

and the Commanding Officers of the submarines.

This briefing was carried out by the officer of my Staff (Commander Davies) who had been responsible for the planning.

*Security.*

25. Special security measures at Port HHZ were increased as from the 1st September. No leave was allowed, none but specially selected officers and ratings were permitted to leave the area, and all ships present were retained in the port until the completion of the operation. It is considered that the security of the operation was well maintained.

*Departure for the Operation.*

26. Soviet reconnaissance on the 3rd September had shown that TIRPITZ, SCHARNHORST and LUTZOW were present in the Alten area, and it appeared likely therefore that the operation would be carried out in that area (Operation "Funnel"). On the 7th September, however, the first Spitfire sortie showed only LUTZOW present, and the TIRPITZ and SCHARNHORST were later reported off Ice Fiord, Spitzbergen.

27. In order for Day D to be the 20th September in the case of Operation "Funnel," it was necessary for the X-craft to be sailed from Port HHZ on 11th-12th September. Furthermore it was not desirable to postpone Day D by more than two or three days owing to the waning moon. It was therefore vital to obtain the re-disposition of the main units as soon as possible.

28. However, visual reconnaissance at 1000A on the 10th September confirmed the return of the TIRPITZ and SCHARNHORST to Alten Fiord, and the S.B.N.O., North Russia that evening signalled the exact positions of both ships in their berth in Kaafiord. LUTZOW was not seen.

29. I arrived at Port HHZ on the morning of the 10th September, to see the crews before they sailed and to witness the start of this great enterprise.

30. On the following morning I signalled to Admiralty, Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleet, and Admiral Commanding Orkney and Shetlands, my intention to carry out Operations "Source" and "Funnel", Day D being 20th September.

31. Submarines, each with an X-craft in tow, sailed from Port HHZ as follows:—

- 1600Z, 11th September—  
TRUCULENT and X.6.
- SYRTIS and X.9.
- 1800Z, 11th September—  
THRASHER and X.5.
- 2000Z, 11th September—  
SEANYMPH and X.8.
- 2130Z, 11th September—  
STUBBORN and X.7.
- 1300Z, 12th September—  
SCEPTRE and X.10.

X-craft were manned for the passage by passage crews.\*

*The Passage.*

32. The passage was uneventful from the 11th to 14th September. Good weather was experienced and all submarines made good speed with their X-craft dived in tow. X-craft surfaced to ventilate three or four times every 24 hours for approximately 15 minutes during which time speed was reduced. The average speed made good over this period was approximately:

- "T" class submarines . . . 10 knots.
- "S" class submarines . . . 8½ knots.

33. With the arrival of photographs, flown to this country from Russia by Catalina, of the preliminary Spitfire sorties, a detailed interpretation of the net defences was carried out and on 15th September the results were signalled to the submarines taking part in the operation. The presence of LUTZOW in Langfiord was confirmed by P.R. on the 14th September which also showed TIRPITZ and SCHARNHORST in Kaafiord, and the geographical positions of these ships were signalled to the submarines and Target Plan No. 4 ordered.

Target Plan No. 4 allocated X.5, X.6 and X.7 to attack TIRPITZ, X.9 and X.10 to attack SCHARNHORST, and X.8 LUTZOW.

*15th September.*

34. At 0400Z on the 15th September, when X.8 was being towed by SEANYMPH at 8 knots, the tow parted X.8, who was dived at the time, surfaced five minutes later, but, although the visibility was estimated at 5 miles, there was no sign of the SEANYMPH X.8's estimated position at that time was latitude 69° 04' N. 08° 14' E. At 0430Z, X.8 set course 029°, speed 3 knots, on main engines.

35. The fact of the tow parting was not immediately apparent to the SEANYMPH, and it was not until 0600Z, when X.8 was due to surface to ventilate, that it became apparent.

*Admiralty footnote —*

\* The Commanding Officers of the towing submarines, and of the operational and passage crews of the X-craft were —

TRUCULENT		Lieut. R. L. Alexander, D.S.O., R.N.
X. 6	(Passage)	Lieut. D. Cameron, R.N.R., Lieut. A. Wilson, R.N.V.R.
SYRTIS		Lieut. M. H. Jupp, D.S.C., R.N.
X. 9	(Passage)	Lieut. T. L. Martin, R.N.; Sub-Lieut. E. Kearon, R.N.V.R.
THRASHER		Lieut. A. R. Hezlet, D.S.C., R.N.
X. 5	(Passage)	Lieut. H. Henty-Creer, R.N.V.R.; Lieut. J. V. Terry-Lloyd, S.A.N.F.
SEANYMPH		Lieut. J. P. H. Oakley, D.S.C., R.N.
X. 8	(Passage)	Lieut. B. M. McFarlane, R.A.N., Lieut. J. Smart, R.N.V.R.
STUBBORN		Lieut. A. A. Duff, R.N.
X. 7	(Passage)	Lieut. B. C. G. Place, D.S.C., R.N., Lieut. P. H. Philip, S.A.N.F.
SCEPTRE		Lieut. I. S. McIntosh, M.B.E., D.S.C., R.N.
X. 10	(Passage)	Lieut. K. R. Hudspeth, R.A.N.V.R., Sub-Lieut. E. V. Page, R.N.V.R.

The operational crews of the X-craft were embarked in the towing submarines and the