

Requirements as laid down by the Chiefs of Staff were 336 Initial Equipment. Reserves for these on the basis of 50 per cent. for flying-boats and 100 per cent. for all other aircraft should have amounted to 327, a total of 663.

Omitting the Vildebeestes, the total deficiency in aircraft was 415.

The Dutch sent over a total of 22 bombers and 9 fighters. If these are included, the net deficiency becomes 384.

The figure of 100 per cent. for reserves of land-based aircraft was laid down in an Air Ministry telegram of the 23rd February, 1941.

#### APPENDIX K.

##### SUMMARY OF OPERATIONALLY SERVICEABLE I.E. AIRCRAFT IN MALAYA.

	Dec.	Dec.	Dec.	Dec.	Dec.	Dec.
	7.	12.	17.	19.	22.	24.
Bombers (including Torpedo Bombers)...	59	45	59	58	49	61
Fighters ... ..	72	53	58	53	45	50
Reconnaissance ... ..	24	7	12	11	12	13
Flying Boats ... ..	3	3	4	4	3	3
Total ... ..	158	108	133	126	109	127

The above figures do not include Dutch aircraft in N. Sumatra or in Borneo, which were stationed North of the Equator and thus came under the command of the Air Officer Commanding, Far East, under the terms of the A.D.B. Agreement. Nor do the figures include Immediate Reserves with Squadrons, Reserves in the Maintenance Units nor Aircraft in the A.A.C.U.

#### APPENDIX L.

##### PERFORMANCE OF THE BUFFALO SINGLE SEATER.

A report on the tests of a Buffalo was sent in from the A. & A.E.E., Boscombe Down, dated the 3rd July, 1941. Comparison of this with the official intelligence figures of the Japanese Naval fighter, Zero type, showed that the Buffalo was much inferior at heights of 10,000 feet, and over, viz. :—

	Zero Fighter.	Buffalo.
Rate of climb to 13,000 feet ... ..	4.3 minutes	6.1 minutes
Speed at 10,000 feet ... ..	315	270 (Approx.)

At 20,000 feet the performance, as indicated by the official figures, is more nearly equal, i.e. :—

	Zero Fighter.	Buffalo.
Speed at 20,000 feet ... ..	295	292

Actual experience in Malaya, however, showed that this speed of 292 for the Buffalo could not be obtained. Whether this was due to the aeroplane, to the climate or to the pilots I cannot say.

#### APPENDIX M.

##### MALAYA.

##### *Order of the Day issued December 8, 1941.*

Japan's action to-day gives the signal for the Empire Naval, Army and Air Forces, and those of their Allies, to go into action with a common aim and common ideals.

We are ready. We have had plenty of warning and our preparations are made and tested. We do not forget at this moment the years of patience and forbearance in which we have borne, with dignity and discipline, the petty insults and insolences inflicted on us by the Japanese in the Far East. We know that those things were only done because Japan thought she could take advantage of our supposed weakness. Now, when Japan herself has decided to put the matter to a sterner test, she will find out that she has made a grievous mistake.

We are confident. Our defences are strong and our weapons efficient. Whatever our race, and whether we are now in our native land or have come thousands of miles, we have one aim and one only. It is to defend these shores, to destroy such of our enemies as may set foot on our soil, and then, finally, to cripple the power of the enemy to endanger our ideals, our possessions and our peace.