar line, it was impossible at this time to despatch aeroplanes to the Kohat and Waziristan areas; arrangements were, however, made to despatch a flight to Bannu, from which the bombing of Matun in Khost could be undertaken.

42. On the evening of the 24th May information was received at Thal that General Nadir Khan, the Afghan Commander in Khost and *ex-Commander-in-Chief* of the Afghan army, intended to advance either into the Tochi or the Kurram, and it was reported from Spinwam that Afghan troops were moving on that post. Major-General Eustace accordingly proceeded to Thal and ordered one more battalion and two more mountain guns to rail from Kohat to Thal. On the arrival of these units, the garrison of Thal comprised 4 battalions, 4 mountain guns, one squadron, and one company of sappers and miners. On the 27th a considerable force of Afghan troops with a large following of tribesmen advanced on Thal and occupied Thal city and the hills to the south-west of the posts. The enemy's guns and the majority of his regular troops were on the south bank of the Kurram river, which, at this season, is liable to sudden floods. The fort and camp were subjected to considerable shelling, two of the guns used being German howitzers of 3.8" calibre. On the

morning of the 28th, General Sir A. A. Barrett ordered the immediate despatch to Kohat by rail from Peshawar of a field battery of the 2nd Division, and a battalion of the 45th Infantry Brigade, to be followed by the remaining units of that brigade under the command of Brigadier-General R. E. H. Dyer, C.B. The headquarters of the 16th Division were also ordered to proceed to Kohat from Lahore, instead of to Peshawar as previously ordered. These troops began to arrive at Kohat on the morning of the 29th, and were followed in quick succession by two additional battalions and the 46th Brigade from Ambala which I had also ordered to Kohat.

By the afternoon of the 30th May, Brigadier-General Dyer had concentrated his force by rail and road at Togh, from which place he marched 18 miles towards Thal on the early morning of the 31st. On the 1st June he entered Thal with little opposition. The hills to the south-east were then cleared of the enemy. The following day the operations were continued to the west of Thal; but the enemy retreated hurriedly, leaving behind him his camp equipment and a large quantity of cordite ammunition. During the advance of General Dyer's column on Thal, the extreme heat had made the long marches exceedingly arduous and exhausting; but the march discipline and spirit of the men were excellent, and the commander and troops deserve great credit for the manner in which the operation was carried out. A flight of aeroplanes based on Thal co-operated throughout, and contributed largely to the enemy's hasty retreat.

43. General Nadir Khan's enterprise was a move which, had it met with a greater measure of success, might have compromised our plan of campaign. The salient of Afghan territory which reaches out between the Tochi and Kurram valleys enabled him to concentrate on the flank of two of our main communications through tribal country. An attack on the Kurram undoubtedly promised more important results, for had Nadir Khan succeeded in raising the Orakzai and Afridi tribes against us the effect would have been felt in our operations in the Khaibar.

44. On the 2nd June the regular troops and Kurram Militia from Parachinar, where Brigadier-General E. A. Fagan, C.M.G., D.S.O., was in command, attacked the Afghan force near Kharlachi, captured the Afghan post at that place and destroyed six villages. The Kurram Militia also carried out several minor operations, in which they were invariably successful. Throughout the whole period of the operations the behaviour of this corps has been deserving of the highest praise.

45. As already mentioned, cholera appeared at Hangu in the Kohat area on the 1st June and spread rapidly, appearing a few days later in the Khaibar also. As the transport drivers were chiefly affected, the movement of animal transport up the Khaibar was suspended; all camels from the stages up to Landi Kotal were withdrawn to Nowshera Thana, and did not return to the Khaibar until the end of June. Outbreaks of foot-and-mouth disease and glanders also seriously affected the Bullock Corps on the Khaibar line, so that it became necessary for some time to rely almost exclusively on mechanical transport.

46. After the operations in the neighbourhood of Thal, the troops in the Kohat area were reorganised, the 46th, 60th and 65th In-

fantry Brigades being located at Kohat, Parachinar and Thal respectively. The 16th Divisional Headquarters and the 45th Infantry Brigade were withdrawn to Nowshera, and the 66th Infantry Brigade was formed at Mardan as the third Infantry Brigade of the 16th Division. On the 19th and 20th of June our cavalry at Dakka succeeded in ambushing parties of Mohmands and inflicting on them considerable losses. The Dakka camp was sniped nightly from the left bank of the Kabul river and telegraph lines were constantly cut. Considerable raiding continued in the Peshawar area, and on the night of the 6th to 7th June the village of Badhber was surrounded by a column and several arrests made. A similar operation against Utmanzai village was carried out later in the month, and drives by columns of all arms, including armoured cars, were carried out to clear the Kajuri plain of hostile gangs.

47. At the beginning of July the activities of the Afghan Commander at Asmar near the Chitral border, and the arrival of reinforcements, indicated the probability of renewed Afghan attempts to invade Chitral, notwithstanding the Amir's orders to the contrary. To meet this threat the Officer Commanding, Chitral, made suitable dispositions, and, while retaining his regular troops at Drosh and Chitral, placed a central striking force of Chitral Scouts at Ayun. In the middle of the month Afghan troops occupied certain passes on the border, and an attack down the Bumboret valley was made by a mixed force of Afghan regulars and tribesmen. This was driven back in disorder by the Chitral Scouts, whose behaviour throughout the operations has been excellent. On July the 24th an enemy gathering of about 1,200 was reported to have assembled about six miles south of Ziarat near the Lowari pass with the object of attacking the post at that place. A force of Chitral Scouts, Bodyguard, and Levies delivered a most successful attack which drove the enemy from a series of positions. Heavy rain and sleet during the night completed his discomfiture, and he dispersed with a loss of 60 men in killed alone, including a well-known leader. Towards the end of the month Afghan troops from Faizabad advanced towards the Dorah pass, but no attack was made from this direction.

