

lution premature. Your Majesty will run the Risk of Accidents, which are not suitable to your high Person: I think that you should first, before all, wait for the Compleating of that Army, by the Junction of the French, the Palatins, the Cannon, and the Pontons; and that even before that, Seckendorff should not advance too much, to run the Risk that the Austrians, spreading the Report that they are hastening towards Passau, and the Frontiers of Austria and Bohemia, should return with Force upon him, and give him a Blow, or at least make him retreat precipitately, which, as Affairs are, would be extremely prejudicial. Your Imperial Majesty will therefore be pleased to consider, how much more fatal it would be, if you were there in Person, or if only, when you should be there, you should meet with Obstructions to stop you. And, even though the Austrians should have retreated a good Way towards Passau, I do not think that your Majesty should join your Army before Seckendorff is Master of Donawerth, and of the Lech, in order to your Imperial Majesty's being able to march forward. I must submit one Thing more to your Majesty, which is, that if you go so soon to the Army, and that you require Marshal Belleisle to attend you, you take away, too soon, the only Man here about the King, who is for your Majesty and for the King my Master, and give Room to Belleisle's Enemies to work against him; whereas going later, Belleisle might employ himself in causing all the French Troops, which will not be wanted at Fribourg, to advance into Suabia, on the Side of the Iller; and as they would then give him the Command, he might, according to the Wants of that Body of Troops, go and return to your Imperial Majesty's Army, and to your Person, and second your Enterprizes. Nay, Belleisle would work with his most Christian Majesty, and has already got Tancin and Argenfon, as well as the Comptroller General, to join in his Sentiments; that is to say, that it may be the Troops of France who make the Siege of Ingolstadt, to the End that your Imperial Majesty's whole Army may go to the Inn and to Passau. I beseech your Imperial Majesty to reflect upon all this. Moreover, Sir, it appears to me, that it is no longer expedient, that your Majesty should have such punctilious Regards for the Princes and Circles, but that the Time is come, that *it must either bend, or break*, and that any Neutrality in the Empire can no longer subsist. It will be Right immediately to declare to the Circles of Suabia and Franconia, that they must be for or against the Head of the Empire; that your Majesty cannot now go on, upon any other Foot with your Allies, in order to the Recovery of your Estates, and your Support in the Possession of them: That for this Effect, the Communication with your Allies through Suabia and Franconia, was indispensably neces-

sary to you, and that Germany could not be torn to Pieces by two Factions.

I am, with the most profound Veneration,  
S I R,

Your Sacred Imperial Majesty's  
most humble and most obedient,  
Metz, Sept. 13, 1744. the Marshal Count de Schmettau.

N<sup>o</sup> 2.

Extract of Count Schmettau's Relation, wrote to the King of Prussia from Metz, September 16, 1744.

Argenson complained afterwards of Seckendorff's Manner of acting, who, not only gave him no Advice of his March, nor of his Views and Designs, though it would have been necessary for their co-operating in Conformity, but also, that M. de Seckendorff seemed to have Views quite different from those which I, as well as Mortagne, had given the Ministry here to understand; and that all this came but indirectly to him, through the Marshal de Noailles, who did not however himself, in any Manner, approve Seckendorff's Design of drawing with his Army to the left Side of the Danube, towards the Country of Anspach, and the Upper Palatinate, pretending to conform to your Majesty's Will. But as, in your Majesty's Letter of the 31st of August, the most Christian King had read, that your Intentions were, that the Imperial Army should be put in a Condition to follow the Enemy, and to enter, N. B. into Bavaria, they could not combine this Idea of Seckendorff's, which seemed quite opposite with what he would make Marshal Noailles believe was the Will of your Majesty. Marshal Belleisle being at the Door, Count d'Argenson called him in, and the Discourse was concerning Seckendorff's Designs, and the Emperor's Intention of setting out the 17th of September to join his Army: Thereupon Belleisle drew out of his Pocket two Letters from Mortagne, dated from Lauffen upon the Neckar, if I mistake not, the 11th or 12th of September, which set forth, in a very sensible Manner, the Dissatisfaction at the Proceedings of the Imperial Army; that it wanted Forage, because it had been refused; that the States of Suabia were not to deliver any, in order to make an Advantage rather of the Undertakers, and pay ready Money for Bread and Forage. He wrote farther, that General Seckendorff availing himself of your Majesty's Will, seemed still to have an Idea of marching towards Franconia, saying, that he would turn afterwards towards Passau; but that he (Mortagne) saw clearly that all that tended only to his going on the Side of Anspach and Nuremberg, and to cause the Provisions and Forage to be paid for, hinting very intelligibly, that there was neither Rhime nor Reason, but only Views of Interest in that Affair.