

prepared and was to have been launched at 1000 hours; but just before that hour an Iranian Officer arrived with a white flag and the request for a truce was granted.

Lt. General Quinan arrived at Zibiri whilst Major General Slim was still discussing terms with the Iranian envoy and he approved the terms offered. He also instructed Major General Slim to advance and occupy Kermanshah in order to secure the oil refinery and tinning factory there.

The refinery area was occupied on 29th August by a detachment and on 30th August the remainder of the 2nd and 9th Armoured Brigades reached Kermanshah.

45. Our total casualties during the operations from 25th to 28th August in Iran were as follows:—

	<i>Killed.</i>	<i>Wounded.</i>
British Officers	5	3
Viceroy's Commissioned Officers	1	1
British Other Ranks	1	4
Indian Other Ranks	15*	34
Total	22	42

46. On 29th August Major-General Slim at Kermanshah was ordered to despatch to Hamadan a force under Brigadier Aizlewood consisting of the 14/20th Hussars, one Gurkha Battalion and a troop of artillery, with ancillary units, with the object of making friendly contact with the Russians.

A report was received that Russian forces were advancing on Kermanshah from the direction of Senna and on Hamadan from Kazvin. A detachment was despatched therefore along the Senna road as well as that to Kazvin.

The Russian forces were met at Senna at 2200 hours 29th August and just South of Kazvin on the afternoon of 31st August.

47. On 29th August the General Officer Commanding Iraq was instructed to report his views and plan for dealing with the situation in Iran. He stated that it was proposed to:—

(i) station troops at Hamadan, Kermanshah, Shahabad and thence along the Line of Communications to Khaniqin;

(ii) hold Khuzistan with the minimum forces, with Headquarters at Ahwaz. A detachment could be maintained at Sultana-bad for railway protection;

(iii) withdraw to Iraq all troops not required in Iran.

Owing to the shortage of motor transport it was not found possible to maintain any formations beyond Hamadan. The shortage of transport had been aggravated by the arrival of the 5th Indian Division (less one brigade group) in Iraq on the 6th September without any maintenance transport. This division had been sent to Iraq from Middle East as an additional garrison in accordance with a previous decision when operations in Iran appeared likely.

The Commander-in-Chief, India, arrived at Baghdad on 31st August, confirmed the above plan and instructed Lt.-General Quinan to maintain close contact with the Russian forces in Iran.

48. From 1st September onwards reports were received of tribal risings in Iranian Kurdistan. The situation rapidly deteriorated although active patrolling was carried out by the 9th Armoured Brigade from Senna and Kermanshah and also by the 21st Indian Infantry Brigade on the line of communication between Kermanshah and Khaniqin. Considerable quantities of arms and ammunition hidden or sold to tribesmen by Iranian Army deserters were recovered.

49. A small detachment of British troops with Colonel Popov of the Russian Mission was sent to contact the Russian troops at Saujbulagh on 7th September.

50. On 9th September orders were issued for the 9th Armoured Brigade (less one Regiment) with one Indian Infantry Battalion under command, to be ready to move to Teheran at short notice.

51. The 13th Lancers which had been withdrawn from Khuzistan, arrived at Kermanshah on 12th September and moved on to Hamadan next day, less one squadron which was retained for employment in the Kermanshah-Senna area.

52. There were indications that the Persians did not intend to satisfy our demands for the surrender of Axis nationals and on 14th September the War Office intimated that a joint Anglo-Russian advance to Teheran would begin as soon as mutual arrangements with the Russian Commander had been completed. The Russians agreed to a simultaneous entry into Teheran at 1500 hours on 17th September by the British from the South and the Russians from the East and West. This was carried out according to plan, relations between our troops and the Russians were most cordial.

Meanwhile Khuzistan remained quiet and all except one Infantry Brigade and a battery of Field Artillery were withdrawn to Iraq.

But in Kurdistan fighting still continued between gangs of Kurds and Iranian troops garrisoned in various forts. Active patrolling was continued to give moral support to the Iranian Commander at Kermanshah.

The Headquarters of the 6th Indian Division (Major-General J. N. Thomson) arrived at Basra on 12th September with the 27th Indian Infantry Brigade, and was ordered to relieve the 8th and 10th Indian Divisions in Khuzistan and West Iran respectively.

Other local moves were carried out, and on 26th September and 3rd October respectively the 9th Armoured Brigade from Teheran and the 5th Indian Division (less one Brigade Group) from Kirkuk began to return to Middle East Command.

53. On 10th October information was received from His Majesty's Government to the effect that a proposal had been made to the Russian Government for the withdrawal of both Russian and British troops from Teheran and its neighbourhood and that plans should immediately be made with the Russian Commander for joint withdrawal to take place as soon as possible. The withdrawal was carried out on 18th October after a combined British-Russian parade on 17th October. The Russians withdrew to Kazvin and Pahlevi and our troops to Sultanabad and Hamadan.

*Includes four died of wounds.