48. On the 13th of July piqueting troops from Dakka experienced considerable opposition in taking up a position on the hills in the direction of Ghuzgai. The tribesmen were in strength and, offering favourable targets to our gun fire, suffered severely. In spite of the armistice conditions, Afghan officials were everywhere busy endeavouring to incite the tribesmen to rise. This culminated on the 16th July in a large gathering in the Bazar valley, estimated to be 10,000 strong. On the 18th, Ali Masjid was threatened and attacks were made on piquets in the Khaibar, one of which was rushed after stubborn resistance. The following night determined but unsuccessful attacks were made on the piquet line from Ali Masjid to Shagai, and as a result of the losses he had suffered in this fighting the enemy retired into the Bazar valley, where he was bombed by aeroplanes and finally dispersed on the 19th. The General Officer Commanding, 2nd Division, brings to special notice the 1st Battalion, Royal Sussex Regiment, for their

capture of a ridge to the south of Ali Masjid on the 16th May, and for their defence of the same ridge on this occasion, as well as for consistently good work. On the early morning of the 22nd July a drive was carried out by a force of all arms of the 2nd Division across the Kajuri plain, by which gangs of Afridis harbouring in the plain were driven into the hills. On the 23rd a small action against a tribal gathering west of Dakka resulted in considerable enemy casualties. During the month of July the strength of the Mohmand lashkars at Hazarnao and Busawal varied in strength, but rose at one time to as many as 6,000 men. After a flying bridge across the Kabul river to Lalpura had been established, the sniping of Dakka camp practically ceased.

49. Major General Skeen had assumed command of the Kohat-Kurram force on the 22nd of June. During July there was continuous sniping on the Peiwar front and parties of enemy, both regular and tribesmen, were constantly infringing the frontier. Occasional raids occurred in the Kurram and Miranzai valleys which were easily dealt with. These included an attack on a convoy near Sadda on the 9th, an attack on Shinawari post on the night of the 21st-22nd, and another on Badama on the 30th. In the Kurram area punitive operations were undertaken during the period 16th to 20th July by a column under Brigadier-General C. O. O. Tanner against the Kabul Khel villages near Shewa and Biland Khel. With a view to undertaking offensive operations against Khost, should the negotiations break down, two additional battalions and a pioneer battalion were despatched into the Kohat-Kurram area during July, bringing the number of infantry units to 16. To meet the same eventuality, the field batteries of the 1st Division, which had hitherto not proceeded up the Khaibar, were sent to Dakka, where all the transport necessary for an advance was also concentrated. On the 24th July the Afghan peace delegates arrived at Dakka and left the same day for Rawalpindi. No operations of any importance occurred on the Khaibar line between that date and the 8th of August, when peace was signed.

OPERATIONS OF THE WAZIRISTAN FORCE.

50. In the Waziristan area no movement of troops from their normal stations had taken place before 21st May, though information had been received prior to that date of movements of Afghan troops towards the Upper Tochi and in the direction of Wana, and of a concentration in Khost. Major-General N. G. Wood-yatt, C.B., Commanding in Waziristan, had been directed not to despatch troops up the Gomal to Wana or to operate beyond Miran-shah in the Upper Tochi valley, as the troops available in the area were considered insufficient for any widely extended operations.

51. Owing to the threatened approach of Afghan regular troops to the Upper Tochi and Wana, the probability of their presence resulting in a general rising of the Mahsuds and Wazirs, and the impossibility of despatching troops to support the militia posts in the Gomal, General Sir A. A. Barrett decided (in view of the uncertain behaviour of the Khaibar Rifles even when closely supported by regular troops) that it would not be possible to trust the Waziristan Militias when left unsupported. He therefore issued orders to Major-General

Woodyatt on 21st May that, should Afghan regulars advance into the vicinity of Wana and be joined by the tribes, Wana and the Gomal posts were to be evacuated, the British officers withdrawing with such men as remained loyal. Similar orders applied to the garrisons in the Upper Tochi.

52. On May 24th, the General Officer Commanding the Bannu Brigade, desiring to reassure the tribes of the Upper Tochi, ordered the movable column which is held permanently in readiness at Dardoni (the new cantonment, of Miranshah) to move to Muhammad Khel; but, in consequence of information received that General Nadir Khan in Khost was preparing to move either against Thal or Miranshah, General Sir A. A. Barrett ordered its return to Dardoni, where he considered it would be more suitably placed to meet the threatened attack. On receipt of this order, the General Officer Commanding the Bannu Brigade decided to evacuate the Upper Tochi posts, as in his opinion the withdrawal of the movable column would inevitably be followed by the defection of the militia. On learning of the evacuation of these posts, the Political Agent at Wana decided to evacuate the Southern Waziristan Militia posts as well, as he considered that a general rising of the Mahsuds would be the immediate outcome of events in the Tochi.

