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Vienna, September 30, N. S.

THE Emperor's circular Letter to all his Ministers in Foreign Courts, has been printed and published here, and is as follows.

YOU was informed, at the Time it hap- pen'd, of the Circumstances that related to the imprudent and unfortunate Attack of Krotzka. Notwithstanding our repeated Orders to advance without Delay towards the Morava, Count Wallis gave the Enemy Time to post themselves at Semendria; and that was the Source of all the Disasters which followed. Upon several frivolous Pretex- ts, and strained Constructions of the Orders he received, he stayed longer than he ought in the Lines of Belgrade, by which the Cavalry first began to suffer. The great Complaints this occasioned, did at length determine him to make some Motions; but it was so late before he took that Determination, that the Enemy had already not only prevented him at Semendria, but also at the important Post of Krotzka.

He, Count Wallis, had been ordered several Times, that in Case the Grand Visier should come to meet him, he should give him Battle, not with separate Bodies, but with the whole Army drawn together: Yet directly contrary to those Orders, Count Wallis, after having let the most precious Time slip, under the Pretence of waiting for the Body of Troops commanded by Count Neiperg, all of a sudden took a Resolution not only not to wait any longer for that Body, but even to make an Attack with what Cavalry he had with him and 18 Companies of Grenadiers, and this on a Post where the great Difficulty of acting with the Cavalry was not unknown to him.

He sent Advice of this Resolution the 21st of July, and under Colour of the Danger there would be in delaying, he immediately put it in Execution.

This Advice did not come hither till the 26th of the same Month, and he made the Attack on the 22^d at Day-break.

Notwithstanding the advantageous Situation of the Enemy, the Valour of the Troops would in all Probability have surmounted all Difficulties, had they been conducted otherwise than they were; but they were not allowed Time to form themselves, and the Attack was made in a Manner contrary to all military Rules: Which could never have been foreseen, from so experienced a General as Count Wallis is. Such an Attack could not but have the bad Success it had: It is even surprizing, that the Horse being broken and put into Disorder, the Foot alone could, in the Midst of the Victory, stop the Impetuosity of so active an Enemy as the Turks are. So that at Krotzka it was not the Troops that failed, but the Conduct was wrong: And what the Infantry did perform, is a convincing Proof of what might have been hoped for, if waiting for the Body under Count Neiperg, the Attack had been made in right Order of Battle.

As the Number of the killed and wounded in this Action did not exceed 6000 Men, and the Body led by Count Neiperg, which afterwards joyn'd Count Wallis, was double that Number, the fatal Consequences which ensued might well have been prevented; if, instead of reinforcing the Army (as we had ordered) by all the Means possible, it had not been further ruined, (for unhappily the Troops suffer'd much more by the very toilsome Motions and Marches that followed, than they had at Krotzka;) and if the Means that were practicable for reinforcing them, had not been slighted, till it was too late. Good Use might also have been made of the Advantage gained at Panchova, if, pursuant to the Advice of the other Generals, the Troops had been led on to Vipalanka; but Count Wallis had not made the necessary Dispositions for that Purpose.

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