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From the Camp at Portella, June 25. N. S.

ON the 11th Instant, when we were encamped before Balaguer, advice was brought to Marschal Staremberg, that the Enemy had left their Camp at Corbins, and passed the Segra that Morning, in order to attack us. Upon this Intelligence the Marschal immediately drew up our Army in an advantageous Post between some Mountains on the Left of Balaguer, ordered the Tents and Baggage to cross the River into the Town, and commanded the Army to lie under their Arms all that Night. On the 12th in the Morning we perceived twelve of the Enemy's Squadrons advancing towards us in order of Battle; but on our firing some Cannon they retired behind the Hills, by the same Road wherein they approached us. We saw no more of the Enemy all that Day: However, our Army was commanded to continue under Arms all the Night following. On the 13th, at four in the Morning, we perceived their whole Army marching towards us in a Line of Battle, in order to attack us on the Left. Some of their Parties had the day before observed the situation of our Camp on that side, where Lieutenant-General Stanhope was posted with the English Forces under his Command; at ten they came up within Cannon-shot, their Right Wing marching between the Mountains to attack us in the Flank of our Left, at the same time that their Left advanced in the Plain, in order to wheel about and attack us in our Front. Our Cannon began to play upon them with such Success, as to put in disorder several of their Squadrons and Battalions, and we could perceive that whole Ranks were swept off, as well of Horse as Foot, at each Wing. After the Discharge of one hundred and forty Shot, their whole Army halted for some time, and about one in the Afternoon they faced about, and retired. The number of their killed, as we have since learned by Deserters, and such of their wounded as they could not carry off, amounts to three hundred Men, among whom were a Colonel, a Lieutenant Colonel, four Captains and three Lieutenants. Notwithstanding the Superiority of their Numbers, the Advantage of our Post, the Alacrity and good Disposition of our Troops, gave us great Expectations of Success, in case of an Engagement, and the King appeared every where with great Cheerfulness and Resolution. As the Enemy were retiring, General Stanhope charged at the Head of our English Cavalry the Horse of their Right Wing, which he put into some Confusion, but received Orders from Marschal Staremberg to March no further; his Horse was wounded under him in two Places in the Pursuit. On the 13th at Night the Marschal ordered a Bridge of Boats to be laid over the Segra below Balaguer, which was completed at two in the Morning. On the 14th the Army marched over that River, and the Marschal resolved to pass the Noguera, to possess himself of the Camp at Corbins, which the Enemy left when they passed the Segra, to attack us at the Camp of Balaguer; but by the first Intelligence we had of the Enemy, they were making Preparations to re-pass the Segra with the utmost Expedition, and were marching to prevent us from taking their Camp; for which reason General Stanhope, who commanded the Cavalry, and had reached the Noguera at 4 in the Afternoon, perceiving some Squadrons of the Enemy's Horse on the other side of the Segra, (and being apprehensive that they might cross that River, and possess themselves of their Camp before he could send to Marschal Staremberg, and receive his Orders to pass the Noguera,) resolved to ford it immediately, and tho' the Stream was very rapid, he passed the River at Corbins, and made himself Master of the Enemy's Camp, where he found a great quantity of Forage. At the same time Count Alalaya passed with the Right Wing at Alboras, and lost only 1000 Horsemen and Dragoons, who were torn down by the Current in his Passage. The Foot

came up at seven in the Evening; but we could not easily lay our pontoons, because of the rapidity of the Stream, insomuch that the Troops were obliged to halt, and lye all Night on their Arms, and the Marschal himself at the Head of them. The Bridges were finished with great Difficulty at three in the Morning of the 15th; and that Day all the Infantry marched over, and at Noon the whole Army took this Camp at Portella, which the Quarter-Master and Adjutant-Generals think more advantageous than that of Corbins. General Stanhope being advised that the Enemy's Army had stretched towards the Segra, believed they designed to attack him with their Horse, whereas they are much superior, before our Foot could get over the River, he therefore lay all Night on the Ground at the Head of the Cavalry, prepared to receive them. The next Morning we had Advice by Deserters, that the Enemy despairing to regain their Camp, had resolved to stay on the other side of the Segra, and endeavour to intercept our Provisions, and cut off our Communication. This Project cannot be executed without great Difficulty, all the neighbouring part of Arragon being entirely in our Interests, whereas the Enemy must suffer in Catalonia, where the Country is as entirely averse to them. On the 16th and 17th we had Intelligence, that the Enemy remained encamped at Ivars, and had sent Parties to Cervera and Agramont, in expectation of finding some of our Magazines of Corn; but we had taken Precaution to remove our Stores from those Places. They also attempted to possess themselves of Cataff; but one hundred Men who retired from Cervera got into the Place before their Arrival, and prevented them, and in their retreat the Peasants of the neighbouring Country killed several of their Men. On the 18th we had Advice, that the Enemy had brought out of Lerida some pontoons, and four Pieces of Cannon, in order as they gave out, to pass the Segra, and cut off our Communication with Balaguer, by which way we must necessarily be supplied with Provisions, and secure our Retreat. Marschal Staremberg having received this Intelligence, immediately ordered Major-General Goatracout to pass the Noguera with a Detachment of eight Companies of Grenadiers, and the same number of Squadrons, with Instructions to encamp on the Banks of the Segra, and observe the Motions of the Enemy; so that should the Enemy attempt to pass the River, such timely Notice might be dispatched to the General, that he may March and attack them before one half of their Army can get over. On the 19th our Parties brought in seventeen Troopers with their Horses. On the 20th they took 2 Captains, a Lieutenant, a Cornet and twenty Men, with their Horses, and brought them Prisoners to the Camp. On the 21st the Partizan Gran Jan came in with ten Mules and ten Horses, which he took from the Enemy; and at the same time we had Advice, that General Nebott, who commanded the Miquellets in the Mountains between Tortosa and Mequinenza upon the Elro, had taken two hundred Mules and one hundred Horses of the Enemy, as they were Foraging. On the 23d the Enemy, who had quitted their Enterprize on the Castle of Cataff, returned to the Attack with four Pieces of Cannon, and it is reported they have taken that Place, which may incommode our Convoys; but we have still a secure Communication by the way of Mandress, Cardona and Solsons, through the Mountains of the Conca de Trem to Balaguer, and from thence to the Camp; and it will be very difficult for the Enemy to molest our Convoys, since if they sent any Troops that way, they would not only very much weaken the main Body of their Army, and be in danger of being destroyed by the Miquellets; but also the Passes are in several Places inaccessable, and in others so narrow, that they can March but one a breast, and a small number may oppose the Progress of an Army. We have Advice of the Arrival of the Grafson and Chesham Men of War, with the Lord Rocfort's Regiment of Dragoons, and several Italian Recruits.

Turin