53. The withdrawal of these garrisons was an operation of extreme difficulty and danger. The loyal elements of the militia, led by a small but gallant band of British officers who carried their lives in their hands and paid dearly for their devotion, made their way by forced marches to Murtaza and into Zhob. The route was infested by tribesmen who clung to the rear of the party and made it impossible to give the men a rest on the way. Desertions to the enemy were numerous. It was not till the arrival of the party at Moghalkot, forty miles from Wana, that it was possible to call a halt, and by this time the men were utterly exhausted by heat, thirst, and their continued exertions. Up to this point casualties had been comparatively few, but when issuing from Moghalkot in an attempt to reach Mir Ali Khel, the party was heavily attacked and lost four British officers killed and two wounded out of a total of eight. Marching continuously for a further twenty-four hours, the survivors reached Fort Sandeman in the early morning of the 31st. Regarded merely as a feat of endurance, the withdrawal of this party was, of itself, a fine achievement; but taking into consideration the almost insurmountable difficulties which beset them on the road and the dangers through which they emerged, the exploit stands out as one of the finest recorded in the history of the Indian frontier. The success of the operation was due in large measure to the personality of Major G. H. Russell, 126th Baluchistan Infantry, who conducted the withdrawal with remarkable skill, courage and endurance, and set a fine example to those under him. The steadfast fortitude of these men in circumstances before which most would have quailed, is a stirring example of the height to which the devotion of the British officer can rise.

54. On May 26th, I issued orders for the move of headquarters and two battalions of the 43rd Infantry Brigade and a mountain battery to Bannu. The troops of the Derajat Brigade were ordered to concentrate at Murtaza, where

a squadron of cavalry successfully engaged a body of Mahsuds on the 30th. On May 27th, Major-General S. H. Climo, C.B., D.S.O., assumed command of the Waziristan Force (Major-General Woodyatt having been transferred to the command of the 4th Division), and on June 1st, the force was separated from General Sir A. A. Barrett's command and came directly under my orders. The situation on this date was briefly as follows:—

55. (a) *Bannu Area*.—Communication by road between Bannu and Dardoni, which had been interrupted since 26th May, was not yet restored. A column under Brigadier-General J. G. Clarke, C.M.G., Commanding the 43rd Infantry Brigade, was assembled at Bannu to move up the Tochi. There were persistent reports of the presence of Afghan troops in the Upper Tochi and near Pai Makhmad, 8 miles north-west of Miranshah, and strong lashkars of Wazirs and Mahsuds, assisted by Daurs from the Upper Tochi, were reported to be in the neighbourhood of Miranshah and to be threatening Idak. Spinwam had been occupied by Afghan detachments after its evacuation by the militia, and the Bannu Movable Column had been moved out to Kurram Garhi to watch the approaches to Bannu from the north and north-west. On the 1st June, reliable information was received that the Afghan detachments had withdrawn and the Bannu Movable Column was accordingly recalled to Bannu.

(b) *Derajat*.—Consequent on the evacuation of the Gomal militia posts and the considerable quantity of booty which had fallen into the hands of the Wazirs, the Mahsuds had become very restless, and thinking probably that it was our intention to evacuate Jandola, had assembled in large numbers around that place. A force under Brigadier-General P. J. Miles, C.B., had begun to assemble at Khirgi on the 29th May when it became known that communication with Jandola was interrupted. Other posts had also been threatened by Mahsud and Sheranni lashkars, notably Murtaza, Gomal, Manjhi and Zarkani, and many urgent demands for military assistance for posts held by frontier constabulary were received from the civil authorities.

56. There were therefore two problems which demanded immediate solution:—

(a) The opening up of the Tochi from Saidgi to Miranshah and the re-establishment of our posts evacuated by the North Waziristan Militia.

(b) The reinforcing of Jandola.

Major-General Climo decided to deal with the Tochi first, as, with the troops at his disposal, he did not consider that both operations could be carried out simultaneously in view of a possible repetition of an Afghan concentration at Spinwam or in the Lower Tochi, of a Mahsud incursion into British territory from the Khaisora and Shaktu direction, and of the possibility of encountering strong opposition in the Shinki and Hinnis Tangi defiles. The troops available in Bannu for the first operation were three squadrons of cavalry, one section of Indian mountain artillery, one section of sappers and miners, two battalions of Indian infantry, and details of two other battalions which were at Dardoni. Major-General Climo therefore decided to await the arrival of the two battalions of the 43rd Infantry Brigade which were already *en route* for Bannu. Meanwhile, he strengthened the garrison at Saidgi (which was held by the

North Waziristan Militia) with a detachment of Indian infantry.

57. On the 1st June, as considerable lashkars were found in occupation of the hills to the south and west of Miranshah, the Dardoni Movable Column moved out and fought a successful action. The enemy was put to flight with a loss of about 90; and certain towers, from which he had been sniping Miranshah post, were destroyed. On the 2nd June the Tochi Column, under Brigadier-General J. G. Clarke, moved from Bannu to Saidgi without incident. On the 3rd it got through to Idak, accompanied by a large convoy, without any serious opposition, and on the 4th it opened up communication with Dardoni.

