

(d) The night bombers were ordered to attain their maximum height over the aerodrome and then to throttle down their engines and appear over the target as silently as possible.

(e) A sufficient reserve was always kept in hand to enable a heavy attack to be launched, should any suitable target, such as a concentration of tribesmen, be located.

21. *Forced Landings.*—It was of the utmost importance to avoid any pilot having to make a forced landing in hostile territory. Raids were therefore carried out at a sufficient height to give pilots a reasonable chance of being able to reach one of the emergency landing grounds in case of engine failure. These were the only places where a forced landing could be made without damage.

22. *Operations.*—The operations opened on March 9th 1925 with attacks on all the sections concerned; the main concentration during the first 4 days being directed against the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL. The hours flown and flights made are given in the Appendix. Several villages in DRE ALGAD were set on fire, a tower was demolished in the SPLI TOI. On the 13th bombing operation ceased as various hostile sections had promised to comply with Government demands. Nothing occurred, however, and action was begun again on March 14th.

On March 15th the two captured Hindus were brought into SPLI TOI Post, and on March 17th the whole hostile and friendly ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL jirga arrived at JANDOLA; operations against this section were in consequence again suspended. The Resident announced the terms to the hostiles, and an agreement was in sight when internal dissensions caused a breakdown of negotiations. Operations were resumed against the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL and continued against the remainder. During the renewed operations some damage was caused to the caves. It was found at this time that various friendly villages were giving shelter to the hostiles and their flocks: these villages were promptly warned by the Resident.

The friendly section of the ABDUR RUHMAN KHEL left the SPLI TOI area altogether at this period, compelling various hostile sections to return to their own areas. Our action had by this time forced the majority of the hostile sections underground and completely upset their normal life.

One flight from No. 20 (A.C.) squadron was sent up to TANK on March 18th to reinforce No. 5 (A.C.) Squadron.

23. *Settlement with GURI KHEL.*—On March 21st Flying Officers N. C. HAYTER-HAMES and E. J. DASHWOOD, while carrying out a bomb raid, were forced to come down in hostile territory from some cause unknown, their machine being completely wrecked. Flying Officer HAYTER-HAMES was killed instantaneously, and Flying Officer DASHWOOD, who fell into the hands of GURI KHEL friendlies, died shortly afterwards. Flying Officer DASHWOOD's body was brought into SORAROGHA on March 22nd in face of considerable opposition from the KARIM KHEL, although the BILAND

KHEL hostiles helped the friendlies, and KARIM KHELs, after haggling, brought Flying Officer HAYTER-HAMES's body in on March 25th together with the rifles demanded. The jirga was interviewed at JANDOLA by the Political Agent, when they surrendered their leading Malik (DANGAR) as security for the payment of the money fine.

24. About this time it became obvious that the operations were likely to be protracted, and it became essential to restrict their intensity in case any other operations became necessary, or the present operations had to be continued indefinitely. The attack on the tribes now developed into an Air Blockade carried out with a diminished force, chief attention being paid to the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL who were reported to be collecting prior to migrating to AFGHANISTAN. These operations were successful. A tower was destroyed in a MARESAI village. On March 30th bombing of the MARESAI was suspended for one day to allow their jirga to appear at JANDOLA. Nothing however came of these overtures.

25. *Night Flying.*—On March 30th one night flying Bristol Fighter from No. 31 Squadron, AMBALA, arrived at TANK to carry out night bombing raids over the hostile area. Parties were despatched to the landing grounds at SORAROGHA and KHIRGI, with searchlights and landing flares. The first flight was successfully carried out on the night of April 4th and produced a most excellent result. The tribesmen had, hitherto, considered themselves perfectly safe after dark, and the discovery that we could operate at night proved disconcerting. It was arranged, therefore, to reinforce this machine with two more from AMBALA. The arrival of these machines on April 6th necessitated some re-organisation of forces, which were re-distributed as follows:—

Operational Headquarters	TANK.
1 Flight—No. 31 (A.C.) Squadron — Bristol Fighter (for night flying)	TANK.
1 Flight—No. 5 (A.C.) Squadron — Bristol Fighter MIRAMSHAH.
1 Flight—No. 20 (A.C.) Squadron — Bristol Fighter MIRAMSHAH.
2 Flights—No. 27 (B) Squadron—D. H. 9a	... MIRAMSHAH.
2. Flights—No. 60 (B) Squadron—D. H. 9a	... MIRAMSHAH.
Searchlight Party	... SORAROGHA.
Searchlight Party	... KHIRGI.

It was decided to launch a big offensive on April 4th immediately before the first night raid, and accordingly 38 machine raids were carried out, giving a total of 52½ hours flying. This action caused casualties and the night raid succeeded in killing a notorious FARIDAI, TORMARCHAI. A friendly ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL jirga appeared at TANK on this day with various irrelevant suggestions which were rejected.