

26. On April 9th an afternoon patrol sighted a big collection of FARIDAI personnel moving up the DRE ALGAD. This exceptional target was at once engaged, and additional machines called for from MIRAMSHAH to drive home the attack. Considerable casualties had already been inflicted, when the weather, which had been threatening all day, broke completely, thus making it impossible to press home the attack on the only concentration of hostiles encountered in the open during the whole course of the operations.

27. *Extension of Areas.*—As a result of information received, warnings were issued to the following "friendly villages" which were giving sanctuary to hostiles and their flocks:—

GALLI PUNGA, PASTI KHAN, JUL-LAMDAR PARI KHEL, JEMADAR DIDAI's village, SHINKAI, WAZIRGAI. It was also definitely established that a large number of hostile ABDUR RAHMAN KHELs were sheltering with friendlies in the SARELA, and a warning was issued to this district on April 12th. A successful attack was carried out on this date. About this time information was received that hostile families were sheltering in the BARWAND area, and the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL were likely to move to the BADDAR ALGAD *en route* to AFGHANISTAN. Permission to extend the operations to these areas was therefore asked for: this was received on April 20th for the BADDAR area only.

28. *Further Negotiations.*—Representatives of the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL hostiles arrived on April 12th with definite peace proposals. These proposals were considered to be so important by the Resident, that bombing of the SPLI TOI area was stopped from 14-00 hours on April 13th until midnight on April 14th. The jirga duly appeared, but no useful results were obtained, and operations were resumed on April 15th, when 57½ hours flying were accomplished. During these raids chappar encampments in the SARELA were set on fire. Two more night raids were also sent out during the night.

29. *Settlement with FARIDAI and MARESAI.*—About this time very conflicting reports were being received in regard to the intentions of the FARIDAI and MARESAI, and the Political Authorities despatched an emissary to AHMEDWAM to collect their jirga. A message was received in consequence, on April 15th, that the jirga would appear under certain conditions which were at once refused. However, on the morning of the 18th the fine of 7 Government rifles was handed in, followed by the 3 GOMAL rifles, whereupon operations ceased as far as these sections were concerned.

30. *Conclusion of Operations against ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL.*—Meanwhile a constant reconnaissance was maintained over the BADDAR area in order to get information of any migration of hostile sections. Bombing of the ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL hostiles was continued, patrols being kept constantly over their area. On the 17th a further deputation of intermediaries for the hostiles arrived, but their proposals were not accepted. They returned on the night of April 20th, this time

with definite promises of security, and they were accordingly granted 24 hours' respite. It was now discovered that the hostiles had actually left the SPLI TOI for BADDAR, but had been turned back by sections living *en route* who were afraid of being bombed. This forced them to return either to SPLI TOI or BARWAND, and it was reported that, if peace was not concluded, they intended to go direct to AFGHANISTAN *via* KHAISORA, to avoid further bombing. The three security rifles were not produced by the time allotted, and bombing was begun again, only to be suspended the same evening on the receipt of the rifles. After a preliminary meeting with hostiles and friendlies at Sarwekai on April 23rd, a representative jirga was met on Tuesday 28th at JANDOLA. After three days of strenuous discussion, due to the conflicting interests of the hostiles and friendlies, terms were agreed to on Friday May 1st. The full fine of 16 rifles was accepted and guarantees for payment within a considerable time given.

31. The operations which had lasted 54 days were thus brought to an end. The ABDUR RAHMAN KHEL, the GURI KHEL, including the BILAND KHEL sub-section who have been stubborn in the past, the FARIDAI and MARESAI have all accepted the terms originally laid down, except for one rifle which was remitted to the BILAND KHEL as a reward for their assistance in recovering Flying Officer DASHWOOD's body. The moral effect of the bombing on tribesmen not included in the actual area of operations has also been considerable: various fines which were imposed before and during the present operation have been paid up, and the decisions of the Political Authorities have been carried out with exemplary promptitude. The following shows the nature of these results and, although they were not all due to the moral effect of air action, this undoubtedly influenced the decision of some of the tribes to settle their debts:—

(a) A section of the MALIKDINAI, led by a famous badmash SHAMDAI, who were the instigators of the raid on GOMAL Police Station, were so impressed by the bombing of their neighbours, that they handed over the 13 rifles in their possession and paid the necessary fine. This result was a complete surprise and cleared up what might have proved a difficult situation.

(b) The BAHADUR KHEL tribe came in and paid up in full a long outstanding fine.

(c) The SHABI KHEL tribe paid up a fine of over Rs. 7,000 for their share in the MAROBI case last August.

#### COMMENTS.

32. *Damage Inflicted.*—It is difficult to obtain information as to the number of casualties inflicted on the enemy. The tribesman is reluctant to admit that the fighting strength of his tribe has been reduced by the killing of his young men, so his losses are usually concealed. It is not likely that the actual casualties were many, nor is it desirable that they should be, provided that the enemy can be brought to terms without.