58. Punitive measures against the lower Daurs were then undertaken by columns operating from Dardoni under the orders of Brigadier-General F. G. Lucas, C.B., D.S.O. These operations were to some extent limited by the necessity of keeping the troops ready to concentrate rapidly for co-operation with the Kohat-Kurram Force, but the villages of Spalga, Anghar, and Tughri were burnt, and fines were inflicted on others which had not been so deeply implicated in the looting of the Tochi posts. It is probable that, had there been any immediate military object in doing so, it would have been possible at this stage to have re-occupied the Upper Tochi posts with little opposition, as the tribes were thoroughly frightened.

59. Meanwhile the situation in the Derajat had not improved. A number of posts, including Manjhi, Gomal, Luni, and Zarkani, held by Frontier Constabulary were seriously threatened and communication with Jandola was cut. Kulachi and Draband also reported lashkars of Sherannis and Dazirs in their vicinity. A force despatched to the relief of Gomal post succeeded, however, in evacuating the garrison, and Draband and Kulachi were occupied by mixed detachments on the night of 1st-2nd June. On the 3rd June a lashkar of about 400 was driven into the hills with a loss of 30 men, and on the same day Manjhi post was reinforced by a column from Tank after some fighting. On the 4th a lashkar of 500 Mahsuds which was threatening Girni post was successfully dealt with and the garrison of the post reinforced. Jandola, though the water supply had been cut and the post was surrounded by the enemy, had not been seriously assaulted. The garrison had supplies up to the 24th June and water storage for 15 days. Wholesale desertions had occurred from the Frontier Constabulary at Domandi, Moghal-kot, Drazinda, and Luni. Chaudhwan was attacked on the night 4th-5th June and partially looted by about 200 Sherannis, and Bigwam Shumala, near Paharpur, was raided by a gang of Mahsuds.

60. With the arrival of three Indian infantry battalions from the Tochi, Major-General Climo ordered a column to march to Jandola on the 9th June to clear up the situation. No opposition was met with on the march, though the tribesmen attempted to prevent the restoration of the water supply after the column had reached its destination. After re-victualling the post and changing the garrison, the column returned to Khirgi on the 11th June.

61. About the 9th June reports were re-

ceived and were subsequently confirmed that, in spite of the terms of the armistice, an Afghan force of about 300 men with 2 guns had reached Wana. This detachment appears to have been given a purely passive rôle and to have confined its activities mainly to anti-British propaganda amongst the tribes.

62. On the 11th June, on receipt of reliable information that the village of Drazinda was serving the purpose of a supply depôt for the various raiding gangs in the vicinity, an air raid was carried out against it and a number of bombs dropped. The effect of this raid was considerable and for a time the activities of the tribesmen showed a marked decrease. On the 13th June Raghza village was destroyed for complicity in attacks on Gomal and Manjhi posts, and a large amount of fodder removed to Murtaza. The following day Parwara, in the Sheranni country, was bombed. On the 18th June arrangements were made for the re-establishment of the Luni and Zarkani posts with militia garrisons. These two posts had been partially destroyed by the tribesmen, but were repaired and occupied on the 28th June with the object of checking the recrudescence of cattle stealing in the neighbourhood and of enabling work to be resumed on the Gomal river head-works at Kotazam and Diwan Shah. On the 25th June four squadrons of cavalry and a section of mountain artillery, with 2 aeroplanes co-operating, undertook punitive operations against Drazinda, on supplies from which the Sheranni and Wazir gangs of raiders were dependent. The village was destroyed and over 500 head of cattle captured.

63. Early in July Major-General Climo concentrated a small force of all arms at Dardoni with the object of co-operating with the Kohat-Kurram force in an advance into Khost, should the peace negotiations fall through. The concentration of this force appears to have been interpreted by the tribes as preparatory to an advance into the Upper Tochi, and on the 7th July a lashkar, reported at over 1,200 Mahsuds and Wazirs, was seen entrenching and sngaring a position at Boya. Next day a half-hearted attack was made on the North Waziristan Militia piquets as they moved out from Isha, and on the 14th a cleverly organised attack on the aerodrome at Bannu was carried out by a band of 60 or 70 Shabi Khel Mahsuds. The aerodrome, which is situated about five miles out of Bannu on the Tochi road, was guarded by a platoon of Indian infantry. The enemy made a determined attempt to break into the hangar but were counter-attacked and driven off with loss. No damage was done to the machines.

64. On the 24th July, consequent upon the capture of one of our convoys at Kapip in Zhob, Major-General Climo concentrated at Murtaza a force of one squadron of cavalry, one section of mountain artillery, and one and a half battalions of Indian infantry, his intention being to give the impression that preparations were on foot for an advance up the Gomal, and thereby to draw the Wazir lashkars back to oppose him. The ruse was completely successful.

65. During the latter half of July, Vihowa was attacked several times by Wazirs; on the 18th July they succeeded in getting away with some loot, but otherwise did no important damage.

66. Several minor enterprises were carried out by the tribesmen against our piquets in the

Tochi between 28th July and the 8th August. On the 29th July a North Waziristan Militia piquet at Khajuri was ambushed by about 70 Mahsuds; on the 3rd August piquets south of the road between Isha and Miranshah were engaged all day with tribal lashkars and suffered some casualties; on the 8th August our troops moving out to piquet the road between Saidgi and Shinki were ambushed by 200 Abdulai Mahsuds and suffered somewhat heavily. These incidents can be attributed to lack of experience in frontier warfare, and a failure to recognise the necessity for constant vigilance when dealing with expert enemies like the Mahsuds and Wazirs.

67. Although no major operations were carried out by the Waziristan Force during the period under review, there were few on which troops on some part of this wide front were not engaged. The elusiveness of the enemy with whom they had to deal necessitated constant readiness and in many cases long and rapid marches. Escort duties were heavy; piqueting was continuous; and the troops were subjected to frequent sniping by night. The heat during June and July was abnormal even for that part of the frontier. I cannot speak too highly of the cheerful manner in which all hardships were borne. Whenever the tribesmen were met, all ranks showed that desire to get to close quarters and use their bayonets which is the true spirit of the offensive; and this is especially gratifying in troops who for the most part were young and without previous war experience. Major-General Climo brings to the notice the following units as especially deserving of mention:—

27th Light Cavalry.

31st Duke of Connaught's Own Lancers.

41st Dogras.

55th Coke's Rifles (Frontier Force).

2-2nd King Edward's Own Gurkha Rifles
(The Sirmoor Rifles).

OPERATIONS OF THE BALUCHISTAN FORCE.

68. When mobilisation was ordered, the troops at the disposal of the General Officer Commanding the Baluchistan Force consisted of:—

(a) the 4th Division (of which the two field batteries were located in their peace station at Hyderabad, Sind; one British battalion was temporarily employed at Lahore in connection with disturbances in the Punjab; and two Indian battalions were on detached duty at Chaman and Peshin respectively);

(b) the 12th Mounted Brigade;

(c) two Indian battalions and one regiment of Indian cavalry, and the Zhob Militia, in Zhob and Loralai;

(d) a force of two squadrons, two companies of sappers and miners and three battalions, together with about 1,500 levies, allotted as line of communication defence troops on the Nushki extension railway, and the 650 miles of road between railhead and Meshed.

Only two aeroplanes were immediately available on mobilisation, as the bulk of No. 114 Squadron, was employed in connection with internal disturbances.

69. At the outbreak of war the enemy forces in southern and western Afghanistan were estimated at 16 battalions (of which one formed the garrison of Fort Spin Baldak), 11 batteries

of artillery and 5 regiments of cavalry. The number of tribesmen which it was estimated could co-operate with these regular troops amounted to about 40,000 men.

70. On May 8th Lieutenant-General R. Wapshare, C.B., C.S.I., assumed command of the Baluchistan Force in addition to the command of 4th Division; on the 28th he handed over command of the latter to Major-General N. G. Woodyatt, C.B., transferred from Waziristan. Lieutenant-General Wapshare was informed that the policy of the Government of India in regard to the Baluchistan area was to show a bold front and, to carry out this policy, I authorised him to make any reconnaissances which might be necessary. There was no indication at this time of any hostile force moving on Chaman, and the nearest enemy troops were those garrisoning Fort Spin Baldak. Reports were soon received, however, of large gatherings of Afghan troops at Wazikhwa on the Zhob border. These troops had arrived from Ghazni and Kabul, and their probable intention was to overawe the Ghilzais and force them and other tribes to join in the *Jihad* with the object of attacking the Fort Sandeman area, or of invading the upper Zhob valley. The Achakzais, who live half in Afghan and half in British territory, were also becoming restless.

71. Lieutenant-General Wapshare considered that it would be strategically unsound to detach a force to reinforce the Zhob at this juncture, and that his best plan of action would be to take the offensive and attack Fort Baldak. The capture of Fort Baldak would have the immediate effect of diverting the attention of the troops threatening the Zhob, and a successful offensive from Chaman would have a great moral effect on the tribesmen, more especially on the Achakzais. On May 5th I authorised Lieutenant-General Wapshare to attack and destroy, at his discretion any Afghan force which might advance to Spin Baldak; and directed that the fort should, if captured, be razed to the ground. Owing to shortage of rolling-stock, which delayed the arrival of the divisional howitzer battery from Hyderabad, the attack on the fort was postponed till the 27th. The troops employed consisted of the 4th Division (less 10th Infantry Brigade), assisted by some units of the 12th Mounted Brigade. To ensure secrecy, no preliminary reconnaissance was made by the cavalry, but the necessity of this was obviated to a great extent by the simplicity of the terrain; reconnaissances of the fort had also been carried out daily from the air. The attack involved considerable preliminary preparation. A large number of light scaling ladders were issued to the assaulting columns, as also were rafts for use in the event of the ditch being found to have been filled in. A train of water-kegs on camels was also organised, as the water supply of Fort Baldak was derived from outside sources 12 miles distant and under the control of the enemy.

72. In the early morning of May 27th, the cavalry moved forward in two columns with the object of skirting both sides of the fort, forming a cordon in rear astride the two roads leading to Kandaha, and thus making the escape of the garrison impossible. A white flag was then sent from Chaman to demand the surrender of the fort, and, failing acceptance, to inform the commander that if there were any women in the fort they could be sent out

with an escort of twelve men under safe conduct. The white flag was fired on, and Lieutenant-General Wapshare therefore ordered the attack to proceed.

73. After a bombardment lasting two and a half hours, the artillery had reduced the towers of the fort to a crumbling condition, and the parapet had been breached in several places. While this bombardment was in progress, about two hundred of the enemy broke out of the fort and made for the hills to the north. They were caught under heavy rifle and machine-gun fire, and also attacked by the cavalry; it is improbable that more than thirty of the party reached the hills. The fort was assaulted by the 1-22nd Punjabis, whose leading company entered the main gate, and by good use of their Lewis guns quickly secured the first foothold. The 4th Gurkha Rifles simultaneously stormed the south-east face by means of scaling ladders, and in a few minutes the fort was in our hands. The Duke of Wellington's Regiment captured the ridge and towers in a most gallant style, gaining their objectives a few minutes before the main defences had been scaled. The only organised resistance now remaining was from a *sangar* which held up the advance of the Royal West Kent Regiment. The Duke of Wellington's Regiment worked round in rear of the *sangar* with bombs, and not a single man escaped from it.

74. The enemy had shown the greatest bravery throughout the operation, and when the assaulting columns reached their objectives the survivors continued a hand-to-hand fight. The mopping up parties had to clear the numerous cellars with bombs and bayonets. Out of the garrison of about 600 men, 169 were taken prisoners, about 30 escaped, and the remainder were either killed or buried in the ruins. Daud Shah, the Commander, was among those who escaped, but he was severely wounded.

75. The fall of Fort Baldak had the desired effect of relieving the situation in Zhob, but the evacuation of the Tochi and the retirement of the remnants of the Wana garrison through Zhob produced an atmosphere of unrest among the tribesmen in the Fort Sandeman area. The Zhob Militia were employed to help the Wana garrison into Mir Ali Khel by piqueting a portion of the route between that place and Moghalkot, but the loss of a British Officer killed was the signal for wholesale desertions, and only about one-sixth of the corps could be counted on during the remainder of the operations. A mobile column was accordingly formed in Zhob, under the command of Brigadier-General de C. O'Grady, C.I.E., commanding the 10th Infantry Brigade. While this column was concentrating, a detachment of 200 Gurkhas, proceeding as a reinforcement to Fort Sandeman and accompanied by a small detachment of Zhob Militia Cavalry, was attacked in the vicinity of Fort Sandeman and suffered heavy losses before reaching its destination. Communication with Fort Sandeman was interrupted and for a time attacks on the various posts on the Loralai-Fort Sandeman road were of frequent occurrence. Brigadier-General O'Grady reached Kapip, near Fort Sandeman, on the 20th June and remained in the area for some time carrying out punitive measures.

76. In the meantime the situation on the

Chaman front had developed rapidly. Enemy forces amounting to about eight battalions, four regiments of cavalry, twenty-six guns, and twenty machine guns under the command of General Abdul Qudus, had concentrated in the Takht and Murgha-Chaman areas, with advanced detachments at Tsagai springs and Sheroba. On our side, a strong line of defence, covering a length of twelve miles and consisting of a series of lunettes at intervals of 600 yards, had been completed between New Chaman and Bogra water-works; and, in addition to this, New Chaman and the mobilization camp there were protected by a separate encirclement of strong points and wire fencing.

77. In dealing with the situation thus created, Lieutenant-General Wapshare was faced with a problem of considerable difficulty. Within striking distance of his main force at Chaman, and concentrated within a comparatively small area, lay the bulk of the Afghan southern army. Each group of Afghan regulars had its following of armed tribesmen, who, though lacking cohesion and organisation, were fired by the spirit of *Jehad* and threatened to become formidable adversaries under the elation of success. In ordinary circumstances, Lieutenant-General Wapshare's course of action would have been clear, *viz.*, to attack and destroy the force opposed to him; but the political situation precluded him from adopting this obvious solution. Moreover, the difficulty of his position was aggravated by anxiety in regard to the Zhob, for Afghan agents, whether by accident or design, had succeeded in arousing the hostility of the tribes all along the Baluchistan border and in creating a situation in Zhob, which at one time threatened to develop into general insurrection. Great political importance attached to the maintenance of the line stretching from Peshin, through Hindubagh, Kila Saifulla, Gwal Haiderzai and Murgha Kibzai, to Musa Khel; for on this depended our ability to prevent the Afghan and British border tribes from penetrating the rich districts of Loralai and Sibi and from gaining contact with the Marris, a tribe which, had they risen, would have added seriously to our embarrassments by harassing our communications with India. He was thus faced with two conflicting considerations, *viz.*, to maintain his striking force at Chaman at sufficient strength to attack and disperse the Afghan army opposed to him, should the peace negotiations break down; or, alternatively, to accept the risk of reducing his striking force, with the object of restoring and maintaining order in Zhob. It appeared to me clear that the strong inducement to dissipate our strength should be resisted as the governing factor in the situation was our ability to strike hard and quickly at such Afghan forces as lay within reach. I was of opinion that a heavy blow dealt at Abdul Qudus's force on the Chaman front would react quickly along the Baluchistan border, and produce the desired solution to the problem in Zhob. I therefore directed Lieutenant-General Wapshare to maintain his striking force at Chaman at full strength and with the highest possible degree of mobility.

78. Lieutenant-General Wapshare accordingly recalled Brigadier-General O'Grady from Zhob, together with as many troops as could be spared from that area. I had been able to despatch a reinforcement of three battalions and one mountain battery to the Baluchistan

area, and with these Lieutenant-General Wapshare was able to complete the concentration of the 4th Division at Chaman and secure the Loralai-Fort Sandeman road for the time being. In spite of the terms of the armistice, the enemy continued to encroach near the British border, and sniping was of daily occurrence. To complete his preparations to meet a possible breakdown of the negotiations, Lieutenant-General Wapshare moved the 10th Infantry Brigade, less two battalions but strengthened by the addition of a mountain battery and a detachment of cavalry, to the top of the Bogra pass, in order to deny the Toba plateau to the enemy as well as to secure the Bogra water-supply and his own railway communications.

79. Numerous reliable reports were received about this time of hostile activity on the border north of Hindu Bagh, which appeared to indicate that the enemy intended to make a determined advance into the upper Zhob. The situation at Fort Sandeman was also disquieting. The withdrawal of Brigadier-General O'Grady's force had been followed by a concentration of Wazirs and Mahsuds who were joined by disaffected parties of Mando Khel and Sherranni tribesmen. A wireless party and a section of mountain guns marching from Babar to Fort Sandeman under escort of two companies of Gurkha Rifles and a small detachment of Zhob Militia were attacked at Kapip on July the 6th by about 300 Wazirs and local tribesmen who held sangared positions across the road. The enemy resisted the advance of our column with great determination, but were eventually driven off, leaving 37 dead including their leader. On July the 14th an unsuccessful attack on Lakaband was followed immediately by an attack on a convoy moving to Fort Sandeman. An escort, consisting of a section of mountain guns, 225 men of the 1st Gurkha Rifles and 75 Zhob Militia, was sent from Fort Sandeman to Babar in relief of the escort which had accompanied the convoy from Lakaband, but was itself attacked on the return journey near Kapip by a force of Wazirs and Sherannis estimated at between 1,200 and 2,000 men, who had collected from a great distance and with great secrecy. A gallant attempt was made to clear the tribes on either side of the road, but this was only partially successful, and several commanding points remained in the hands of the enemy. From these points he poured a heavy fire into the column, inflicting numerous casualties on men and animals; and, while holding up the advance of the column, repeatedly attacked the flanks and rear guard. The troops resisted with great bravery, but they were altogether outnumbered, and at nightfall the tribesmen rushed the convoy in overwhelming strength. Fierce hand-to-hand fighting ensued in which the escort was gradually overpowered and swept away, with the loss of the two mountain guns and practically the whole of the transport. The remnants made their way to Fort Sandeman in small parties.

80. This incident had the inevitable result of raising the tribesmen's morale, and the local situation was seriously aggravated. It became imperative to organize another mobile column in the Zhob, but, in order to do so, Lieutenant-General Wapshare was faced with great difficulties in regard to transport, for his railhead at Harnai was 170 miles from Fort Sandeman and the road traversed a difficult and

mountainous country. Hired transport refused to move beyond Loralai under any circumstances. He was therefore compelled to transfer one of his camel transport corps from Chaman to the Zhob, and this reduced his radius of action against the Afghan forces concentrated against him on the Chaman front. The concentration of the column was also much delayed by heavy rains which breached the road and railway, and it was not ready to move from its base at Murgha till August 12th, by which date reports indicated that the Wazir and Mahsud *lashkars* were dispersing to their homes. The main objective of the column therefore became the re-rationing of Fort Sandeman and the re-establishing of the road posts.

81. In the meantime news had been received that a *lashkar* of 500 men, mainly Zhob Militia deserters and therefore well armed, had occupied Murgha Fakirzai and the hills immediately north of Hindu Bagh. In attempting to deal with these, the Hindu Bagh garrison had suffered appreciable loss. Reinforcements, including an armoured motor battery, were accordingly sent to Hindu Bagh. The enemy attempted to intercept the battery which was acting as escort to a convoy, but were quickly driven off after heavy losses had been inflicted on them.

82. No important operations occurred on the Nushki extension railway or the line of communication in East Persia. The line was well organised and the troops soundly disposed. Armoured trains were also improvised and proved a great deterrent to raiders. A small column was concentrated in Seistan, consisting of four mountain guns, an infantry battalion, and 300 mounted levies, but no serious raid took place.

CONCLUSION.

83. It now only remains for me to express my appreciation of the manner in which commanders, staffs, troops and administrative services faced and overcame the difficulties of this campaign. The enemy rarely gave the troops an opportunity of meeting him in open fight, but when he did so our superior discipline, training and leadership enabled us to overcome opposition with much ease. I have already referred to the fine military spirit in which the troops accepted the burden of this campaign; this spirit was fully maintained in the field, and all ranks, British and Indian, showed themselves to be animated by that determination to close with the enemy which is the surest guarantee of success. No greater testimony of this spirit could be adduced than the cheerfulness with which all ranks endured the trying climatic conditions prevailing and the discomforts inevitable in the opening stages of a campaign. The lot of the troops and administrative personnel detailed to posts on the lines of communication was a particularly hard one, for communications with the frontier pass through a belt of country possessing a climate of exceptional severity and scanty facilities for providing comfort or recreation. Nevertheless, this spirit of cheerfulness was nowhere more in evidence than among these posts.

84. The work of the Royal Air Force under the direction of Brigadier-General N. D. K. McEwen, C.M.G., D.S.O., was carried out under peculiarly difficult and dangerous con-

ditions. The machines could only be used during the heat of the day at considerable risk, but pilots and observers unhesitatingly answered every call made upon them and rendered invaluable service throughout. The same may be said of the workshop personnel who laboured untiringly under the most trying climatic conditions.

85. The units of the Machine Gun Corps were used for the first time in frontier operations during this campaign, and have amply proved their value. The work of the Armoured Motor Batteries has emphasized the great utility of this weapon in frontier fighting.

86. The Signal Service has performed its duties to my entire satisfaction. In spite of many difficulties of ground and constant interruption by the enemy, communications have been quickly established and efficiently maintained. The service has been handicapped by the lack of British reinforcements to replace evacuations, and it is greatly to the credit of the officers and men who remained at duty that so high a standard of efficiency was maintained. I am also much indebted to the Indian Postal and Telegraph Departments for their assistance and for the readiness with which they have met demands on their already strained resources.

87. The duties of the Engineer and Works Services have been particularly onerous. The construction, upkeep or repair of roads, railways, bridges, and defences; the provision of barracks, camps, and hospitals, water supplies, ice factories, and electric installations; the erection of a ropeway through the Khaibar: these and various other projects have necessitated the employment of a large number of sapper and miner units, field and railway companies, pioneer battalions and labour units. I desire to express my high appreciation of the devotion which has characterised the work of these units and which has contributed so largely to the comfort and welfare of the troops.

88. As already stated, I have had every reason to be satisfied with the work of the Veterinary, Remounts, Ordnance, Supply and Transport Services, the latter of whom were the chief sufferers during the cholera outbreak. The energy and promptness displayed in dealing with this outbreak reflects the greatest credit on the Medical Service, whose work throughout has been deserving of the highest praise. I desire also to express the gratitude of the army to the Nursing Sisters whose devotion under most trying conditions has done much to mitigate the suffering of patients in hospitals. The spiritual welfare of the troops has been in capable hands.

29. My special thanks are due to the Red Cross Association, under the direction of their Commissioner, the Honourable Mr. W. M. Hailey, C.S.I., C.I.E., for their immediate and continued ministrations to the comfort not only of those in hospital, but wherever help was needed; to the Comforts for the Troops Fund, who brought the whole of their admirable organisation into play to ameliorate the conditions under which the troops were serving; and to the number of devoted ladies and gentlemen who contributed with unremitting zeal to the welfare of the troops. The work of the Y.M.C.A. was also of great value.

I take this opportunity also of tendering my thanks for the services rendered by the Railway Administration throughout India, and especially to the North-Western Railway for the admirable manner in which they have met the heavy calls made upon them, and for the unremitting energy which made it possible to concentrate and maintain so large a force. The success of the arrangements for concentration was due in large measure to the cordial co-operation of the Railway Board.

90. The advice and assistance of the Hon'ble Sir A. H. Grant, K.C.I.E., C.S.I., and the Hon'ble Mr. Denys Bray, C.I.E., who successively held the appointment of Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department during the period of the operations, of the Hon'ble Sir George Roos-Koppel, G.C.I.E., K.C.S.I., late Chief Commissioner of the North-West Frontier Province, and of the Hon'ble Mr. H. R. C. Dobbs, C.S.I., C.I.E., late Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, have been of the greatest value throughout. I am also much indebted to the political officers attached to the headquarters of the forces in the field.

91. I desire also to express my gratitude and appreciation of the assistance which the Ruling Princes and Chiefs have generally rendered in this emergency. It will be remembered that before the close of the great war the Alwar and Bharatpur Darbars offered their Imperial Service Troops for incorporation in the Indian Army, and that five other Darbars, namely, Bikanir, Dholpur, Jodhpur, Kolhapur, and Patiala, agreed to the formation in their States of new battalions of the Indian Army. The units thus incorporated in the Indian Army were retransferred to the Darbars on the conclusion of the Great War and the newly raised regiments were disbanded; but on the outbreak of war on the frontier, every Darbar possessing Imperial Service Troops once more placed them at the disposal of the Government of India, notwithstanding that many of these units had only just returned from active service overseas. Contingents of cavalry, infantry, artillery, sappers and miners and transport from nineteen States were employed either with the Field Army or on garrison duty. Many offers of personal services were also received, and appointments on the staff in the field were held by the Rulers of Patiala, Dholpur, Rutlam, and Baria, the two brothers of His Highness the Maharaja of Patiala and the two sons of the Nawab of Loharu. Many offers of motor-cars, camels, and money, were also received and accepted.

92. I further wish to express my grateful thanks to the Nepal Government for their generous assistance and co-operation. In spite of serious climatic difficulties His Excellency the Prime Minister of Nepal again sent to our aid a contingent of Nepalese troops accompanied by two generals of the Nepalese army. The two battalions forming the contingent were a welcome addition to our resources.

93. Finally, I desire to express my high appreciation of the services rendered by the three Force Commanders.

General Sir A. A. Barrett commanded the North-West Frontier Force with the military skill and instinct associated with his name. His profound experience of frontier warfare and his sagacious advice were at all times of the greatest value to Army Headquarters.

Lieutenant-General R. Wapshare, Commanding the Baluchistan Force, gave evidence of his military qualities by the manner in which the attack on Spin Baldak was executed. The small number of casualties sustained is a testimony to the thoroughness of his preliminary arrangements. His high powers of organisation were displayed in the measures taken to ensure the health and well-being of those under his command.

Major-General S. H. Climo, Commanding the Waziristan Force, dealt with the many difficult situations which arose within his area with marked ability; and has shown himself as

skilful in the handling of troops as in ordering the administrative arrangements necessary for their comfort.

94. I attach a list* of those whose services have been of particular value and whose assistance and work I desire to bring specially to notice.

I have the honour to be,
SIR,

Your obedient servant,
(Signed) C. C. MONRO, *General.*
Commander-in-Chief in India.

* To be published later.

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